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I. INTRODUCTION
As international law underwent a profound transformation in the
twentieth century, two movements in particular led the transformation: the
international human rights movement and the movement to unify private law.
Both developments challenged the international regime that had predominated
since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia.1 The human rights movement did so by
rejecting the premise that nation-states are the sole actors on the international
stage and that international law exists to serve their interests. It posited a
contrary set of premises: international law exists to foster the freedom and
dignity of the individual, and the international legal system must subject states
to accountability in their treatment of individuals, including their own citizens.
The Westphalian regime also came under attack from a second source, the
unification movement, which was directed at a particular byproduct of the
nation-state's rise to dominance: legal fragmentation, exemplified by the
creation of national legal codes intended to embody the spirit of particular
nation-states rather than their common legal patrimony. These codes moved
nearly every country in Europe (with ripple effects on the legal systems of
overseas colonies) toward a conception of private law that celebrated
particular national characteristics. 2 In the face of this trend, the unification
movement of the twentieth century sought to restore not only the unity of
European law, but also a conception of law that was less a product of
positivism and more an expression of universalism.
Initially, the human rights movement and the unification movement
complemented one another. Each provided a potent critique of positivism as
applied to lawmaking by the modem nation-state and championed
universalism instead. Both rejected the view that law should be the
embodiment of the national character or spirit. Human rights law found its
source in the universal human spirit, not in national particularism. For the
1. With the end of the Thirty Years War, the Peace of Westphalia ushered in a sharp decline
in the temporal power of the Catholic Church, the slow disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire, and
the emergence of distinct nation-states. After Westphalia, it was increasingly these nation-states that
claimed the allegiance of the individual, and the prerogatives of these new entities and their dealings
with one another became the dominant themes of international law. See generally WILHELM G. GREWE,
THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael Byers trans., 2000).
2. See, e.g., Hugh Collins, European Private Law and the Cultural Identitfy of States, 3 EUR.
REV. PT-v. L. 353, 353 (1995) (arguing that "the private law systems of the [EU] Member States
represent an intrinsic part of their culture and traditions" and that proposals for uniformity represent an
"excess of centralisation").
2005] Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization 213
unification movement, the jus commune embodied centuries of custom and
tradition from across the entire European continent.
Despite these initial similarities, the human rights movement and the
unification movement have grown apart. As they have scored important
victories over the old regime, they have grown more ambitious, and the
differences between them have become more apparent. One major difference
stems from their divergent orientations toward procedural law and process-
oriented values. For the unification movement, procedural values such as
predictability and regularity lie at the heart of its vision for the future of
international law. If the unification of private law is to be achieved, it will
occur through multilateralism, transparency, and inclusiveness. Agreement on
common principles of private law will require keeping unilateralism in check
and including multiple legal traditions in the final product.
In contrast, the importance of process-oriented values to the human
rights movement has declined in recent years, as human rights advocates have
devoted less effort to those national legal systems that function relatively well
(where only fine-tuning is needed), and instead have addressed the wholesale
denial of rights taking place in large parts of the world, where legal systems
are either under authoritarian control or non-functional. It is not difficult to
understand why. In the immediate post-World War II era, human rights
supporters drafted seminal texts articulating rights and creating international
institutions to oversee compliance. These efforts largely failed to change the
situation on the ground. Treaties did not prevent mass killings in Cambodia,
South America, or Africa. U.N. monitoring committees did not dislodge
profoundly unjust and oppressive regimes. Human rights nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) in particular adopted a greater focus on the most acute
and systemic human rights violations. 3 A new subfield--call it "atrocity
law"-exerted increasing influence on the human rights movement as a
whole, creating a shift in emphasis from procedural due process to holding
perpetrators accountable and providing remedies to victims.
As these differences widen, the tension between the two movements can
be expected to increase. This dynamic is especially powerful in their
competing blueprints for the future of national courts. The human rights
movement sees national courts as the institutions best situated 4 to become, in
effect, the global system's courts of first instance for adjudicating alleged
violations of the most fundamental individual rights. A major obstacle,
however, must be overcome: existing national procedural laws that were never
intended for such an undertaking. The human rights movement's response is
to demand procedural innovation. National courts must be armed with
3. I mean to refer to the most serious offenses against human dignity-genocide, torture,
ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and offenses of similar gravity-many of which are the
subject of multilateral treaties. I focus on these offenses not because the human rights movement has lost
interest in freedom of speech, the death penalty, and other human rights issues, but because in the last
decade in particular a great deal of the movement's resources has been devoted to the after-effects of
genocide in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, the creation of the International Criminal Court, and
efforts to address atrocities in Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere. See, e.g., HUM. RTs. WATCH,
WORLD REPORT 1999, Introduction, available at http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/intro/index.html
(noting that more than 200 NGOs attended the Rome Conference in 1998).
4. National courts are best situated in terms of resources, enforcement powers, and prestige.
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procedural rules better suited to the task, even if such new rules conflict with
long-standing principles of procedural law.
5
The unification movement sees the future differently. It regards national
courts as oases of constancy. It sees cause for concern in the call for unilateral
innovation in hopes of realizing an ambitious new conception of global
justice. According to the unification movement, national judges have a
humbler calling. They must provide a reliable forum for resolving
transnational disputes of all kinds. To do so, they must act with restraint,
maximize predictability for litigants, and cooperate with courts elsewhere to
form a coherent global system of courts working with each other in order to
minimize differences in outcome resulting from differences in forum.
These competing visions are now having an impact on many aspects of
procedural law, from rules of evidence to choice-of-law rules, from the limits
of national court jurisdiction to limits on the extent to which courts in one
country will recognize and enforce the judgments of courts elsewhere. A brief
look at a recent transnational human rights suit illustrates the extent of the
potential conflict.
During World War II, the Nazi regime compelled approximately ten
million people to work as slave laborers. Most worked for private German
companies, often under horrific conditions. By the 1990s, approximately one
million former slave laborers were still alive. Few had received compensation.
Class action lawsuits were filed in New York against the leading German
companies that had maintained slave labor forces during the war.6 These suits
were eventually settled in the context of a treaty between the United States
and Germany.7
Had these suits gone forward, difficult issues of procedural law would
have loomed ahead. Under New York choice-of-law rules-whether those in
effect during the war years or those operative at the time of the suit-there
were forceful arguments that the law of Germany (the place of the wrong)
applied to most of the substantive issues. Applying German law might have
resulted in no recovery for the plaintiff class if, for example, German law
defined enslavement in a way that denied recovery to most claimants, or if it
provided airtight defenses to the defendants. 9 The statute of limitations was
5. As one political scientist critical of legalism puts it, "[t]he application of municipal law to
war crimes is in many ways the legal equivalent of a bad analogy. The worst crimes in Western law are
utterly pallid next to crimes against humanity." GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE
12(2000).
6. See, e.g., Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999). Among the
defendants were Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, Daimler Benz AG, Degussa AG, I.B. Farben AG,
Leica Camera AG, Siemens AG, and Volkswagen AG. See Christopher Rhoads, German Companies
Face U.S. Lawsuits over Slave Labor, WALL ST. J. (INT'L), Sept. 1, 1998, at A14.
7. See Agreement Concerning the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and the
Future," July 17, 2000, U.S.-F.R.G., reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 1298 (2000).
8. Moreover, New York's public policy exception in the context of choice of law is narrow.
See, e.g., Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99 (1918) (refusing to invoke public
policy exception unless applying law other than that of the forum would "violate some fundamental
principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the
common weal"); accord Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 66, 78 (1993).
9. See MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN
AMERICA'S COURTs 69 (2003) (discussing defendants' claim that they used slave laborers under
governmental compulsion).
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also a point of controversy. Under both German and New York laws, the
statute seemed to have expired. In some transnational human rights cases,
however, U.S. courts had ruled that the statute of limitations ceased to run
during periods when the plaintiffs did not know about their claim or faced
formidable obstacles in pursuing it.10 Finally, there were questions concerning
the application of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in this
context. The circumstances of enslavement varied tremendously among the
members of the plaintiff class, most notably between those who were Jewish
(viewed as expendable) and those who were not (seen as long-term labor
assets). Existing class action law in the United States suggested that if the case
were viewed as an ordinary class action suit, the plaintiff class might not
qualify for certification because of lack of commonality or, alternatively, that
there might be a need for several subclasses.' 1
For human rights advocates, the three procedural issues in this case
could not be resolved as if this were a run-of-the-mill case. The norms at issue
were anything but ordinary. Rather than focus on the place of the wrong, the
nationality of the parties, the governmental interests involved, and other
factors typically employed in conflict-of-laws jurisprudence, human rights
activists maintained that national judges should focus on vindicating the
interest of the international community in enforcing a universal norm as
important as the prohibition on slavery. With jus cogens 12 norms at stake, a
domestic court in New York or elsewhere should view itself as part of an
international system of tribunals providing remedies to victims of grave
offenses.
Others saw the matter differently. The defendants, supported by business
entities from many countries, decried what they saw as the growing resort by
U.S. courts to novel and sometimes result-oriented procedural approaches in
human rights litigation. If ordinary choice-of-law rules led to the application
of German law on various substantive law questions, why should German law
be treated as presumptively suspect? To override the statutorily indicated law
by resorting to some heretofore unannounced choice-of-law methodology
would create uncertainty and irresistible opportunities for forum shopping.
10. See, e.g., Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 68-69 (D.D.C. 1998)
(allowing equitable tolling for victims of terrorism during time period in which Iran was protected from
suit by virtue of sovereign immunity); Nat'l Coalition Gov't of Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176
F.R.D. 329, 360 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (discussing equitable tolling as "available where (1) defendant's
wrongful conduct prevented plaintiff from asserting the claim or (2) extraordinary circumstances outside
the plaintiff's control made it impossible to timely assert the claim").
11. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814-24 (1985) (choice of law
issues may block class certification because constitutional limitations on choice of law must be
respected even in large class actions); Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 910-12 (7th Cir.
2003) (certifying class only with respect to one common question of causation and refusing to certify it
with respect to individual claims of harm); Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co, 178 F.R.D. 493, 497-98 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (denying certification to national class for failure to meet commonality requirement in the face of
the "nuances of 50 consumer fraud statutes"). Cf also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Co., 527 U.S. 815 (1999)
(tightening the standard for certifying a limited fund class action).
12. A jus cogens norm, also called a "peremptory norm," is binding on all states regardless of
whether or not they have ratified a treaty incorporating that norm and regardless of whether they have
consistently dissented from recognizing its jus cogens character. See Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344 ("[A] peremptory norm of international law is a
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted.").
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The same argument was potentially true for any court's ruling on certification.
A relaxed reading of Rule 23's commonality requirement would give
additional momentum to making the United States a plaintiff haven for human
rights suits against foreign corporations. Eventually, there would be a
backlash. Courts elsewhere would less readily cooperate with U.S. courts.
Efforts to create global rules of procedure would be frustrated.
The problem is pervasive. As Part IV illustrates in detail, similar
tensions arise between procedural laws that advance the global interest in
multilateralism and ones tending toward unilateralism with respect to personal
jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, evidentiary privileges, and recognition
of foreign judgments. These rules may soon be caught in a crossfire-with
those who desire to bring about uniformity for the sake of an international
legal order based on greater cooperation and predictability on one side, and
those who resist uniformity in the name of more effective enforcement of
basic human rights norms on the other.
This Article examines efforts to deploy domestic courts around the
world to implement the human rights policies not only of their own countries
but of the international community as a whole. It argues that this development
has run into a stumbling block not foreseen by human rights advocates who,
during the formative years of the human rights movement, all but ignored the
field of private international law. In retrospect, this lack of engagement with
private international law appears to have been a mistake. Similarly, few of
those lawyers and legal scholars deeply engaged in unification of procedural
law saw a conflict with human rights on the horizon. Thus, as one
harmonization project after another was launched and as human rights
advocates scored victories on several procedural fronts (for example,
expanding the jurisdiction of national courts, extending or eliminating statutes
of limitations, adapting class action techniques to human rights claims), no
one was especially alert to the likelihood that advances in human rights
enforcement would become a perceived threat to the priorities of global
business and others with vested interests in the existing principles of private
international law. The result is that two movements at the heart of liberal
internationalism in the twentieth century are poised for conflict in the twenty-
first. Unless steps are taken to mediate this conflict, its intensification likely
will harm both movements and the international legal system's ability to
manage globalism. The present work argues that the most promising path to
mediating the conflict lies in a new unification initiative, an effort to identify a
narrow but important category of cases involving the most grave human rights
offenses-what one might call atrocity cases-and to harmonize the
procedural rules applied in such cases by different national legal systems.
Part II traces the growth of the unification movement in the twentieth
century with a particular focus on procedural law. These efforts aimed to
create a legal regime that was more intellectually coherent, more hospitable to
transnational business, and more supportive of the political integration of
Western Europe. From a modest beginning, the movement to unify procedural
law produced, by century's end, a set of important legal instruments.
European states, especially members of the European Union (EU), took the
216
2005] Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization 217
lead in this endeavor, producing a continental European approach to
procedural law unification. As the century drew to a close, the influence of
this approach was expanding. Cornerstones were laid for global principles of
contract law, 13 transnational rules of civil procedure, 14 a global regime for
transnational bankruptcies,' s a regime for the worldwide recognition of civil
judgments, 16 and global rules of jurisdiction.
17
Part III turns to the human rights movement, which in the decades after
World War II produced a series of landmark texts articulating fundamental
rights. These texts were widely ratified but also widely ignored. In response,
the emphasis of the human rights movement shifted. Increasingly, its
resources were directed at a short list of grave human rights violations
typically associated with a complete breakdown in rights protection. The
movement also became increasingly focused on developing mechanisms for
punishing violators and compensating victims. Frustrated in its efforts to
create international tribunals to perform these functions, it turned to domestic
courts. This turn to domestic courts as a potential solution to the under-
enforcement of human rights law, however, revealed institutions that offered
the bitter with the sweet: national courts had the resources and stature to
undertake the job, but their procedural rules were poorly suited to the task.
The human rights movement responded with calls for changes in those
procedural rules-changes that ran counter to the proposals for the unification
of procedural law.
Part IV presents a series of hypothetical cases designed to illustrate the
conflict between the conception of procedural law promoted by the unification
movement and that promoted by human rights advocates. These cases show
the conflict at work in such aspects of procedural law as assertions of
jurisdiction, class action mechanisms; forum-shifting doctrines, statutes of
limitations, retroactivity, evidentiary privileges, and recognition of foreign
judgments.
Part V considers and ultimately rejects the manner in which this tension
is currently being managed-by directing atrocity cases to separate tribunals,
such as the new international criminal tribunals and various hybrid courts. It
proposes instead that human rights advocates focus less on creating unique
fora and more on developing widely accepted rules of procedure applicable in
cases arising from extreme human rights violations, rules that will apply
regardless of which court (international, domestic, or hybrid) applies them.
13. See INT'L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW (UNIDROIT), PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (1994), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm [hereinafter UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS].
14. See Am. Law Inst., ALIUNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil
Procedure, Proposed Final Draft, http://www.ali.org (May 19, 2004) [hereinafter ALI/UNIDROIT
Principles] (the Principles and their accompanying Comments were approved at ALI's 2004 annual
meeting, subject to editorial revisions); see also notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, G.A. Res. S2/158, U.N.
GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/S2/158 (1998).
16. See generally SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER, THE PROPOSED HAGUE CONVENTION ON
JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: TRANS-ATLANTIC LAWMAKING FOR TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION (2003).
17. Id.
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That is, the task at hand is harmonizing the procedural rules that govern the
enforcement of human rights law in national legal systems.
II. PRIVATE LAW HARMONIZATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
As the twentieth century began, private law differed greatly from
country to country and even among regions within the same nation. By the
end of the century, these differences had narrowed significantly. The fruits of
this convergence are easily seen. In contract law, for example, unification has
produced watershed achievements. More than sixty countries have ratified the
U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),'
8
enabling parties to opt out of the uncertainty caused by differences in national
laws. Use of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) Principles of International Commercial Contracts 19 has
increased, reflecting the desire among commercial parties to incorporate non-
national sources of contract law into their agreements. Elsewhere, a series of
multilateral treaties has improved various aspects of financing, 20 thereby
lowering the costs of many international transactions. Public law, too, reflects
this movement toward convergence. Not long ago, trade in goods was
regulated by a motley collection of national laws, many of which were highly
protectionist. Inconsistent national tariffs, quantitative restrictions, health and
safety rules, and various other legal complexities hampered suppliers of
goods. Much, though not all, of this web of conflicting and overlapping rules
has yielded to greater uniformity. The World Trade Organization (WTO), the
North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the EU governing bodies,
the World Intellectual Property Organization, and other institutions have done
much to build consensus on key elements of world trade.2' Along with these
developments, procedural law has also been the focus of concerted efforts at
harmonization.
18. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 10,
1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980) [hereinafter CISG]. A
current list of countries that are party to the CISG can be found at CISG: List of Contracting States, at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html (Dec. 15, 2004).
19. UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 13.
For regional developments in this field, see COMM'N ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW pts. I & II (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000); Communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European Contract Law, 2001 O.J. (C JSS)
1; Jirgen Basedow, A Common Contract Law for the Common Market, 33 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 1169
(1996); Ole Lando, European Contract Law After the Year 2000, 35 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 821 (1998).
20. See UNIDROIT Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001,
http://www.unidroit.orglenglish/conventions/mobile-equipment/aircraftprotocol.pdf [hereinafter Aircraft
Equipment Protocol]; UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16,
2001, http://www.unidroit.orglenglish/conventions/mobile-equipment/mobile-equipment.pdf
[hereinafter Mobile Equipment Convention]; UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring, May
28, 1988, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 925 (1988), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/imnplement/i-
88-f.htn [hereinafter Factoring Convention]; UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial
Leasing, May 28, 1988, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 923 (1988), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-88-l.htm [hereinafter Financial Leasing Convention].
21. See generally John 0. McFinnis & Mark Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114
HARV. L. REv. 511 (2000).
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A. The Origins and Ideologies of Modern Private Law Harmonization
The harmonization of procedural law, from the outset, was a project
conceived and guided by elites.22 Because of the intensity and duration of
their influence on this process, three such elites warrant special focus: (1)
scholars and intellectuals in search of common legal principles and intellectual
coherence; (2) business and commercial interests eager to remove obstacles to
transborder trade; and (3) political elites convinced that private law unification
could widen economic and political integration among states in a specific
geographic region. Each elite was present at the start of the modem
unification movement, and each continues to influence the process today.
1. Scholars and Intellectuals
The origins of the international unification movement are closely tied to
the birth of modem comparative law, which has always been one of its
intellectual engines. The First International Congress of Comparative Law met
in Paris in 1900, just after the founding of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law.23 At that time, the Hague Conference consisted solely of
European countries; likewise, European legal scholars dominated the new
field of comparative law and wrote many of the reports of the Congress,
which proved hugely important for the new discipline. 24 Several themes
dominate these Congresses and the scholarly literature of this period:
universalism, empiricism, and the rise of comparative law as "legal science."
This early view of comparative law had a strong impact on the new
enterprise of juridical harmonization. Many of the scholars who took part in
the new venture sought to emulate the natural and social sciences. They
believed that comparative law, like chemistry, could be both pure science and
22. A notable exception is the harmonization produced by international arbitration. See infra
Part II.B.2. In contrast, much of the convergence in substantive law has been from the bottom up,
originating in trade usages and other preexisting commercial practices. In contract law, for instance,
perhaps the most important source of harmonized rules is preexisting trade usage. See, e.g., CISG, supra
note 18, art. 9.2; UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, supra note 13, art. 1.8; U.C.C. §
1-205 (1995).
23. The first session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law met in 1893 in
The Netherlands. The organization held six sessions between 1893 and 1928. After World War 11, it was
reconstituted with a new foundational statute as a permanent intergovernmental organization. See Statute
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Oct. 9, 1951, 15 U.S.T. 2228, 220 U.N.T.S. 12,
available at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/text01e.html [hereinafter Hague Conference Statute].
For additional details about its history and methods of operation, see Georges A.L. Droz, A Comment on
the Role of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994);
HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, ACTES DE LA PREMItRE SESSION DE LA CONFtRENCE DE
LA HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (1893).
24. See David S. Clark, Nothing New in 2000? Comparative Law in 1900 and Today, 75 TUL.
L. REV. 871, 881 (2001).
25. For literature on legal science during this period, especially in Germany, see JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 30-
32 (2d ed. 1985); Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth Century German Legal Science, 31 B.C. L. REV. 837,
842 (1990); Symposium, Savigny in Modern Comparative Perspective, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1989);
Susan Gaylord Gale, Note, A Very German Legal Science: Savigny and the Historical School, 18 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 123 (1982). For the roots of legal science much earlier in European legal development, see
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 120-
64 (1983).
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applied science. In the latter form it could produce great social benefits.26 As
one reporter at the first Congress commented, comparative law was a "vast
experimental field, in which the legislator can observe the effects of reform
that have been attempted within diverse civilized nations.,
27
The early meetings of the Hague Conference were planted in this
optimistic soil. They were dominated by comparativists from continental
Europe, and these meetings left an indelible imprint on the Hague Conference
as an institution and on procedural law unification as a scholarly pursuit. This
imprint was to endure even after common law countries joined the process in
earnest decades later. 28 The influence of continental scholars was both
scientific and aesthetic. National laws were a vast pool of data in which the
scholar had to be immersed. 29 Empirical rigor was needed to identify the
common core of human experience in private law on the way toward the
"progressive unification of the rules of private international law."
The work of these individuals and organizations was also influenced by
a continental aesthetic: a tradition of structured codes rather than case-by-case
determination; a strong preference for precise rules rather than loose
standards; an orientation toward binding texts rather than model laws; 31 an
admiration for the simple and the orderly and a distaste for judicial
26. See, e.g., RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 47-52 (6th ed. 1998). This
view of comparative law as applied science is especially associated with the German scholar Ernst
Rabel. By the 1940s, Rabel's approach had become a kind of orthodoxy in Germany and also in the
United States. See David S. Clark, The Influence of Ernst Rabel on American Law, in DER EINFLUSS
DEUTSCHER EMIGRANTEN AUF DIE RECHTSENTWICHLUNG IN DEN USA UND IN DEUTSCHLAND 107
(Marcus Lutter et al. eds., 1993). For an argument that legal science is back, in the context of European
integration, see Reinhard Zimmermann, Civil Code and Civil Law: The Europeanization of Private Law
Within the European Community and the Re-emergence of a European Legal Science, 1 COLUM. J. EUR.
L. 63, 68 (1994-1995).
27. See Session du Congres: Proc~s-Verbaux Sommaires (SEances du ler Aout: ler Section),
in 1 CONGRES INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT COMPARt: PROCES-VERBAUX DES StANCES ET DOCUMENTS 36
(1905) (trans. by author). Use of the metaphor persists. See SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 26, at 47
(describing the difference between pure scholars of comparative law and those seeking to use the
insights of comparative law for private law unification as "roughly analogous to that which natural
scientists draw between basic and applied research").
28. Common law countries became members of the Hague Conference relatively late: Ireland
(1955), United Kingdom (1955), Israel (1964), United States (1964), Canada (1968), Australia (1973),
South Africa (2002), and New Zealand (2002). See Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law,
http://hcch.e-vision.nl/indexen.php?act=home.splash (last visited Dec. 12, 2004).
29. See MERRYMAN, supra note 25, at 32.
30. See Hague Conference Statute, supra note 23, art. I ("La Conference de La Haye a pour
bOt de travailler i l'unification progressive des rgles de droit international priv.").
31. The choice between the two approaches was vigorously debated at the time the United
States joined the Hague Conference. For arguments in favor of the U.S. position that instruments with
opt-in/opt-out features were preferable to one-size-fits-all treaties, see Philip W. Amram, Uniform
Legislation as an Effective Alternative to the Treaty Technique, 54 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 2, 64-65
(1960); Kurt H. Nadelmann, Uniform Legislation Versus International Conventions Revisited, 16 AM. J.
COMP. L. 28 (1968); Kurt H. Nadelmann & Willis L.M. Reese, The American Proposal at the Hague
Conference on Private International Law to Use the Method of Uniform Laws, 7 AM. J. COMp. L. 239,
242 (1958). The European preference for treaties prevailed. For European responses to the U.S.
proposal, see Georges A.L. Droz, La Confirence de la Haye de Droit International Privd et les
Mithodes d'Unification du Droit: Traitis Internationaux ou Lois Mod~les?, 13 REVUE INTERNATIONALE
DE DROIT COMPARt 507 (1961).
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32
discretion. Unification was more than a means to useful results. It was a
search for intellectual coherence.
2. Commercial Interests
Commercial interests also supported private law unification. Early on,
European enterprises saw international unification efforts as an opportunity to
replicate the benefits they had achieved through codification at home.33 They
supported unification not for aesthetic reasons and not because they valued
legal science in itself. They saw the existing patchwork of national laws as an
obstacle to cross-border trade. Unification would lower these indirect trade
barriers and expand international commerce. Decades later, multinational
firms of all flags would line up behind the view that global commerce had to
be freed from inconsistent and idiosyncratic national laws.
Though derived from different perspectives, the views of European
business enterprises and intellectuals tended to reinforce each other. 34 The
academic celebration of legal science and technical expertise was attractive, at
least early on, to people of commerce, who believed that a technocratic view
of private law was more likely to produce reliable, stable rules than one more
open to political influences. The structure of Hague Conference negotiations
has long reflected this view. Much negotiation and drafting is delegated to
special commissions composed of experts in the specific field under
negotiation, many of them drawn from the academy. These special
commissions produce highly detailed drafts before there is any substantial
involvement at the diplomatic level. The role of interest groups in producing
these multilateral conventions tends to be less active than their role in
producing national legislation. Negotiations take place away from the public
eye, shrouded in the myth that what is going on is purely technocratic. The
audience is limited to multinational businesses, scholars in the field, highly
specialized members of the bar, and officials of specific national ministries.35
3. Political Integrationists
A third group--I will call them "integrationists"-has also been
involved in the unification movement from the beginning, supporting the
unification of private law for another set of reasons. Harmonizing technical
legal fields is not, for the integrationists, an end in itself. Rather, it is a step
32. The search for order and simplicity was especially characteristic of internal codification in
France, which strongly influenced subsequent codification in Belgium, Italy, and much of Western
Europe. See JoHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA,
AND EAST ASIA 435-58 (1994).
33. For discussion of the codification of private law in France and Germany, see
SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 26, at 245-83; Zimmerman, supra note 26.
34. For discussion of Ernst Rabel's especially close ties to German business interests, see
David J. Gerber, Sculpting the Agenda of Comparative Law: Ernst Rabel and the Facade of Language,
in RETHInKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 195-96 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001).
35. Notwithstanding some efforts by the Permanent Bureau to better publicize Hague
Conventions. See, e.g., Resolution Adopted by the Seventeenth Session of the Hague Conference, May
19, 1993, http://www.hcch.net/e/resolution.html (recommending that member states "take the
appropriate measures to publicize the existence and the operations of the Conventions").
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toward a wider unification of politics, culture, and identity. These aspirations
marked the private international law congresses convened in Latin America in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 36 which attempted, albeit
unsuccessfully, to foster Bolitical unity and broad cooperation among the
peoples of Latin America. Half a century later, Europeans followed suit, but
with greater success. At that point, private law unification received support
from pivotal figures in the struggle to unify Europe economically and
38politically. The seeds of this unification began with the early work of
UNIDROIT, 39 the Hague Conference, 40 and specialized international bodies in
fields such as aviation, telephony, and road transport.
36. E.g., the Congresses of Lima, Mexico City, Montevideo, Rio de Janiero, and Santiago. See
generally Simeon E. Baldwin, The Comparative Results in the Advancement of Private International
Law of the Montevideo Congress of 1888-9 and the Hague Conferences of 1893, 1894, 1900, and 1904,
2 PROC. OF THE AM. POL. SCI. ASS'N 73 (1905); Alejandro M. Garro, Unification and Harmonization of
Private Law in Latin America, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 587 (1992); Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Pan-American
Code of Private International Law, 4 TuL. L. REv. 499 (1930); Tatiana B. De Maekelt, General Rules of
Private International Law in the Americas, 177 RECUEIL DES COURS 193 (1982-IV); Peter H. Pfund,
Contributing to Progressive Development of Private International Law: The International Process and
the United States Approach, 249 RECUEIL DES COURS 13, 37-39 (1996-IV).
37. More success was achieved several generations later. In the post-World War II period,
Latin American unification has been led, albeit weakly, by the Organization of American States. See
Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3; First
Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law, Jan. 30, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 325
(1975) (adopting six conventions: Inter-American Convention on the Legal Regime of Powers of
Attorney To Be Used Abroad, reprinted in id. at 325-28; Inter-American Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad, reprinted in id. at 328-32; Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws
Concerning Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, and Invoices, reprinted in id. at 332-34; Inter-
American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning Checks, reprinted in id. at 334-36; Inter-
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 12
(1981); Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, O.A.S.T.S. No. 43, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 339
(1975)); Second Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private International Law, May 8, 1979, 18
I.L.M. 1211 (1979) (adopting eight conventions: Inter-American Convention on Conflicts of Laws
Concerning Checks, reprinted in id. at 1220-22; Inter-American Convention on Conflicts of Laws
Concerning Commercial Companies, reprinted in id. at 1222-24; Inter-American Convention on
Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, reprinted in id. at 1224-27; Inter-
American Convention on the Execution of Preventive Measures, reprinted in id. at 1227-31; Inter-
American Convention on Proof of and Information on Foreign Law, reprinted in id. at 1231-34; Inter-
American Convention on Domicile of Natural Persons in Private International Law, reprinted id. at
1234-36; Inter-American Convention on General Rules of Private International Law, reprinted in id. at
1236-38; Additional Protocol to the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, O.A.S.T.S. No. 56,
reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1238 (1979)); Third Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private
International Law: Conventions and Additional Protocol, May 24, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 459 (1985) (adopting
three conventions and one protocol: Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning the
Adoption of Minors, reprinted in id. at 460-64; Inter-American Convention on Personality and Capacity
of Judicial Persons in Private International Law, reprinted in id. at 465-67; Inter-American Convention
on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments,
reprinted in id. at 468-71; Additional Protocol to the Inter-American Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad, reprinted in id. at 472-83); Fourth Inter-American Specialized Conference on Private
International Law, July 15, 1989, 29 LL.M. 62 (1990) (adopting three conventions: Inter-American
Convention on the International Return of Children, reprinted in id. at 63-72; Inter-American
Convention on Support Obligations, reprinted in id. at 73-80; Inter-American Convention on Contracts
for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, reprinted in id. at 81-90).
38. See, e.g., ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR & RICHARD F. Scolr, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION:
A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 29-30 (2001) ("Europe will not be made all at once according to a
single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity."
(quoting Robert Schuman's declaration of May 9, 1950)); JEAN MONNET, MEMOIRES 312-15 (1978).
39. See Statute of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Mar. 15, 1940,
15 U.S.T. 2494.
40. See Hague Conference Statute, supra note 23.
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Private law unification took on new urgency after World War II, when
economic and political integration were seen as practical steps toward
preventing catastrophic European wars. 41 The preeminent private law
organizations were reborn at that time. As before the war, their membership
was almost entirely drawn from the European continent. With a homogeneous
membership, they developed a European conception of juridical unification,
one with the jus commune 4 2 as a frame of reference, one that recalled the time
when great universities across Europe taught the same system of law.43 These
organizations sought to bring a European dimension to people's daily lives
through such initiatives as the cross-border recognition of marriages, the
spread of common name-brand goods and services across Europe, and the
creation of a common body of legal rules protecting consumers and
employees.
4. The Cumulative Impact
Although these three groups did not hold identical perspectives, their
agendas tended to reinforce each other. All tended to ensure that continental
European aesthetics and ideas about legal science were built into the structure
of procedural law unification. All tended to disparage conferring substantial
discretion on judges. All fed the perception that private law harmonization
was an esoteric, technocratic endeavor nourished by expertise in comparative
law. All saw juridical unification as part of a broader enterprise-intellectual,
economic, or political.
B. Harmonization After World War II
The roots of the unification movement's conflict with the human rights
movement can be found in the developments described above. But events after
World War 1I transformed a latent conflict into one more apparent. Advocates
of unification became intellectually more ambitious. Multinational business
became more assertive in this realm. The ideas behind regional integration
grew into strong influences on European legal thought. Harmonization
became a widening river fed by three main streams: (1) the projects of a
international private law organizations; (2) the usages spawned by
41. See Winston S. Churchill, Address to the Congress of Europe (May 7, 1948), in
COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, at 7636 ("Mutual aid in the economic field and joint military defence
must inevitably be accompanied step by step with a parallel policy of closer political unity.").
42. The term jus commune is associated with the system of law that resulted from the fusion
of Roman law with canon law. This process, and the accompanying revival of Roman law, began in
centers of higher learning in Italy in the twelfth century and then spread across Europe. See generally
David S. Clark, The Medieval Origins of Modern Legal Education: Between Church and State, 35 Am.
J. Comp. L. 653, 678-81 (1987). For the reception of the jus commune across Europe and its influence
on the development of various European legal systems, see, e.g., ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL
LAW SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW (1977); MERRYMAN ET AL.,
supra note 32, at 325-50 (1994); SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 26; 1 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN
KOTz, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 2d ed. 1987).
43. See MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 325 (referring to the "nostalgia of the civil
lawyer").
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international arbitration; and (3) the initiatives of regional organizations, such
as the EU and the Council of Europe."
1. Harmonization Treaties
Continuing the trend begun in the first half of the century, much
harmonization in the post-World War II years resulted from the work of
international and intergovernmental organizations. Six organizations were the
principal venues for formal, intergovernmental efforts at private law
harmonization: UNIDROIT, the U.N. Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL), the Hague Conference, the Organization of American
States (OAS), the Council of Europe, and the EU. The first two have focused
on harmonizing substantive fields of law, especially contract law 45 and
finance.46 The Hague Conference has become the preeminent international
institution devoted to procedural law harmonization on a global scale, while
the EU, the Council of Europe, and the OAS are prime examples of
organizations devoted to regional, rather than global, harmonization, a subject
to which this Article turns in Part II.B.3.
Since its rebirth in the early 1950s, the Hague Conference and its
member states have produced thirty-four multilateral treaties on various
aspects of national procedural law. These treaties can be divided into four
categories: (1) treaties establishing choice-of-law rules; (2) treaties prescribing
jurisdictional rules; (3) treaties creating a duty of mutual recognition; and (4)
treaties promoting other forms of judicial cooperation. Before the
Conference's current jurisdiction and judgments project, 47 Hague conventions
typically had a narrow focus. So, for instance, the Hague Conference
44. For simplicity of presentation, the discussion that follows will emphasize the role of
intellectuals in the work of international private law organizations, the role of multinational business in
arbitration, and the role of political integrationists in the output of the EU. Reality, of course is more
complicated; each of these constituencies has played a role in each of these endeavors.
45. See United Nations Convention on the Limitations Period in the International Sale of
Goods, June 14, 1974, 1511 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 952 (1974); Convention on Agency in
the International Sale of Goods, Feb. 17, 1983, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 249 (1983); CISG, supra note 18;
International Convention on Travel Contracts, Apr. 23, 1970, 1275 U.N.T.S. 531, reprinted in 9 I.L.M.
699 (1970); Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 169, available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-ulis.htm; Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the
International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 107, available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-ulf.htm.
46. See Aircraft Equipment Protocol, supra note 20; Mobile Equipment Convention, supra
note 20; Financial Leasing Convention, supra note 20; United Nations Convention on Independent
Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit, Dec. 11, 1995, U.N. Doc. AIRES/50/48 (1995), reprinted in
35 I.L.M. 735 (1996); Factoring Convention, supra note 20.
47. In 1992, the United States first proposed that the Hague Conference on Private
International Law draft a multilateral convention that would obligate signatory states to recognize and
enforce civil and commercial judgments under specified circumstances. The proposal was adopted by
the Hague Conference in 1996, which assigned the research, negotiation, and drafting to a special
commission in which all member states would be represented. Soon after the project began, the
members of the commission concluded that it would not be possible to draft a convention solely
regulating recognition and enforcement without also addressing the exercise of jurisdiction. See
generally Catherine Kessedjian, Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Special Comm'n of June 1997,
International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Prelim. Doc. No. 7
(1997), http://www.hcch.net/doc/jdgm_pd7.doc [hereinafter Hague Preliminary Draft Convention Doe.
No. 7].
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concluded five treaties from 1958 to 1996 relating to mutual recognition in
specific substantive areas: adoption; marriage; divorce and separation;
maintenance obligations; and the protection of minors. Similarly, with respect
to rules of jurisdiction, three treaties address jurisdiction in three specific
contexts: adoption, the protection of minors, and forum selection clauses.
Despite the breadth of private law covered by the Hague treaties, these
agreements are in many ways similar in approach. Their common approach
involves: (1) drawing upon academic expertise in comparative law and private
international law; 48 (2) producing uniform texts rather than principles,
49
guidelines, or model laws;50 (3) discouraging states from ratifying subject to
reservations; and (4) drafting texts not designed to confer private rights on
individuals. This similarity derives historically from the Hague Conference's
origins as a small organization of neighboring Western European states and




In recent decades, legal harmonization has spread beyond the confines of
intergovernmental treaties. International arbitration now exerts an important
influence on the development of procedural law as well as substantive law.
The growth of arbitration accelerated at mid-century. What had been a
collection of ad hoc practices and customs derived from the law merchant
coalesced into a recognizable field.52 Practices that had varied greatly among
industries and countries assumed a more standard form not tethered to
national judicial systems. Toward the century's end arbitration expanded still
48. The co-rapporteurs for the Hague Judgments Project, Fausto Pocar and Peter Nygh, were
leading scholars of private international law in Italy and Australia, respectively. See Peter Nygh &
Fausto Pocar, Report of the Special Commission on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, 19th Sess., (Aug.
2000), http://hcch.e-vision.nllupload/wop/jdgmpdl l.pdf [hereinafter Nygh & Pocar]. In 2000, Pocar
became a judge on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Nygh recently passed
away. The drafting committee has included Arthur von Mehren of Harvard and Andreas Boucher of the
University of Geneva. From 1996 through 1999, a French legal academic, Catherine Kessedjian, was
deputy secretary-general in charge of the project. Other legal academics that have served as delegates
are: Antonio Boggiano (Argentina), David McClean (British Commonwealth), Kresimir Sajko (Croatia),
Helene Gaudemet-Tallon (France), loannis Voulgaris (Greece), Masato Dogauchi (Japan), Antoon
Struycken (Netherlands), Paul Vlas (Netherlands), Isabel de Magalhaes (Portugal), Octavian Capatina
(Romania), Alegria Borras (Spain), Paul Beaumont (United Kingdom), Trevor Hartley (United
Kingdom), Ronald Brand (United States), and Paul Dubinsky (United States).
49. UNIDROIT's work is a good basis for comparison. The UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts are similar in style to the U.S. Restatements of Contract Law, with
text, commentary, and illustrations designed to flesh out the governing factors and principles, but often
stopping short of articulating one mandatory, universal rule. UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF COMMERCIAL
CONTRACTS, supra note 13.
50. See Amram, supra note 31; Droz, supra note 31; Peter Hay, The United States and
International Unification of Law: The Tenth Session of the Hague Conference, 1965 U. ILL. L. F. 820;
Nadelmarm, supra note 31; Nadelmann & Reese, supra note 31.
51. In the past, EU member states occasionally disagreed with one another in the context of
negotiations at the Hague.Conference. In the aftermath of the Treaty of Amsterdam's conferral of new
powers on the EU in private law, see infra notes 74, 77, & 136, EU member states have presented more
of a united front in Hague Conference negotiations. See infra note 73.
52. See generally LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW
MERCHANT (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1990).
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further,53 drawing in participants from regions not previously represented,
such as Asia, Latin America, and the Arab world. This newfound acceptance
had two important byproducts. First, the procedures used in international
arbitration became hybridized in form, drawing upon multiple national legal
traditions. Second, arbitration gained in influence, losing its taboo as a threat
to judicial authority, and becoming instead a source of input into judicial and
legislative thinking about procedural norms.
International arbitration today typically involves parties, lawyers, and
arbitrators differing in nationality and legal training. This diversity has
created new pressures to draw upon more than a narrow range of legal
traditions in addressing such procedural details as the form and length of
written submissions, the content and style of expert witness affidavits, and the
extent to which the proceedings are oral or purely written. A single arbitration
proceeding conceivably can incorporate U.S.-style document discovery,
Canadian evidentiary privileges, and a French emphasis on written
presentation. This mix would not be found in domestic judicial proceedings.
55
Another source of international arbitration's harmonizing effects can be
found in the stature and influence of the major global and regional arbitral
institutions. 56 In drafting arbitral rules of procedure, rules of evidence, and the
like, these institutions seek to incorporate principles found in several
commercially influential legal systems.5 Rules that are antiquated or confined
53. Statistics provide a rough sense of how dramatic growth in the field has been. In the fifty-
two years from 1924 to 1976, a total of 3000 cases were filed with the International Chamber of
Commerce in Paris. In the twenty-two years from 1976 to 1998, more than twice that number, 7000
cases, were filed. See W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
ARBITRATION 2 (3d ed. 2000). There have been other indicia of growth: the size of the average claim has
grown exponentially; prestigious international law firms have entered the field; and arbitration has
become the subject of multilateral treaties and serious study at universities. See generally 15 INT. CT.
ARB. BULL. 1 tbl. of contents (2004), available at http://www.iccbooks.com/shop/ropBannersites/back-
issues.asp#15_1; Facts and Figures on ICC Arbitration,
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/righttopics/stat_2003.asp (last visited Dec. 12, 2004).
54. It is also common for arbitration panels to hold hearings in locations determined with
reference to the convenience of the parties and not with reference to the substantive or procedural law
applied to the dispute.
55. See Swiss Private International Law Act of 1987, art. 182, translated in PIERRE A.
KARRER ET AL., SWITZERLAND'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (2d ed. 1994) ("The parties may,
directly or by reference to arbitration rules, determine the arbitral procedure; they may also submit the
arbitral procedure to a procedural law of their choice."). Though national courts often apply the
substantive laws of other countries (especially pursuant to choice-of-law clauses), they rarely, if ever,
apply foreign procedural law. See generally William W. Park, The Relative Reliability of Arbitration
Agreement and Court Selection Clauses, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION OF
FORUM SELECTION 3 (Jack L. Goldsmith ed., 1997). Thus when parties choose a Swiss judicial forum,
they are choosing Swiss procedural law to the exclusion of others.
56. E.g., the International Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of International
Arbitration, and the American Arbitration Association. These institutions furnish a set of standard
arbitration rules (which can be adapted by the parties), provide a mechanism for choosing arbitrators
(intervening when necessary on issues such as alleged bias), and ensure that fees are paid. They also
promote national legislation on arbitration and scholarship, and education about arbitration.
57. Commercial influence is not a precise term. It reflects many factors: gross domestic
product (GDP); the volume of a country's foreign trade; its competitiveness in growth industries; the
age, depth, and stability of its legal system; and the global reach of its law firms and legal scholars. On
the margin, it may be difficult to spot, but most would agree that the French legal system, for instance, is
a commercially influential one. Empirical work and anecdotal accounts suggest that parties and
arbitrators in International Chamber of Commerce arbitrations tend to choose procedural rules that are
followed in a large number of influential commercial countries. They will choose in this manner because
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to a single country or to countries poorly represented in international business
are typically left out.
58
The position of the arbitrator, unlike that of the judge, is well adapted to
experimentation. Arbitrators are less constrained by precedent or fixed schools
of statutory interpretation than their judicial counterparts. 59 In most countries,
arbitral awards are accorded a highly deferential standard of review,60 a fact
that permits arbitrators to apply procedural rules with great responsiveness to
the parties' need for compromise, something difficult for national courts to
accommodate.
The combined input of arbitrators, arbitral institutions, parties, and their
lawyers typically leads to a set of procedural choices that, as a package, do not
wholly replicate the provisions of any one national legal system. 61 Moreover,
their working group-the parties, their lawyers, and the arbitrators-covers a range of nationalities in
search of a common denominator, a common legal language for working on the case together. The
process is similar with respect to substantive law. Examples of contract principles that widely appear in
international arbitration, regardless of the substantive law governing the parties' agreement, are that
parties have a duty to mitigate damages, that contractual rights can be modified by estoppel, and that
good-faith renegotiation can modify contractual rights, even without consideration. See, e.g., CRAIG ET
AL., supra note 53, at 623-59; Ole Lando, The Principles of European Contract Law and the Lex
Mercaloria, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA: FROM NATIONAL CONFLICT RULES
TOWARDS HARMONIZATION AND UNIFICATION 391 (Jtirgen Basedow et al. eds., 2000).
58. See, e.g., INT'L BAR ASS'N, COMM. ON ARBITRATION AND ADR, SECTION ON Bus. LAW,
RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1999), available at
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/IBA%2 Rules%20on%20the%20Taking%20of/2OEvidence
%20in%20ntemational%2OArbitration%201999.pdf; Ole Lando, Assessing the Role of the UNIDROIT
Principles in the Harmonization of Arbitration Law, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMI. L. 129 (1995). Most model
arbitration rules grant both the parties and the arbitrators much leeway in modifying the standard rules to
fit the arbitration at hand. See, e.g., Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, ch. V § C, art. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/31/17 (1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules] ("[Dlisputes shall be settled in
accordance with these Rules subject to such modification as the parties may agree in writing."); id. art.
15 ("[Slubject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it
considers appropriate.").
59. Arbitrators are not bound by precedent to the same extent as common law courts. Whereas
a lower court in the United States could well be reversed for basing a decision on hearsay, a comparable
arbitral award likely would not be overturned. Cf United Paperworkers Int. Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco,
484 U.S. 29, 39 (1987) (noting that parties are entitled to leave evidentiary matters to their chosen
arbitrators). Nor are the procedural rulings of arbitrators binding precedents for others; they influence
subsequent arbitrators only to the extent they seem useful. See Sarah Rudolph Cole & E. Gary Spitko,
Arbitration and the Batson Principle, 38 GA. L. REV. 1145 (2004).
60. Article V of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, the landmark multilateral treaty on the recognition of awards rendered in foreign
arbitral proceedings, specifies seven grounds on which a court may exercise discretion to decline to
recognize or enforce an arbitral award. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York
Convention]. On the deference of U.S. courts to arbitral awards, see Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 520 (1973).
61. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 340-42
(1993). To see these contributions at work, consider a hypothetical construction dispute. The
construction site is in Nigeria. The construction firm is Korean. The architectural firm is French. The
parties choose three arbitrators: one French, one Korean, and an American. Under these circumstances,
it would not be unusual for the parties and the arbitrators to incorporate various procedural aspects of
French, Korean, and U.S. law. They may agree that the presentation of proof should be largely in
writing, as in a French court. They may opt for limited discovery that is more extensive than in France
or Korea but more limited than in the United States. The arbitrators may decide that most rules of
evidence regarding hearsay, original documents, and the like will not apply. In short, the final package
of procedures for this one construction arbitration may incorporate aspects of several procedural
systems: those that are somehow connected to the dispute and those that are well-known practices of
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each component in this new mix of procedures, by virtue of having been
plucked from its national milieu, may be stripped of the interpretive tradition
in which it was bred. If modified U.S. discovery rules worked well in one
case, repeat players 62 will incorporate such rules in future arbitrations. Their
experience using a particular variation on U.S. document discovery will be
communicated to other clients, party-appointed arbitrators, and others through
arbitration journals, conferences, and word of mouth. As this process of
experimentation and selection repeats itself, dominant approaches to
arbitration emerge, especially in niche areas.63 Moreover, the results do not
remain confined to the world of arbitration. The same law firms representing
clients in international arbitrations also represent these and other clients in
national courts. National judges become more familiar with arbitration as they
rule on the growing volume of motions to recognize or vacate arbitral awards
or to stay arbitral proceedings. Principles of procedural law developed in the
context of arbitration subtly find their way into domestic courtrooms, 64 a
phenomenon demonstrated with respect to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.65
commercially dominant nations. See Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing
a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 341, 412-16 (noting that
hybridized procedures "have become popular to the point of being commonplace," id. at 412). See
generally Serge Lazareff, International Arbitration: Towards a Common Procedural Approach, in
CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES AND NEW TRENDS 31-38
(Stefan N. Frommel & Barry A. K. Rider eds., 1999).
62. The repeat players are multinational businesses that frequently incorporate arbitration
clauses in their contracts, and lawyers who repeatedly serve as counsel and as arbitrators. One of the
most common and valid criticisms of arbitration is that it tends to favor these repeat players, especially
in securities disputes, consumer banking, and claims regarding products marketed over the Internet. In
an arbitration between a small buyer of stock and a brokerage firm, the latter has much greater
knowledge of the procedures, the pool of potential arbitrators, and the unwritten, informal ways in which
this type of arbitration is done. Moreover, the arbitrators selected to serve on the panel know that the
brokerage firm will be back next month with another dispute, ready to hire another panel of arbitrators.
63. For example, disputes involving construction projects and disputes involving cargo. Cf
Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in International Arbitration Procedure,
30 TEX. J. INT'L L. 89 (1995). Some of the more typical features of international commercial arbitration
include: the absence of rules designed to protect lay jurors (e.g., evidentiary rules); an emphasis on
written submissions, as in civil law countries, with fewer opportunities for cross examination than in
common law countries; some pretrial discovery, far less than in U.S. courts, but more than in civil law
countries; and an arbitral panel that will likely construe its own jurisdiction broadly.
64. Arbitration is not a hermetically sealed world. Scholars of international arbitration also
specialize in transnational litigation. See, e.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter BORN,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION]; GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS (1994) [hereinafter BORN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION]; LOWENFELD, supra note 61; RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION: PRACTICE AND PLANNING (2d ed. 1997). For the rise in global influence
of the Anglo-American law firm and its impact on cross-fertilization between international litigation and
arbitration, see Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International Arbitration, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RES. 69, 80-87 (2003).
65. Cf Thomas E. Carbonneau, National Law and the Judicialization of Arbitration: Manifest
Destiny, Manifest Disregard, or Manifest Error?, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: TOWARDS "JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY? 115, 120 (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N.
Browers eds., 1993) (noting the uniformity of national judicial decisions interpreting the New York
Convention, supra note 60). Two institutions in particular have greatly fostered arbitration's influence
on courts and on national views of procedural law: UNCITRAL and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.
UNCITRAL contributed the New York Convention, supra note 60, and the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, supra note 58. The former, the most widely ratified private international law treaty in the world,
makes it possible to enforce arbitral awards in over 150 countries. The latter was a project in arbitral
harmonization: the creation of a new set of global arbitral rules based on picking and choosing among
2005] Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization 229
The procedural harmonization generated by this process tends to reflect
the commercial nature of most arbitrated disputes and the needs of
commercial parties. 66 Foremost among those needs are dispute resolution
procedures adaptable to changing commercial practices and custom. In that
context, international arbitration has long approached procedural concepts in a
distinct manner that is now dramatically influencing national courts. For
example, party autonomy has always been at the heart of how arbitrators and
arbitral institutions approach procedure.67 In recent decades, national courts
have shown increasing respect for party autonomy in the context of forum
selection clauses. Often, in fact, the judicial language of deference to forum
selection clauses is borrowed from decisions applying arbitration clauses.
68
Arbitration has also fostered the concept of the "natural" or "neutral" forum,
one that ex ante is no more advantageous to one party than the other and that
is preferable in terms of administrative convenience and cost. Recent common
law decisions applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens have borrowed
some of the language and the ex ante perspective of arbitration.69 A number of
commentators report the erosion of mandatory rules 7 ° in the context of
rules dominant regionally. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, created in 1981 by the Algiers Accords, uses
the UNCITRAL rules. Its twenty years of opinions now fill more than thirty volumes. Its influence is
attributable to: 1) the stature of its U.S. and neutral-country judges; 2) its being one of the few arbitral
bodies to publish all its opinions, which are readily available in law firm and law school libraries around
the world and now on the Internet, see Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, http://www.iusct.org (last
visited Dec. 12, 2004); and 3) the large volume, and often large dollar amounts, of the claims it has
arbitrated. See generally STEWART ABERCROMBIE BAKER & MARK DAVID DAVIS, THE UNCITRAL
ARBITRATION RULES IN PRACTICE: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
(1992); Howard M. Holtzmann, Some Lessons of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, in PRIVATE INVESTORS
ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (J. Moss ed., 1987).
66. To a much greater extent than litigation, the parties to international arbitration are business
entities. Often they are medium-to-large businesses, as reflected by the size of the average claim filed
with arbitral institutions. In 1998, almost 35% of the cases submitted to International Chamber of
Commerce arbitration involved amounts between $1 million and $10 million, and almost 20% were for
amounts over $10 million. CRAIG ET AL., supra note 53, at 743. Typically, one or more claims are for
breach of contract, pursuant to an arbitration clause in that contract.
67. In terms of procedure, party autonomy means that the parties choose the forum and the
procedural law to be applied, rather than being forced to appear in some other forn or to submit to
another set of procedures and remedies. Unlike courts, for example, arbitral tribunals might not have
authority, absent the parties' consent, to order preliminary relief or to hold parties in contempt for
noncompliance. See BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 64, at 813-23.
68. See generally, Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 703, 727 (1999) (maintaining that the U.S. Supreme Court has
come to regard arbitration clauses as a type of specialized forum selection clause). For analyses of the
deference that courts currently give to forum selection clauses, see GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS: PLANNING, DRAFTING, AND ENFORCING 90-97
(1999). Cf. Park, supra note 55, at 3-35.
69. For a prominent British reference to the "neutral" or "natural" forum, see Spiliada
Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., 1987 A.C. 460, 478 (H.L.). For recent applications of the forum non
conveniens doctrine in Australian courts, see Peter Nygh, Forum Non Conveniens and Lis Alibi
Pendens: The Australian Experience, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA: FROM NATIONAL
CONFLICT RULES TOWARDS HARMONIZATION AND UNIFICATION 511-26 (JUrgen Basedow et al. eds.,
2000). In the United States, the seminal case is Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
70. Mandatory rules are rules of law that tribunals must apply, even if parties have attempted
to exclude them. Whether rules of substantive law or procedure, they are legal rules from which parties
cannot opt out. Because arbitration is a creature of contract, arbitrators hesitate to apply statutes or
common law rules that the parties have tried to avoid. This fact, and the possibility that parties will
intentionally seek to avoid mandatory rules through arbitration, worried the dissent in Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), in which the majority held that a contract
defense alleging violation of U.S. antitrust laws had to be resolved by arbitration in Japan. Id. at 656
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arbitration, together with evidence that the range of legal rules treated as
mandatory by courts is also narrowing.
As each of these principles-party autonomy, the natural forum, and
narrower mandatory rules-has moved beyond arbitration to judicial
procedure, the bar for human rights victims seeking access to court has been
raised, a topic to which Part III will return.
3. Regional Harmonization: The Brussels and Lugano
Conventions
A third important postwar development is the harmonization of private
law on a regional basis, a process by which the countries of the EU 71 and their
neighbors have exerted great influence on the global direction of procedural
law. The EU today boasts a substantial and growing corpus of treaties and
legislation harmonizing aspects of private law. By virtue of its size, 72
economic strength, and ability to influence the initiatives of international
organizations, 73 the EU's approach to private law harmonization warrants
special attention.
The first targets of harmonization in what was by the late 1950s the
European Community (EC Lwere differences in trade law that caused unequal
conditions of competition. Although the emergence of common policies in
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he rudimentary procedures which make arbitration so desirable in the
context of a private dispute often mean that the record is so inadequate that the arbitrator's decision is
virtually unreviewable."); see also Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying the
same reasoning with regard to U.S. securities laws).
71. What is now the EU began in the early 1950s as three distinct entities created by three
treaties. TREATY INSTITUTING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S.140; TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter TREATY OF ROME]; TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMUNITY (EURATOM), Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167. Since then, the institutions created by
these treaties have been merged, the treaties have been repeatedly revised, and the number of member
states has grown from six to twenty-five through five waves of accession agreements. See generally T.C.
HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 3-10 (5th ed. 2003). The label "European
Union" originated with the treaty concluded in Maastricht, The Netherlands, in 1992. TREATY ON
EUROPEAN UNION AND FINAL ACT, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992)
[hereinafter MAASTRICHT TREATY]. For simplicity, when discussing the evolution of procedural
harmonization in the decades spanning the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, this Article will
refer to the integrated European entity as the EU. References to the European Community (EC) will be
confined to pre-Maastricht events.
72. The EU grew to twenty-five member states upon the accession of the Czech Republic,
Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia in May 2004. The
addition of these ten member states increased the EU population by 28% (to nearly 450 million) and
expanded its geographic area by 34%, but decreased its per capita GDP by 18%. Opinion of the
European Economic and Social Committee on "The Impact of the Enlargement of the European Union
on the Single Market," 2003 O.J. (C 85) 102. Aspects of the legal systems of these new states are
noticeably different from those of existing member states. It is unclear whether this unprecedented
growth in size and diversity will pose an obstacle to private law harmonization in the EU.
73. This disproportionate influence received criticism from the head of the U.S. delegation to
the Hague Conference, who complained of "block voting" by EU countries during the negotiation of the
proposed Hague Judgments Convention. Letter from Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for
Private Int'l Law (U.S.) to J.H.A. van Loon, Secretary-General, Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law
2 (Feb. 22, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kovar Letter].
74. Prime examples were tariffs and other trade barriers, unfair competition law,
transportation, and coal, steel, and nuclear power regulation. Until the 1980s, practicing EC law usually
meant practicing what Americans refer to as antitrust law. In this early period, private law, especially
procedural law, was regarded as a sphere reserved to the member states and beyond the legislative
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these areas lessened economic distortion, by the 1970s it was evident that
focusing on public law alone would not create conditions in which Dutch
firms, for example, could enjoy equal market access in The Netherlands and in
Belgium. The great majority of economic transactions were governed by
private law, and the common market would remain fragmented as long as the
laws applicable to such transactions differed substantially from one member
state to another. The emergence of a common European identity would be
slowed by the absence of such practical structures as common consumer
protection policies across the Community. Consider a joint-venture agreement
between two European airlines. In the 1960s, such an agreement had to
comply with EC antitrust law, 75 EC aviation regulations, and other public
regulatory laws. However, at that time there was no European contract law.
Rather, the contract law governing the agreement would have been Dutch,
Italian, or the law of some other member state. Similarly, in the realm of
procedure, the domestic law of the forum determined which court had
jurisdiction over any given dispute. Differences in jurisdictional principles
across the EC frustrated efforts to create a level playing field. Aggressive
jurisdictional rules in one EC member state could work to the advantage of
firms based in that state and to the disadvantage of foreign competitors.
A crucial development in harmonizing procedural law came in 1968 in
the form of the Brussels Convention, 76a treaty designed to harmonize
procedural law at two key stages of civil litigation: the initial judicial exercise
of jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of the resulting foreign
judgments. The Brussels Convention was a major step in supplanting national
procedural norms with multilateral norms, moving European integration
beyond public law to a core field of private law-civil procedure. The
Convention broke the prohibition against EC interference in procedural law.77
powers of the EC. This division of power between European institutions and the member states greatly
changed in the 1990s, as the EU pursued deeper and broader political integration through treaties
modifying the Treaty of Rome. See TREATY OF NICE, Feb. 26, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1; TREATY OF
AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997).
75. E.g., Council Regulation 17/62, 1962 O.J. (P 13) 204 (implementing former Article 81 of
the Treaty of Rome and prohibiting anticompetitive "agreements, decisions, and concerted practices").
76. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969), amended by 1978 O.J.
(L 304) 77, amended by 1982 O.J. (L 338) 1, amended by 1989 O.J. (L 285) 1 [hereinafter Brussels
Convention]. The official consolidated, English-language version is at 1998 O.J. (L 304) 36. The
Convention entered into force among the original six members of the EC (Belgium, West Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands) in 1973. Nine accessions followed: Denmark, Ireland,
and the United Kingdom in 1978, Greece in 1982, Portugal and Spain in 1989, and Austria, Finland, and
Sweden in 1996. The Convention was transformed into an EU Regulation, effective as of March 2002.
See infra note 77. In the analysis that follows, I refer to the pre-Regulation version of the Brussels
regime both because Denmark is not bound by the 2002 Regulation and because essentially all the case
law and literature still refers to the pre-Regulation text.
77. Until 2002, the Brussels Convention had an unusual legal status. Neither an EU treaty nor
Community legislation, it technically lay outside the body of EU law. See TREATY OF ROME, supra note
71, art. 220 (providing that member states shall seek to secure for their nationals "the simplification of
the formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and execution of judicial decisions and arbitral
awards"). Until the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, see supra note 74, EU legislation and treaty provisions
left nearly the entire field of judicial procedure to the exclusive legislative power of individual member
states. Even before the Treaty of Amsterdam, however, the concerted action of the EU member states
under the Brussels Convention was widely viewed as quasi-EU law, in part because the European Court
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In shining a floodlight on divergent approaches to procedural justice, the
Brussels Convention began establishing forms of judicial cooperation that
would be helpful to European litigants and would build crucial bridges in
unifying procedural law. With the dissemination and acceptance of case law
interpreting the Brussels Convention, 78 soon there were plans to bring other
forms of judicial comity and procedural uniformity into the European
framework. 9
At the heart of the Convention's influence on procedural law in Europe
are three main principles: (a) curtailing the exercise of exorbitant jurisdiction;
(b) channeling litigation toward its natural forum; and (c) enhancing legal
certainty.
a. Curtailing Exorbitant Jurisdiction
Before the Convention entered into force, procedural systems across
Europe shared a number of core principles derived from the jus commune. For
example, in terms of jurisdiction, most systems incorporated the default rule
that the plaintiff had to sue the defendant in the latter's domicile.80 From this
common starting point, much divergence had arisen as European legal
systems had evolved. Each state had developed supplemental jurisdictional
of Justice (ECJ), an EU institution, routinely provided preliminary rulings interpreting the Convention.
Legislation enacted pursuant to the Treaty of Amsterdam, which amended the Treaty of Rome,
conferred express authority on the EU to harmonize "[mjeasures in the field of judicial cooperation in
civil matters having cross-border implications." TREATY OF ROME, supra note 71, arts. 61(c), 65. Based
on this provision, in 2001 the Brussels Convention was transformed into EU legislation, see Council
Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 2 [hereinafter European Council Regulation 44]. The legislation
was binding on all member states other than Denmark, which exercised a right to opt out of the new
legislative framework while remaining bound by the Brussels Convention.
78. There are two strands of cases interpreting the Brussels Convention. First, there are cases
decided by national courts, interpreting their own domestic procedural law in light of the Brussels
Convention. Second, there are preliminary rulings of the ECJ in cases referred by national courts
through the preliminary ruling procedure. See Protocol on the Interpretation by the Court of Justice of
the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
June 3, 1971, 1998 O.J. (C 27) 28 [hereinafter ECJ Judgments Protocol]. Article 3 of the Protocol
provides that "[w]here a question of interpretation of the Convention ... is raised in a case pending
before one of the courts listed in point 1 of Article 2 [an EU member state court], that court shall, if it
considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of
Justice to give a ruling thereon." Id. art. 3.
79. See Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (C 189) 57 [hereinafter Lugano Convention]; see also
European Communities: Reports on Conventions on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 65. The two most significant differences between the
two Conventions are: (a) the ECJ lacks jurisdiction to interpret the Lugano Convention; and (b) the
states party to the two treaties are not identical, although they greatly overlap. For useful comparisons,
see P. Jenard & G. Moller, Explanatory Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters Done at Lugano on 16 September 1988, 1990 O.J. (C
189) 54; EUROPEAN CASE LAW ON THE JUDGMENTS CONVENTION (Peter Kaye ed., 1998); Harry Duintjer
Tebbens, Judicial Interpretation of the 1988 Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments in the
Lights of Its Brussels Matrix: The Convergence Confirmed, in 3 Y.B. PRIV. INT'L L. (Petar Sarcevic &
Paul Voken eds., 2001).
80. On the role of this principle, which can be traced to Roman law, in modem European legal
systems, see Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law and European Legal Unity, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN
CIVIL CODE 21, 65-82 (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 1994); P. Jenard, Report on the Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 1, 18
("The maxim 'actor sequitur forum rei,' which expresses the fact that law leans in favour of the
defendant, is even more relevant in the international sphere than it is in national law.").
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rules. These supplemental rules, often the product of modem legislation rather
than tradition, reflected the idiosyncrasies and priorities of individual
countries in an age of strong national identities. For the early proponents of
harmonization, the multiplication of these rules across Europe was evidence
of the extent to which a common legal culture had fragmented.
One area of wide divergence was in the so-called "exorbitant" rules of
jurisdiction, which required foreign defendants to litigate in a forum with
which they had little or no connection. A plaintiffs French nationality, for
example, could confer jurisdiction on a French court even if the defendant had
no connection to France. 81 A similar rule prevailed in Luxembourg. In The
Netherlands and Belgium, jurisdiction could be exercised based on the
plaintiffs domicile and residence rather than nationality. 82 In Germany and
Italy, nothing of the kind could be found. These countries and others soon to
become parties to the Convention had exorbitant rules of their own. Anyone
with assets in Germany could be sued in a German court, for example, even in
83suits unrelated to those assets. In England and Ireland, courts exercised
power-based theories of jurisdiction unknown on the continent.84 A defendant
served with process while physically present in England became subject to the
jurisdiction of English courts, even if the defendant's presence was fleeting,
isolated, and unrelated to the suit.
The Convention helped to phase out these exercises of exorbitant
jurisdiction, thus bringing about important changes in jurisdictional law across
Europe.85 By 1973, courts in the EC had been stripped of the power to apply
81. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 14 (John H. Crabb trans., rev. ed. 1994) (Article 14
applicable even if plaintiff not domiciled or habitually resident in France).
82. See DUTCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 126.3 (Alan Redfem & Martin Hunter trans.,
1991) (conferring jurisdiction on Dutch courts for any action brought by a plaintiff domiciled in The
Netherlands). See generally INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH LAW FOR FOREIGN LAWYERS 219-40 (J.M.J.
Chorus et al. eds., 2d rev. ed. 1993). See also BELGIAN JUDICIAL CODE art. 638, translated in BORN,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 64, at 86 (jurisdiction based on plaintiffs registered
address or residence).
83. See § 23 ZPO, translated in SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS:
AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 696 (2d ed. 2003). For concise discussions of civil
procedure law in Germany, see generally id. at 692-701; NORBERT HORN ET AL., GERMAN PRIVATE AND
COMMERCIAL LAW (Tony Weir trans., 1982); Astrid Stadler, The Law of Civil Procedure, in
INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 357, 357-81 (Werner F. Ebke & Matthew W. Finkin eds., 1996). The
judgment in such suits was not even limited to the value of those assets-it extended to the full amount
of the claim, making it operate in practice more like an in personam judgment than one in rem or quasi
in rem. See OLG Diisseldorf, Neue Juristiche Wochenschrilt [NJW], 6 (1991), 3103; see generally
Christopher B. Kuner, Personal Jurisdiction Based on the Presence of Property in German Law: Past,
Present, and Future, 5 TRANS'L L. 691, 696 (1992) (observing that in Germany, the "Anglo-American
distinction between jurisdiction in rem, quasi in rem, and in personam is largely unknown"). For a
discussion of similar provisions in Swedish procedural law, see Hans Smit, Common and Civil Law
Rules of In Personam Adjudicatory Authority: An Analysis of Underlying Policies, 21 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 335, 342 (1972).
84. Under power-based theories ofjurisdiction, the court's ability to adjudicate a claim against
a defendant derives from its physical power over the individual. In its earliest and most raw form, such
power was acquired when a person was taken into custody by authorities while he was physically
present within the jurisdiction. See Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see generally
Arthur T. von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U.
L. REV. 279 (1983).
85. In this respect, the Brussels Convention followed through on earlier efforts of the Hague
Conference to do away with national procedural practices that were widely perceived as unfair, such as
the remise au parquet in France and Italy (allowing service of process to be perfected in the forum state
with only subsequent notification to the foreign defendant), which came under attack at the first
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exorbitant rules in suits among parties from different member states.86 Even in
cases outside the Convention's scope, 87 the old exorbitant rules were not
applied with the same abandon. A newfound discomfort could be identified in
judicial opinions. If member states had agreed that it was unfair to apply
exorbitant rules against a U.S. national domiciled in Italy, could it really be
fair to aply those rules against an Italian defendant domiciled in Los
Angeles? Though the Convention allowed states to continue exercising
exorbitant rules against defendants domiciled outside the EU, actually doing
so had lost some legitimacy. German courts questioned whether there were
limits to asset-based jurisdiction. 89 French courts more willingly found that
plaintiffs had waived jurisdiction under Article 14.90 In England and Ireland,
courts broadened the doctrine of forum non conveniens, in hart as a way of
moderating the unilateralism built into power-based theories.9
In place of the old country-specific rules of supplemental jurisdiction
were new rules, the product of multilateral negotiation rather than
unilateralism. They were based on the principle that jurisdiction always
should be premised on a strong connection between the forum and the
controversy. 92 Jurisdiction over tort actions now lay in courts in the place
where the "harmful event occurred." 93 Suits for breach of contractual
obligations were to be filed "in the courts for the place of performance of the
meetings of the Conference. In legal systems that incorporate remise au parquet, a default judgment can
be entered against a defendant without any assurance that the defendant has received actual notice of
suit.
86. Article 3 lists the jurisdictional provisions deemed to be exorbitant in each of the member
states. The Convention bars a court in any member state from relying on these provisions to assert
jurisdiction over a defendant domiciled anywhere within the EU. Brussels Convention, supra note 76,
art. 3.
87. The bar on exorbitant provisions does not apply to defendants domiciled outside the EU.
Id. art. 4.
88. Jurisdiction under the Convention turns on domicile, not nationality. The Convention
applies when a defendant is domiciled in any EU country. It does not apply with respect to nationals of
EU countries domiciled elsewhere. Id. art. 2.
89. In 1983, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BGH) (the Federal Constitutional Court) noted
that the compatibility of § 23 ZPO, supra note 83, with international law posed significant legal
questions. BverG, 64 BverfGE 1, 18 (1984). A subsequent decision by the BGH held that jurisdiction
could not be based on assets alone; the dispute had to have some other connection to Germany. See
BGHZ 115, 94. In between these two judgments, however, the BGH ruled in a third case that § 23 does
not violate either international law or the Grundgesetz, Germany's Basic Law. See BGHZ 113, 143. See
generally STEPHEN CROMIE, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 42-43 (2d ed. 1997); Kuner,
supra note 83.
90. See generally CROMIE, supra note 89, at 36-37. Before the Brussels Convention entered
into force, application of Article 14 was considered mandatory.
91. See Connelly v. RTZ Corp. plc, 1998 A.C. 854 (H.L.); Spiliada Maritime Corp. v.
Cansulex Ltd., 1987 A.C. 460 (H.L.).
92. These supplemental rules are defined either by subject matter of litigation or by category
of litigant. Plaintiffs thus have the option of bringing suit either in one of these supplemental fora or in
the defendant's domicile, which is the Convention's default rule.
93. Brussels Convention, supra note 76, art. 5.3. In the 2001 Council Regulation, this
formulation was slightly changed to "the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur."
European Council Regulation 44, supra note 77, art. 5.3. In contrast, in the United States the forum need
have no connection to the tort or to the harm. What matters are the contacts between the forum and the
defendant.
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obligation in question." 94 The civil claims of crime victims could be heard in
the forum where related criminal proceedings were pending.
95
Within a generation, lawyers and judges across the EU adapted to the
new regime. 96 In the space of two decades the legal culture of a new
generation of European lawyers and jurists was strongly influenced by
multilateralism-not only by the Brussels Convention, but also by the Treaty
of Rome, 97 the European Convention on Human Rights,98 and an emerging
corpus of European instruments. In this context, exercising jurisdiction based
solely on national interests and a single legal tradition was out of step with the
new Europe.
99
b. The Natural Forum
The Brussels Convention went beyond marginalizing exorbitant bases of
jurisdiction. It embraced the principle that for each suit there is one forum
with the strongest connection to the cause of action. That forum is determined
not by examining a long list of contacts. 00 In each case, one contact is
determinative. For example, Title II of the Convention segregates the universe
of potential lawsuits into categories defined by subject matter (e.g., suits over
maintenance obligations) or by type of litigant (e.g., consumer suits). For each
category, the Convention assigns specific jurisdiction to one and only one
forum. In suits for breach of an individual employment contract, the proper
forum is where the employee "habitually carries out his work."'' ° In suits
against multinational entities with branches in different countries, plaintiffs
can sue in a forum where a branch is located, but only in disputes arising from
the operations of that specific branch. 102 The forum for suits involving
competing claims to real property is the place where the property is located. 10
The Convention was not unique in identifying these logical or natural
connections between the cause of action and the forum; for this purpose it
94. Brussels Convention, supra note 76, art. 5.1.
95. Id. art. 5.4.
96. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal
Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 63, 64 (2001) (arging
that "Itlhe progression towards legal uniformity is spawning a hybrid, homogenized legal culture from
the systems of the civil and the common law that encounter each other in the new Europe.").
97. See TREATY OF ROME, supra note 71.
98. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/0O5.htm
[hereinafter European Human Rights Convention].
99. The conversion was not complete. Under Article 4 of the Convention, national courts
could still apply exorbitant rules against defendants who were not domiciled in an EU member state.
Brussels Convention, supra note 76, art. 4.
100. Under the minimum contacts test in the United States, the suitability of a forum is based
on a set of relationships, not on a bright-line rule. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945).
101. European Council Regulation 44, supra note 77, art. 19.
102. Brussels Convention, supra note 76, art. 5.5. By comparison, U.S. law permits suit against
the foreign parent corporation provided that it has "continuous and systematic" contacts with the forum
state, either by virtue of its own activities, those of the U.S. branch, or a combination of the two. See,
e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels, Int'l, 19 N.Y.2d 533 (1967).
103. Brussels Convention, supra note 76, art. 16.1.
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drew upon rules already in force in one or more member states. °4 Rather, the
Convention required that all EC countries recognize the same set of
connecting factors or rules. Whether or not these rules were the wisest forum
choices, they soon became widely entrenched. Because these jurisdictional
rules incorporated principles from a number of legal systems, they became
endowed with legitimacy and a certain gravitas.105 Because the Convention's
provisions had been produced by multilateral negotiations and compromise,
they were widely regarded as a fair, if imperfect, start at bringing procedural
harmonization to the EC. For those inclined to oppose ratification of the
Convention, there was the sobering thought that failure would be a serious
setback for judicial cooperation in Europe.
The Convention's influence quickly spread throughout Europe. Early
opposition quickly dissipated. Although scholars quibbled with certain
provisions and certain judicial interpretations, few criticized the Convention's
overall approach. The jurisdictional rules of other legal systems now looked
parochial by comparison. 106 European countries present at the Hague
Conference and other multilateral bodies now saw the Convention as the
presumptive starting point for any effort to expand judicial cooperation and
procedural harmonization globally. 1
07
104. Similar principles still run through European choice-of-law jurisprudence. See generally
MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE: A GUIDE THROUGH THE JUNGLE 102-05
(1995).
105. For a comparison of European multilateralism and U.S. unilateralism in private
international law, see id. at 105-09. Certainly the Convention's method was not alien in Europe, where
private international law had long incorporated rules derived from a small number of connecting factors
and little or no overt policy input. In the United States this methodology fell out of favor with the
decline of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934), which underwent several draft
revisions and was superceded by a new Restatement in 1971. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS (1971), Introduction:
what is presented here is a fresh treatment of the subject ... that takes full account of the
enormous change in dominant judicial thought.., that has taken place in relatively recent
years. The essence of that change has been the jettisoning of a multiplicity of rigid rules
in favor of standards of greater flexibility, according sensitivity in judgment to important
values that were formerly ignored. Such a transformation in the corpus of the law reduces
certitude as well as certainty . . . [and requires] candid recognition that black-letter
formulations often must consist of open-ended standards... The result presents a striking
contrast to the first Restatement in which dogma was so thoroughly enshrined.
106. The U.S. legal system became a favorite target of European criticism, especially its
assertions of general jurisdiction based on "doing business," the activities of agents, subsidiaries, and
branches of foreign entities. See BAUMGARTNER, supra note 16, at 178-80.
107. See, e.g., Hague Preliminary Draft Convention Doc. No. 7, supra note 47, para. 9 (arguing
that the Hague project should follow a double-convention model similar to that of the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions). Drafts of the Hague judgments treaty in fact have closely resembled the Brussels
Convention. See id.; Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Interim Text and Summary of the Outcome
of the Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference,
http://www.hcch.net/doc/jdgm2001draft-e.doc (June 6-20, 2001). Despite pressure from EU countries,
the U.S. delegation stuck to the position that the treaty had to incorporate something resembling a
minimum contacts approach to jurisdiction.
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c. Minimizing Concurrent Jurisdiction and Maximizing Legal
Certainty
The principle of legal certainty had been central in many European legal
systems well before the advent of the Brussels Convention.10 8 The Convention
did much to further strengthen its status, in the jurisdictional sense of enabling
prospective litigants to determine which forum would be able to exercise
jurisdiction over anticipated suits.109 The Convention advanced legal certainty
through restrictions on concurrent jurisdiction, 110 prohibitions on parallel
litigation, and more generally limiting judicial discretion.
Concurrent jurisdiction: During the negotiations that produced the
Convention, concurrent jurisdiction was quickly identified as an evil to be
avoided whenever possible. The reasons were obvious. The proliferation of
available fora would create both uncertainty and inequality. Plaintiffs with a
choice among fora would seek the one most favorable in terms of choice-of-
law rules, damage remedies, and so forth. " Weighty differences in the
desirability of one forum compared to another would encourage forum
shopping and thus undermine one of the EC's central policies-the creation of
a level economic playing field. 
12
Forum shopping can also interfere with the willingness of one court to
recognize the judgments of another. Judgments from courts perceived to be
plaintiff havens may elicit less than full cooperation. In its most disruptive
form, concurrent jurisdiction may encourage parties to pursue parallel
litigation, 13 with the possibility of conflicting judicial orders and openanimosity among the courts involved. 14
108. This principle was especially strong in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland (the latter
being a member of the Lugano Convention). See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 10-15 (2d ed. 1997); REiMANN, supra note
104, at 12-17.
109. Early in the genesis of the Convention, the need to increase legal certainty in the realm of
private law was identified as a vital goal. See Communication from the Commission of the European
Economic Community to the Member States, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 1, 3 ("[A] true internal market between
the six States will be achieved only if adequate legal protection can be secured .... [L]egal protection
and, hence, legal certainty in the common market are essentially dependent on the adoption by the
Member States of a satisfactory solution to the problem of recognition and enforcement ofjudgments.").
110. Concurrent jurisdiction occurs when more than one forum can assert jurisdiction over the
same dispute.
11. The extent of forum shopping that took place before the Brussels Convention entered into
force is subject to debate. Some argue that forum shopping was not a regular occurrence because
incentives to initiate cross-border litigation were low and barriers (e.g., differences in language and legal
culture) were high. See RE1MANN, supra note 104, at 102-05.
112. The internal market consists of the sum total of all economic transactions among EU
parties. It does not include external trade. From the beginning it has been an EU policy of overriding
importance to promote fair competition within the EU for the sake of maximizing the economic welfare
of EU citizens and cultivating European enterprises that are competitive in world markets. To the extent
that legal rules function as subsidies or barriers, they distort competition in the internal market.
113. The term "parallel litigation" refers to when the same dispute is litigated in more than one
forum at the same time.
114. In the absence of thorough procedural harmonization, forum shopping can lead to
competition among courts-competition in terms of favorable law, filing costs, and the like. Although
some view such competition as healthy, in a regional organization such as the EU there are clear dangers
to it. Some countries become magnets for plaintiffs, diverting cases from courts elsewhere. The
judgments of courts in those countries, if entitled to recognition elsewhere, can exert disproportionate
influence over legal relations throughout the EU. Lord Denning, the English jurist, captured this idea
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Although the Convention did not seek to eliminate concurrent
jurisdiction entirely, it did seek to restrict it through several mechanisms:
mandatory jurisdictional grants, a double-convention structure, and
centralized interpretation by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
Unlike other multilateral treaties, the Brussels Convention's
jurisdictional grants are mandatory, not permissive. 115 When providing that a
defendant can be sued in a given forum, the Convention requires the courts of
that forum to adjudicate the claim.11 6 Courts have no discretion to decline to
hear the matter based on their national law. The opposite is also true; unless a
Convention rule grants it jurisdiction, a court must close its doors. Member
states have no discretion, as they would in the absence of a treaty, to be
generous with their judicial resources. They cannot create avenues for
concurrent jurisdiction that are not built into the Convention.,
1 7
The Brussels Convention restricts concurrent jurisdiction in a second
way. As a double convention, 118 its jurisdictional rules are enforced at two
stages. 119 First, the court in which the complaint is filed (F1)120 verifies
jurisdiction directly. It must accept a case that has been filed correctly under a
with his memorable depiction of plaintiffs in U.S. courts: "As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a
litigant drawn to the United States. If he can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a
fortune. At no cost to himself, and at no risk of having to pay anything to the other side." Smith Kline &
French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, 733 (C.A. 1982). Parallel proceedings tend to breed
acrimony among courts. One court may enter orders that undermine or interfere with proceedings in
another. In extreme cases, a court may attempt to enjoin a party from proceeding in the other forum. See,
e.g., Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (affirming
district court's order enjoining the remaining defendants from seeking an injunction from courts in the
United Kingdom); British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1985] 1 A.C. 58 (H.L.) (enjoining Laker
from prosecuting an antitrust action in U.S. courts with respect to certain non-U.S. defendants); see also
Midland Bank v. Laker Airways, [1986] 1 Q.B. 689 (Eng. C.A.) (enjoining Laker's U.K. liquidator from
filing an antitrust action in the United States against an English bank). See generally Andrew N.
Vollmer, U.S. Court Use of the Antisuit Injunction to Control International Forum Selection, in
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION OF FORUM SELECTION, supra note 55, at 237.
115. In contrast, jurisdictional grants in multilateral treaties are typically permissive-the treaty
authorizes, but does not require, states party to exercise jurisdiction on specified bases. See, e.g.,
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, art. 3, 20
U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Aircraft Offenses Convention] (stating when contracting
states "are competent to exercise jurisdiction"); see also infra text accompanying notes 203-224.
116. In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court's minimum contacts test operates solely as a ceiling.
State courts may exercise jurisdiction up to the limits of the Due Process Clause, but nothing in the
federal Constitution requires that they enact long-arm statutes that are so expansive.
117. The incentives for jurisdictional overreaching are also greatly reduced. There is no need
for courts to stretch treaty rules out of concern that a meritorious claim may fail to find a forum.
Theoretically at least, every claim will find a forum, so long as procedural requirements (such as service
of process and statute of limitations) are met. In contrast, outside the Brussels regime, plaintiffs can be
denied access even to a forum with statutory jurisdiction. See, e.g., Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi,
467 N.E.2d 245, 250 (1984) ("Although the existence of a suitable alternative forum is a most important
factor to be considered in applying the forum non conveniens doctrine, its alleged absence does not
require the court to retain jurisdiction."). In Pahlavi, the plaintiffwas left with essentially nowhere to go.
118. A single convention (known in French as a convention simple) regulates jurisdiction at the
enforcement stage, but not when suit is brought. A double convention (convention double) regulates
jurisdiction at both stages. See generally Arthur T. von Mehren, Enforcing Judgments Abroad:
Reflections on the Design of Recognition Conventions, 24 BROOK. J. LNT'L L. 17 (1998).
119. In fact, it is somewhat of a misnomer to label double conventions such as the Brussels
Convention as "enforcement ofjudgments" conventions. Rather, they are, as the full title to the Brussels
Convention suggests, treaties on both the exercise ofjurisdiction and the enforcement ofjudgments.
120. It has become common to refer to the court to which litigants initially turn and proceed to
judgment as the F1 court. The national court to which litigants subsequently turn seeking recognition
and enforcement of the Fl judgment is referred to as the F2 court.
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Convention provision, and it must dismiss an action not based on a specific
provision. After the proceeding has gone to judgment, Fl's jurisdictional
ruling may then be reviewed by the courts of other EU member states (F2
courts). 121 At this stage, F2 courts must independently determine whether Fl's
initial exercise of jurisdiction was in conformity with the treaty. If not, they
are obliged to deny recognition to the judgment. 122 Thus, by means of two
jurisdictional filters--one at the filing stage and one at the enforcement
stage-the Convention deters the proliferation of new forms of concurrent
jurisdiction. The ECJ monitors both filters. Under a protocol to the
Convention, national courts funnel difficult issues of treaty interpretation to
the ECJ, whose rulings help to ensure uniform interpretation of the
Convention.123
Parallel Litigation: In international litigation, it is not unusual for
essentially the same dispute to come before courts in two or more countries
concurrently. This phenomenon can even occur among courts within the same
country.124 In the absence of a treaty, it may be that neither court will be
obliged to stay or dismiss its proceedings. Both cases may go to judgment,
creating the potential for at least partially conflicting results.
The Convention avoids this result by establishing a first-to-file rule.
Once an action has begun in one court with jurisdiction, other courts must
dismiss subsequently filed suits, even if there would otherwise be a
jurisdictional basis in the Convention for the second suit to proceed
elsewhere. 125 Thus, litigation is narrowly circumscribed. 126 Once suit has been
brought, it is clear where it will be adjudicated. Litigants cannot invoke
provisions of national law that would allow the case to be moved to another
forum. Such provisions are trumped by the Convention. 127
121. Indirect review of this sort does not occur in every case. It is most common where the
prevailing party in F1 cannot enforce the judgment in F1 but rather must locate assets elsewhere. In the
run-of-the-mill case, the prevailing party can locate assets in F1 to enforce the judgment there without
having to go to another member state. That is most often the case, however, when both plaintiff and
defendant are domiciled in the same member state, a situation in which the Convention does not apply.
122. Under a convention simple or in the absence of a treaty altogether, F2 courts can choose to
enforce an Fl judgment that rests on an approach to jurisdiction unknown in the F1 legal system. See,
e.g., Nippon Emo-Transp. Co. v. Emo-Transp., Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1215 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (recognizing
Japanese judgment on basis other than that articulated by Japanese court). Under the Brussels
Convention, F2 courts enjoy no such discretion.
123. Under the 1971 Protocol, the ECJ provides "rulings on the interpretation of the
Convention." ECJ Judgments Protocol, supra note 78, art. 1. Because the ECJ is not, for these purposes,
a court of first instance, the mechanism by which interpretive issues come before the ECJ is similar to
that under the EC Treaty. Compare id. art. 3, with TREATY OF ROME, supra note 71, art. 234 (formerly
art. 177). In cases pending before national courts, when a question arises for which resolution "is
necessary to enable [the national court] to give judgment" that court "shall" request a ruling from the
ECJ. Id. Although the ECJ does not act in an appellate capacity, these preliminary rulings have a strong
tendency to unify the interpretations of the Convention reached by the national court systems.
124. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)
(addressing the issue of abstention in parallel litigation in state and federal court).
125. See Brussels Convention, supra note 76, art. 21 (mandatory lis pendens rule applies when
the second suit is "the same cause of action and [is] between the same parties").
126. The exceptions are instances in which one or more parties goes to a second court seeking
preliminary relief. See Brussels Convention, supra note 76, art. 24 (using the term "provisional
measures"). In that case the second court's proceedings are unlikely to interfere with the main suit. The
former are typically instituted to preserve assets, and they relate to the merits only tangentially.
127. For recent U.K. case law on forum non conveniens, see Lubbe v. Cape plc, [2000] 259
N.R. 18 (H.L.); Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., 1987 A.C. 460 (H.L.). In practice, this has
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Cumulatively, these aspects of the Convention have increased certainty
for litigants. Jurisdiction under the treaty is designed to be a clear-cut
determination with no leeway for national legislatures or courts to expand or
contract access to court. In addition, because exclusive jurisdictional
provisions are built into the framework, there are categories of cases in which
plaintiffs have only one forum open to them. 128
C. The Brussels Convention as Paradigm: More Recent Developments in
the Harmonization of Procedural Law
A bold step for one generation looks tame to the next. Though the
Brussels Convention was a leap forward in 1968, for the next generation of
Europeans it had not gone far enough. Aspects of the Convention were
129discriminatory and therefore unsuitable as a model for a global treaty.
Moreover, the document was narrow in scope. It did not address service of
process, choice of law, evidence, remedies, and other aspects of procedure
subject to wide divergence under national law.' Finally, the Convention's
chief strength-promoting a deep level of harmonization among a tightly knit
community of states-could also be a potential liability. A successful regional
system could become insular. 131 European states constructing their own
private regime might develop chauvinism and inflexibility that would impede
harmonization on a broader geographic basis.
132
Had none of these limitations and flaws been addressed, the Brussels
Convention would not merit extended discussion. From the beginning,
however, it has been a work in progress. Before its ink had dried, work began
on harmonizing choice-of-law rules.' 33 For subsequent treaties and legislative
measures, the Brussels Convention has served as a model for a pan-European
meant that British and Irish courts have had to abandon the doctrine of forum non conveniens in cases
falling within the Brussels or Lugano Conventions.
128. In this sense, the concept of exclusive jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention is
different from exclusive jurisdiction in the United States. In the United States, exclusive jurisdiction
refers to instances in which Congress has provided that certain suits be adjudicated in federal rather than
state court (e.g., federal antitrust suits), or where Congress has created specialized courts (e.g., the Court
of International Trade). In neither situation has Congress directed that whole classes of cases that arise
under state law be heard exclusively in particular federal courts chosen based on their geography.
129. The very jurisdictional provisions that the Convention abolishes with respect to
individuals and entities domiciled in the EU are expressly permitted against defendants domiciled
outside the EU. See Brussels Convention, supra note 76, art. 4.
130. None of the Convention's rules on jurisdiction or recognition applies to bankruptcy
litigation, for instance, or disputes over wills. Other areas also excluded are taxation, administrative law,
criminal law, social security, arbitration, and property settlements resulting from divorce. See id. art. 1.
131. See Katharina Boele-Woelki, Unification and Harmonization of Private International Law
in Europe, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA: FROM NATIONAL CONFLICT RULES
TOWARDS HARMONIZATION AND UNIFICATION, supra note 69, at 61, 61-77.
132. Some in Asia and North America had precisely this fear in seeing the large volume of
substantive harmonization initiatives in the lead-up to "Europe 1992." See, e.g., Gary Clyde Hufbauer,
An Overview, in EUROPE 1992: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 1 (Gary Clyde Hufbauer ed., 1990)
(referring to "Fortress Europe").
133. See MARIO GIULIANO & PAUL LAGARDE, REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON THE LAW
APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, 1980 O.J. (C 282) 1, available at http://www.rome-
convention.orglinstruments/ireplagardeen.htm (Belgian proposal circulated in September 1967). The
Giuliano and LaGarde report is the official commentary on the Rome Convention, infra note 135,
prepared by the two co-rapporteurs for the project.
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approach to harmonization with uniformity and legal certainty as the central
principles. The Convention's importance has grown with time, allowing it to
become a template for the Lugano Convention 134 and the Rome
Convention. 135 It is also a proof text for those who supported the major
changes in EU procedural law brought about by the Treaty of Amsterdam.1
36
Through its progeny, the Convention has come to represent a certain
orthodoxy that remains at the center of the European program to unify
procedural law. The influence of the Brussels Convention is amplified through
the following treaties that have come after it:
The Lugano Convention: The 1988 Lugano Convention extended the
Brussels Convention framework beyond the EC's borders. The two texts are
similar in substantive scope, in provisions desired to limit concurrent
jurisdiction, and in restricting judicial discretion. They differ in two main
respects: geographic scope (Lugano brought into the fold six countries that
were not members of the EC in 1988) and uniformity of interpretation (the
Lugano treaty lacks any formal mechanism for assuring uniform interpretation
among the many domestic courts called upon to apply it). The success of the
Lugano Convention has significantly strengthened the Brussels approach to
harmonization and judicial cooperation. In the absence of a network of
interstate obligations comparable to those binding upon countries party to the
Brussels Convention, 11 it was not clear that uniform interpretation of the
Lugano Convention would be achieved. More than a decade of case law,
however, confirms that judicial interpretation of the Lugano Convention
closely parallels that of the Brussels Convention, 139 and its impact on
scholarship and the practicing bar in European Free Trade Area (EFTA)
countries has been profound. In five instances, membership in the Lugano
Convention has been a way station on the road to full EU membership. By
2004, the Brussels/Lugano regime applied in twenty-eight countries.
The Rome Convention: Whereas the Lugano Convention extended the
Brussels framework geographically, the 1980 Rome Convention14 extended it
134. Lugano Convention, supra note 79.
135. See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19, 1980, 1998
O.J. (C 27) 36 (entered into force Apr. 1, 1991) [hereinafter Rome Convention].
136. Regulatory power in the EU is divided horizontally among EU institutions, and also
vertically between these institutions collectively and the individual countries that make up the EU. See
Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 205 (1990).
From the 1950s until the 1990s, the powers of the Community legislative institutions did not extend to
regulating the judicial procedures of the courts of individual member states. This changed in 1999, when
the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force and modified the existing EU treaties to confer this power.
By way of comparison, it is interesting to note that in the early part of the twentieth century the United
States refrained from ratifying the Bustamante Code and fully participating in negotiations with Latin
American states in part because at that time many viewed such private law initiatives as outside the
treaty power of the federal government. See Tatiana B. De Maekelt, General Rules of Private
International Law in the Americas: New Approach, 177 RECUEIL DES COURS 193, 227 (1982-IV); Kurt
Nadelmann, The Need for Revision of the Bustamante Code on Private International Law, 65 AM. J.
INT'L L. 782 (1971).
137. For a detailed discussion of the differences, see the authoritative report on the Lugano
Convention by P. Jenard and G. Moller. Jenard & Moller, supra note 79, at 69-86.
138. For EC states, the Brussels Convention was one of a long list of interstate commitments.
That is not true of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) states that ratified the Lugano Convention.
139. See Tebbens, supra note 79.
140. Rome Convention, supra note 135.
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beyond jurisdiction to choice of law. The goals of the work on jurisdiction
could not be fully realized, 14 1 some argued, without a choice-of-law treaty
based on similar priorities: greater legal certainty for transnational litigants,
less competitive distortion in the common market,143 and a narrowing of the
divergence among EC member states in the area of private law.
144
In terms of uniformity and universality, Rome improved upon what
Brussels had achieved by steering clear of discriminatory rules. Whereas the
Brussels regime allows exorbitant provisions to be used against defendants
domiciled outside the EU, the Rome regime is neutral towards foreign
litigants and foreign fora. A choice-of-law provision selecting a forum outside
the EU is enforceable, and in the absence of such a forum selection clause the
choice-of-forum analysis performed by courts does not depend on the
nationality of the parties or their domicile.
Private Law Harmonization Based on the Treaties of Maastricht and
Amsterdam: The Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam were unlike earlier
EC instruments. They were preceded by a widespread popular debate about
the federal vocation of the EU145 and about the degree to which the lives of
EU citizens should be subject to regulation from Brussels rather than from
national or subnational governments. In the private law realm, these treaties
were the first expressly to provide a legal basis for EU legislation in private
law, thus breaking very sensitive ground. 46 They were able to do so in part
because of the early success of the "Europe 1992" program,1 47 the fall of the
Berlin Wall, and the success of the Brussels, Rome, and Lugano Conventions,
which fueled the European Parliament's call for a greater EU component to
European private law. 4C In just the past few years, the result has been a series
of major harmonization initiatives: jurisdictional rules in matrimonial matters
(Brussels II), EU-wide rules for serving process and taking evidence, and
proposed legislation on choice-of-law rules in torts and other areas of non-
contractual liability (Rome II). The February 2000 Commission Green Paper
141. GIULIANO & LAGARDE, supra note 133, para. 3 (Rome Convention described as a "natural
sequel" to the Brussels Convention); see also Rome Convention, supra note 135, 2d pmbl.
142. GIULIANO & LAGARDE, supra note 133, para. 3 (referring to the "urgent necessity for
greater legal certainty in some sectors of major economic importance").
143. Id. Distortion can arise in European product and service markets when, for example, the
validity of a cause of action or a defense is allowed to depend on the forum's choice-of-law rule.
144. See id. para. I (referring to an "element of urgency" and concern that "the existing
divergences would become more marked").
145. See, e.g., Position of the Italian Government on the Intergovernmental Conference for the
Revision of the Treaties, http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/ms-doc/state-it/itallen.htm (Mar. 18,
1996). The Maastricht Treaty was the first instance in which a major revision to the EU treaties was
subjected to public referendum in several EU member states.
146. So sensitive that Denmark, England, and Ireland negotiated opt-out rights with respect to
those provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty constituting the so-called "third pillar," which extends EU
competence to the realms of justice, security, and foreign policy. See generally LEVASSEUR & SCOTT,
supra note 38, at 992-1006.
147. See Hufbauer, supra note 132.
148. The European Parliament's first resolution on private law harmonization was in May
1989. See Resolution on Action to Bring into Line the Private Law of the Member States, 1989 O.J. (C
158) 401 (calling for a "common European Code of Private Law"). Just five years later, the Parliament
urged that the EU "promote harmonization and standardization at [a] world or European level within
organizations such as UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL, and the Council of Europe." Resolution on the
Harmonization of Certain Sectors of the Private Law of the Member States, 1994 O.J. (C 205) 518.
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on barriers to cross-border litigation proposes additional robust efforts to
harmonize procedural law in the EU. 149
The Hague Conference: Another direct offspring of the Brussels
Convention is the Hague Conference's ongoing effort to create a Convention
on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters. The project was proposed by the United States, which
initially envisioned a treaty that would make it marginally easier for U.S.
judgment creditors to enforce U.S. judgments abroad. The proposal came soon
after the U.S. Supreme Court had quite narrowly interreted the Hague
Service Convention t5 ° and the Hague Evidence Convention as supplements
to U.S. procedural rules rather than as presumptive replacements for those
rules. Delegates representing countries other than the United States repeatedly
referred to the two cases at issue, Aerospatiale and Schlunk, as reasons why a
single convention would be inadequate-it would be a superficial stab at
harmonization that U.S. courts might interpret as merely optional and
supplemental. The scope and structure of the United States proposal was
rejected as failing to address the main reasons for poor cooperation between
U.S. courts and others-overly aggressive U.S. jurisdictional rules.
Though the scope of the Hague project has been drastically cut back,
152
the history of the project thus far demonstrates the existence of a critical
number of countries in favor of harmonizing procedural law in the path of the
Brussels Convention and its progeny.
ALI/UNIDROIT: Contemporaneous with the Hague Judgments Project is
a joint endeavor of the American Law Institute (ALl) and UNIDROIT that
seeks to bridge differences between U.S. and European approaches to
pleading and discovery in transnational commercial litigation and arbitration.
The proposed "Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure" and the
accompanying Principles pick up where successive Hague initiatives have left
off. The ALI/UNIDROIT effort moves from jurisdiction to discovery,
pleading, and trial. Going beyond judicial cooperation mechanisms (that leave
149. Council Regulation 2201/2003 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental Responsibility, 2003 O.J. (L 338) 1;
Council Regulation 1348/2000 on the Service in the Member States of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 37; Council Regulation 1206/2001 on
Cooperation Between the Courts of the Member States in the Taking Of Evidence in Civil or
Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 174) 1; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the
Council on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations, COM(2003) 427 final at 1; Green Paper
on Legal Aid in Civil Matters: The Problems Confronting the Cross-Border Litigant, COM (2000) final
at 51. See generally European Union, Activities of the European Union: Judicial Cooperation in Civil
Matters, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s22003.htm.
150. See Volkswagenwerk AG v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988) (ruling that the Hague
Convention is inapplicable where foreign entity has a U.S. subsidiary that can be served with process
within the United States).
151. See Socirti Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987)
holding that the Hague Evidence Convention is not the exclusive means of obtaining evidence located
abroad in a Convention country and that U.S. litigants may resort to direct discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
152. How a project that initially sought a treaty addressing a broad range of issues was pared
down to one addressing only judgments reached pursuant to forum selection clauses is summarized in
Trevor C. Hartley & Masato Dogauchi, Draft Report on the Preliminary Draft Convention on Exclusive
Choice of Court Agreements, Prelim. Doc. No. 26 (Dec. 2004), http://hcch.e-
vision.nl/upload/wop/j dgm_pd26e.pdf.
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national approaches in tack), its proposals essentially hybridize U.S. and
continental European approaches to the mechanics of dispute resolution.
Under the direction of eminent U.S. and European academics, 153 the proposed
Principles are nearing final approval by ALI and by UNIDROIT. Approval
will set the stage for efforts to secure their adoption by national legal systems
and their acceptance by a broad cross-section of transnational litigants. 154 If
widely implemented, this project will infuse the harmonization movement
with additional momentum.
155
D. The Brussels and Rome Conventions in Practice
At this point, the impact of these various harmonization initiatives on
injured parties may seem abstract. Precisely how do the forum limitations
built into the Brussels Convention (and hence any worldwide treaty based on
the Convention) restrict efforts to police grave human rights violations
through private rights of action? Before this question is taken up in full in Part
IV, consider the following hypothetical case.
The Case of the Migrant Workers
A large wine producer in Country A hires temporary workers from
Country B to pick grapes on a seasonal basis. 156 The workers are Muslim and
legally reside in Country B. When the workers arrive, they find the working
and living conditions unsanitary and unsafe. Working hours far exceed the
number permitted in either Country A or B. A few of the workers report these
health and safety violations to local authorities, who are in the pocket of the
wine company. The complaining workers are first subjected to racial and
religious insults by local police. Later, company thugs kidnap and severely
beat the most outspoken workers, two of whom simply disappear without a
trace. Local authorities knowingly look the other way and obstruct efforts to
investigate the beatings. Suppose further that a statute in Country B allows
workers and their estates to bring civil actions for injuries suffered from acts
of retaliation associated with reporting work-related health or safety
violations. How would this case be treated under the Brussels Convention?
Under Article 3, the Brussels Convention's default rule, plaintiffs always
have the right to sue the company and the police officers where the defendants
153. The project was proposed to ALl by Geoffrey Hazard, Jr. of the University of
Pennsylvania. On behalf ofUNIDROIT, the lead has been taken by Michele Taruffo of the University of
Pavia and Rolf Stfrmer of the University of Freiburg.
154. For the origins of this project, see John J. Barcelo Im, Transnational Rules of Civil
Procedure: Rules and Commentary, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493 (1997). For the latest draft, see
AL1!UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 14.
155. See, e.g., Catherine Kessedjian, First Impressions of the Transnational Rules of Civil
Procedure, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 477 (1998); Rolf Stirner, Some European Remarks on a New Joint
Project of the American Law Institute and UNIDROIT, 34 INT'L L. 1071 (2000); Gerhard Walter &
Samuel P. Baumgartner, Utility and Feasibility of Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure: Some
German and Swiss Reactions to the Hazard-Taruffo Project, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 463,476 (1998).
156. Both CountryA and Country Bare EU member states.
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are domiciled, which is Country A. Of course, this right may not be helpful.
The courts of Country A may be less than hospitable to suits by foreign
seasonal workers against a large local employer, especially if the suit alleges
that local officials also conspired based on ethnic and religious bigotry. As a
forum, Country A has the further drawback that police and local officials may
enjoy immunity there. Plaintiffs will also find it expensive and inconvenient to
litigate in Country A, given the geographical distance from their ordinary
place of residence in Country B, the language differences, an unfamiliar legal
system, and the difficulties in obtaining and monitoring local counsel. 
157
Choice of law may also pose problems. Under the Rome Conventions, it is
Country A's substantive law that will apply. Legislation enacted in Country B
for the purpose of protecting whistleblowers and seasonal guest workers likely
will not be applied if the suit goes forward in Country A despite what a U.S.
lawyer would view as Country B's strong interest in protecting its residents.
158
Do any other articles of the Convention apply? The plaintiffs might try
Article 5.1,159 on the theory that their suit is "related to" their contract of
employment. This avenue would not take them very far. Under this provision,
supplemental jurisdiction rests with the courts in the forum where the work
was performed, which, like Article 3, leads to the courts of Country A. They
might try Article 5.3, on the theory that the threats and the beatings were torts.
This tack would not help either. Article 5.3 grants jurisdiction in tort suits to
the courts in the place where "the harmful event occurred." If all the threats
and blows were delivered in Country A, Article 5.3 also leads to the courts of
A. Subsequent medical treatment, long-term disability, and emotional
suffering that take place later in the workers' home country do not, under ECJ
case law, make Country B the place where the harmful event occurred.
160
What about Article 5.5? Suppose the wine-producing operation in
Country A is actually a branch of a larger company that is incorporated and
based in Country B. Will this connection to Country B allow the plaintiffs to
sue there? Again, probably not. Article 5.5 provides a supplemental
jurisdictional rule in the case of disputes "arising out of the operations of a
branch, agency, or other establishment." Although the suit here does arise out
of the operations of a branch, under Article 5.5, suit must be brought where
the branch, agency, or establishment is located. In our case, the branch is
located in Country A.161 Applying the relevant articles of the Convention, the
plaintiffs seem to have no choice but to bring suit in an inconvenient and
perhaps hostile forum.
Could Country B remedy this situation by adopting a special
jurisdictional provision to go along with the substantive statute it has enacted?
Could it, based on legislative findings that the rights of seasonal workers are
157. The conditions for obtaining legal aid may be quite different in the two EU member states.
158. By way of comparison, that interest in worker protection was decisive in Alaska Packers
Ass 'n v. Indus. Accident Comm 'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
159. In matters relating to individual contracts of employment, suit may be brought anywhere
the employee habitually carries out his or her work. Brussels Convention, supra note 76, art. 5.1.
160. See Case C-220/88, Dumez France SA v. Hessische Landesbank, 1990 E.C.R. 1-49.
161. The courts of B may be open if the plaintiffs can show that officials at the main branch
directed the illegal acts or actively concealed them. Even if that were so, it would not provide a basis for
jurisdiction over Country A's local authorities.
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at risk, pass a statute specifying a narrow set of civil claims 162 that may be
adjudicated in the courts of Country B, if the plaintiff is domiciled in Country
B or was recruited or hired in Country B? Again, the answer is no. Such a
jurisdictional statute would be contrary to the Brussels Convention, whose
jurisdictional provisions on employment contracts, torts, and other causes of
action are intended to be exhaustive and preemptive. The law would be struck
down either by Country B's own courts or by the ECJ. 163
This hypothetical case illustrates the difficulty of bringing transnational
civil human rights suits within the Brussels Convention framework. An
employee recruited in Country B to work abroad for a local subsidiary of a
multinational company headquartered in Country B cannot bring suit against
the subsidiary in Country B, 164 even where the complaint alleges conduct
contrary to important legislative policies of Country B. The case also shows
that the Convention's role in harmonizing jurisdictional rules has lessened the
ability of states party, acting individually, to vindicate the rights at stake
here-freedom from torture, disappearance, and workplace retaliation. Before
the Convention, there was greater variation among national jurisdictional
rules. 165 National legislatures had more flexibility to direct their courts to
adjudicate certain extraterritorial 166 violations of their laws. In becoming
parties to the Convention, member states have lost much of this flexibility. In
becoming a party to the Brussels Convention, Country B, above, has lessened
its ability to act unilaterally in the sphere of adjucative jurisdiction.
Of course Country B could lobby for EU-wide legislation to address the
abuses featured in the case. Success, however, would require the votes of
other EU states, and any legislation almost certainly would stop short of
remedying the basic forum problem: the disadvantages that foreign seasonal
162. For example, claims for severe physical injuries inflicted under color of law and suffered
in retaliation for reporting health and safety regulations.
163. Strictly speaking, the ECJ does not have authority to strike down or invalidate national
laws. It has no appellate jurisdiction under either Protocol I to the Convention or the Treaty of Rome. Its
jurisdiction in our hypothetical case would derive from Article 234 (formerly Article 177) of the Treaty
of Rome, which enables the ECJ to give preliminary rulings interpreting the Convention or other sources
of Community law. Such requests for preliminary rulings are, in theory, similar to certified questions in
U.S. practice. In both instances, one court (a national court, in the EU context) asks another court (the
ECJ)--which has authority to interpret a particular body of law (here, the Brussels Convention and EU
law)-to answer a specific question of interpretation so that the requesting court can apply this reading
to the facts at hand. In practice, a number of ECJ preliminary rulings have come quite close to telling
national courts exactly what they should do, even that they should invalidate national legislation after
receiving the ECJ's preliminary ruling. See, e.g., The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte
Factortame Ltd., 1990 ECR 1-2433; see generally Paul R. Dubinsky, The Essential Function of Federal
Courts: The European Union and the United States Compared, 42 Am. J. COMI'. L. 295, 325-40 (1994).
164. It maybe that a public authority in Country B can take some kind of action, but only if it is
authorized to act with respect to extraterritorial conduct by the company.
165. The rules were less flexible than in common law countries, but more flexible than today.
166. Extraterritorial in the sense that the acts and omissions that are actionable-the threats, the
beatings, the retaliation, the police's failure to intervene-all took place outside Country B. A creative
lawyer in the United States might recast the claim in territorial terms by recharacterizing the issue as the
company's failure to warn the workers when recruiting them that they would be exposed to dangerous
conditions, hate crimes, and workplace retaliation. The Supreme Court rejected that argument in Saudi
Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (dismissing attempt to find a jurisdictional exception under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330, §§ 1602-11, & §§ 1332, 1391, 1441 (1976)
[hereinafter FSIA], in a false imprisonment claim by an American engineer recruited in the United
States to work in a Saudi hospital). There is no reason to believe European courts would be any more
sympathetic to such an attempt at recharacterizing a claim in order to overcome a jurisdictional obstacle.
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workers may face in foreign courts. 167 It is likely, however, that the EU
legislative process would fail to address even a subset of that problem-
disadvantages that seasonal workers face in foreign courts when their most
fundamental rights are in jeopardy. Nor would the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) fill the gap. A presumption in favor of Country A's
procedural rules would make it difficult for the ECHR to overturn the result of
litigation in Country A.
The plaintiffs need the ability to go to another forum in the first instance,
as plaintiffs in the United States sometimes may turn to federal rather than
state court. The EU, however, has no comparable dual court system, and the
Brussels Convention firmly bars attempts to make courts like those in Country
B function as an alternative forum. Nor does the ECHR fulfill that function.
The Brussels and Lugano Conventions select proper fora on an ex ante
basis through factors that the dominant legal culture deems to be neutral. The
treaties greatly limit forum shopping. They do not privilege any class of rights
(such as fundamental human rights) as worthy of special jurisdictional
provisions to ensure adequate policing of infringements of those rights in
particular cases. The same one-dimensional treatment holds true under the
proposed Rome II Convention, which in specifying choice-of-law rules fails
to assure that suits relating to human rights abuses will not be frustrated by
local laws that protect the perpetrators. Finally, the example shows how rules
that may make sense in a wrongful termination dispute between an employer
and an employee make less sense in suits alleging systemic bias, violence, and
denial of fundamental rights. The assumption that every forum operates
without bias is questionable in the case of guest workers in general, and
especially so when the claim relates to horrendous human rights violations.
Should claims relating to disappearance, ethnic cleansing, and other
atrocities be privileged under procedural law? Part III analyzes a key shift in
the human rights movement, a shift that has put that question at the crossroads
of competing visions of the future of international law.
III. THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW MOVEMENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Like the harmonization of procedural law, the movement to advance
international human rights is in flux. Initially, the two developments had much
in common. In an era defined by the dominance of the nation-state, both put
forward a more cosmopolitan vision. Both contributed to a new consensus that
took hold in the latter half of the twentieth century: the nation-state's days as
the sole subject and object of international law were numbered. The path to
greater worldwide prosperity and respect for human dignity lay in building
167. A typical EU Directive might identify certain substantive rights to be protected and
require that member states enact their own legislation providing a right to seek relief in local courts. In
our case, that would probably not go far in making Country A a reasonable forum for the plaintiffs,
given the allegations in their case. Note that the EU at present has no real equivalent to the U.S. system
of lower federal courts able to protect rights that might otherwise go unvindicated because of actual or
perceived bias in local courts. Suits of this type cannot be filed initially in any EU court.
168. In order to get their claim before the ECHR, the plaintiffs would first need to work their
way through the court system of Country A. See European Human Rights Convention, supra note 98,
art. 35 ("The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted").
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new international institutions and promoting a wider diffusion of freedom:
free markets, free elections, freedom from persecution, and freedom of
thought and expression.
Despite these early similarities, the two movements have diverged. Part
II focused on one cause of the divergence-the growing efforts to unify
procedural law, disproportionately shaped by continental European notions of
legal procedure. Although the basic elements of this continental tradition had
been in place for quite some time, the European influence was accentuated by
two developments in the latter half of the century-economic globalization
and European integration. Both developments also were to influence the
human rights movement.
This Part examines the growing tension between private law unification
and human rights enforcement not from the vantage point of private law but
rather from that of international human rights law, international criminal law,
and international humanitarian law, three areas traditionally seen as residing at
the core of public international law. 169
Private international law was not alone in responding to globalization.
The new field of human rights law also developed in response to certain
phenomena associated with globalization-the globalization of war, 170 the
globalization of legalism, 171 and the globalization of rights. 172 Initially, the
movement's response to these trends was to draft treaties. Activists in the
early decades after World War II, when the modem human rights movement
really took shape, were consumed with codifying basic human rights and
imposing limits on the conduct of warfare. But when the existence of these
treaties failed to lessen the extent or the frequency of atrocities, human rights
law shifted its focus from codification to enforcement. What was needed was
less moral suasion and more coercion. In the last two decades of the twentieth
century, human rights NGOs focused on domestic courts as the institutions
with the ability to force states to act.1
73
At first blush, ordinary civil and criminal tribunals, creatures of national
constitutions and statutes, might seem an odd choice. If the executive and
legislative branches of the U.S. government had shown little inclination to
stop the waves of "disappearances" in Latin America, 174 what could be
169. In the last decade, the three have converged. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, in LES
NATIONS UNIES ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE 229 (Luigi Condorelli et al. eds., 1996);
Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes ofAge, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 462 (1998).
170. The century ushered in the first truly global wars but also saw a great proliferation of
atrocities committed in so-called internal conflicts, those tacking a clear nexus to an international
dispute. Among the challenges to international criminal law and humanitarian law has been addressing
both the globalization of armed conflict and the historical legacy that conflicts confined to one nation lie
outside customary international law. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal
Atrocities, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 554 (1995).
171. See MICHAEL BYERS, THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (2000).
172. See generally MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 1-26 (2000).
173. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Haitian Refugee Litigation: A Case Study in
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 18 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1 (1994); Michael Ratner, How We
Closed the Guantanamo HIV Camp: The Intersection of Politics and Litigation, 11 HARV. HuM. RTS. J.
187 (1998).
174. In the aftermath of the Pinochet case, infra note 309, the U.S. government declassified
some of its archives with respect to U.S. policy toward Chile in the 1970s and 1980s. These archives
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expected of the U.S. judiciary? The answer, quite simply, was fidelity to the
rule of law. What the human rights community banked on (correctly so, in
retrospect) was that those domestic court systems that were steeped in the rule
of law would not ignore flagrant violations of international law, even when
the events had taken place abroad. Moreover, they accurately predicted that
some domestic courts would conclude that violations of rights of such
fundamental stature had to trigger a remedy of some kind.
The timing of this new focus on domestic courts in the late 1980s and
1990s coincided with perhaps the greatest geographic expansion of judicial
review ever.' 75 Newly invigorated domestic courts had the resources and the
authority to succeed where other institutions had failed. When they spoke, the
political branches of constitutional democracies listened. Thus, the human
rights world, like the world of international private law, began to see domestic
courts as institutions central to a new and better international legal regime.
There was, however, a major problem. Domestic courts had not been
created with transnational human rights enforcement in mind. Procedural laws
had evolved in response to garden-variety domestic litigation. Rules of civil
procedure developed to fit two-party, private law disputes in which parties
were readily accessible and few intractable issues of evidence were presented.
Indeed, most criminal procedure systems incorporated a bias against policing
transnational criminal offenses.' Limits on the exercise of legislative and
adjudicative jurisdiction arose from international law, 17 7 constitutional and
quasi-constitutional doctrines,1
78 and prudential principles. 1
79
Despite their common focus on the procedural rules of domestic courts,
the two movements reacted quite differently to what they found. For
proponents of unification, national procedural rules needed to be more alike.
The main problem, as they saw it, was that prospective litigants confronted an
assortment of national rules that varied too much from country to country.
Transacting parties were left adrift in a sea of legal uncertainty. By contrast,
show much U.S. complicity, as it applied little pressure to stop the "disappearances." See Peter
Kornbluh, George Washington Univ. Nat'l Sec. Archive, Chile Documentation Project, at
http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/latin-america/chile.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2004).
175. Since the late 1980s, new constitutional courts have been introduced (or have come under
serious consideration) in China, Japan, South Africa, Vietnam, the states of the former Soviet bloc, and
throughout Latin America. See Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of
Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 711-18 (2001); Daisy M. Jenkins, From Apartheid to
Majority Rule: A Glimpse into South Africa's Journey Towards Democracy, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 463 (1996); Luz Estella Nagle, The Cinderella of Government: Judicial Reform in Latin America, 30
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 345 (2000); Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of
Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of China, 19 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 161 (2001); Brian J. M. Quinn, Vietnam's Continuing Legal Reform: Gaining Control over the
Courts, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 355 (2003); Symposium, Constitutional "Refolution" in the Ex-
Communist World: The Rule of Law, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 45 (1997). Constitutional debate and
drafting have also moved to center stage in the EU. See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,
2004 O.J. (C 310) 1 (not yet entered into force).
176. See, e.g., The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66 (1825); The Queen v. Keyn, 2 Q.B.D. 90 (1876).
177. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES §§ 47-53 (on sovereignty).
178. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-58 (1909) (territoriality);
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1897) (act of state doctrine); Buttes Gas & Oil Co. v.
Hammer, 1982 A.C. 888 (H.L.) (non-justiciability and act of state doctrine).
179. See, e.g., Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., 1987 A.C. 460 (H.L.) (forum non
conveniens).
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those concerned with human rights enforcement saw a different picture. The
problem, as they saw it, was that jurisdictional rules, choice-of-law rules,
statutes of limitations, and other procedural devices incorporated assumptions
that did not fit the new task that domestic courts faced-or that human rights
advocates would have them face. Rules that in most cases embodied a sensible
balancing of competing principles (for example, assuring access to justice but
also comity toward courts in other countries) were not suitable for disputes
presented against a backdrop of widespread atrocities.
A. The Human Rights Movement and the Unification Movement. Early
Similarities
Like the unification movement, the human rights movement had its roots
in the nineteenth century. Its origin lay in the great moral and humanitarian
struggles of that century: abolishing slavery, 180 securing rights for women, 181
safeguarding civilians and prisoners of war during wartime, 182 and protecting
persecuted religious minorities.' 83 Each of these causes became the focus of
an international movement with an international network of supporters. Each
sought to end a moral evil not in one place but everywhere. During an era
dominated by nationalism, these precursors to the modem human rights
movement espoused universalism.
18
Both the unification and the human rights movements also faced two
common obstacles: the nation-state and legal positivism. In the nineteenth
century, codification of private law on a national level had done much to
displace principles long embedded in the jus commune. In place of principles
that had been shared across much of Europe for centuries, the modem nation-
state now enacted new laws more reflective of national identities. 185 Legal
positivism provided an intellectual justification for this particularism.
Positivism's supporters claimed that the ultimate source of law was neither
tradition, nor religion, nor reason. It was power. Law was what the sovereign
decreed, and in an age in which each nation-state had its own sovereign but
Europe as a whole had none, the call for pan-European legal unity faced a
180. In 1802, Denmark became the first country to prohibit its nationals from participating in
the slave trade. See PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
VISIONS SEEN 310 n.6 (1998). For early British and American legislation, see Act for the Abolition of
the Slave Trade, 1807, 47 Geo. 3, c. 36, at 73-77 (U.K.), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF
THE HISTORY OF THE SLAVE TRADE TO AMERICA 659-69 (Elizabeth Donnan ed., 1931); Act To Prohibit
the Importation of Slaves, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 (1807). For early treaties, see General Act for the
Repression of the African Slave Trade, July 2, 1890, 227 Stat. 886, 1 Bevans 134; Slavery Convention,
Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253.
181. See generally ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1975).
182. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV
Convention), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.
183. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 86-99 (1996) (focusing on minorities after World War I).
184. See generally A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN
AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 91-156 (2001).
185. In common law countries, legal positivists tried to replace judicial lawmaking in private
law with statutory law. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799
(1941) (focusing on U.S. doctrine).
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formidable roadblock. The calls for unity appeared to be at odds with the
emergence of distinct national legal cultures.
Similarly, legal positivism and the nation-state obstructed the early
human rights movement. 186 Positivism and its account of law's legitimacy
posed a large theoretical obstacle to universalism. If the ultimate source of law
was power, how could individual rights be universal? Indeed, the positivist
conception saw rights as defined by a list of variables: geography, historical
tradition, and the specific characteristics of the claimant (nationality, gender,
race, religion, or property ownership). Rights did not rest on a common notion
of humanity. An English man could vote, while an English woman could not.
A white Belgian was free while a black Congolese was enslaved. The czar's
police protected Christian shops, but not Jewish shops.
B. The Early Human Rights Movement: Codification
The two movements also shared an early focus on harmonization and
codification. Indeed, it was codification that most clearly demarcated the
transition from nineteenth-century moral movements to modem human rights
activism. 187 Abolitionists, suffragists, pacifists, and others were essentially
single-issue groups. 188 What mattered was securing progressive legislation on
their issue. They did little to build a broader, progressive rights movement
with foundational texts at its core. That task fell to the immediate post-World
War II generation, which authored the Nuremberg Principles,'8 9 the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 190 and the two International Covenants. 191
These texts soon became a secular canon of sorts. As in private international
law, momentum gathered behind treaty drafting for the sake of producing
consensus. The Universal Declaration in particular was instrumental in
drawing together previously isolated, single-issue groups and transforming
them into networks based in different parts of the world pushing a broad rights
agenda. 192
But this codification of human rights law came at a price. The immediate
postwar texts were abstract and vague. They served as important tools in
186. See Christian Joerges, The Science of Private Law and the Nation-State, in THE
EUROPEANIZATION OF LAW: THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 47 (Francis Snyder ed.,
2000).
187. See Thomas Buergenthal, Codification and Implementation of International Human
Rights, in HUMAN DIGNITY: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 15 (Alice H. Henkin ed.,
1979).
188. See, e.g., Mary L. Clark, The Founding of the Washington College of Law: The First Law
School Established by Women for Women, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 613,657-61 (1998).
189. U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.Comm'n 374, U.N. Doc.
AICN.4/SER.A/1950 (defining the following as crimes under international law: crimes against peace,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and complicity in any of the foregoing).
190. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
191. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2
(1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
192. See ANTONIO CASSESE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD 24-47 (1990); M. Glen
Johnson, A Magna Carta for Mankind: Writing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY OF ITS CREATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
1948-1998, at 26-27 (M. Glen Johnson & Janusz Symonides eds., 1998).
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causing rights advocates of different stripes to coalesce into an effective
political and legal movement, but the texts were able to do so only by stating
rights at a high level of abstraction. 193 They glossed over fundamental
differences in rights traditions and avoided articulating the source of rights or
resolving priorities among competing claims of right.1 94 Instead, they largely
codified a set of least common denominators: prohibitions on slavery, torture,
arbitrary arrest, and inequality before the law; rights to freedom of movement,
freedom of expression, and free exercise of religion. Even the more
controversial social and economic entitlements articulated in the Universal
Declaration (e.g., rights to employment, education, and medical care) were
stated so abstractly and with so little attention to implementation that they
elicited little opposition.
The Declaration was a beginning, however, not an end. It begot more
specific, more juridically worded texts over the next few decades, when
codification dominated the human rights agenda. The result was a series of
widely ratified treaties: the Genocide Convention, 195 the two International
Covenants, 196 the Race Discrimination Convention, 197 the Refugee
Convention, 198 the Supplementary Convention on Slavery, 199 and the
Prostitution Convention. 200 These texts-what one might call "First
Generation Human Rights Treaties"201-were the first global instruments to
193. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 190, art. I ("All human beings are bom free
and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards
one another in a spirit of brotherhood.").
194. Compare id. art. 7 (prohibiting "incitement" to discrimination), with id. art. 19
("[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression"), and id. art. 20 (freedom of
association).
195. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
196. ICCPR, supra note 191; ICESCR, supra note 191.
197. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar.
7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
198. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
199. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Slavery
Convention].
200. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the
Prostitution of Others, July 25, 1951, 96 U.N.T.S. 271. From efforts early in the twentieth century to end
the "white slave traffic," prostitution was viewed in part as the exploitation of a vulnerable class of
persons and hence as what would later be termed a human rights issue. See id. pmbl. (stating that
prostitution is "incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person" and a danger to the
"welfare of the individual"); see also International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave
Traffic, May 18, 1904, 35 Stat. 1979, 1 L.N.T.S 83.
201. Dean Koh divides the postwar human rights movement into four discrete stages. Harold
Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 293, 301-
04 (2002). In focusing on treaties, however, it is useful to speak in terms of two stages. By First
Generation Human Rights Treaties, I mean to refer to instruments that primarily define rights and
offenses. They tend to ignore questions of enforcement and procedure. Examples include the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the Genocide Convention, the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Convention on
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Although the peak period for drafting
these instruments was from 1945 until the early 1970s, the work continues. See, e.g., Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, arts. 6-8, U.N. Doe. 32/A/CONF.183/9, reprinted in 37
I.L.M. 999, 1004-09 [hereinafter Rome Statute of the ICC] (codifying definitions of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes); Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (providing an extensive list of positive and negative rights). In contrast, Second Generation
Human Rights Treaties focus on mechanisms for ensuring accountability and victim compensation,
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articulate universal entitlements and define universal crimes. Although they
were more specific than the Universal Declaration, in terms of enforcement
they failed to require states party to commit to few specific obligations.
202
C. From Codifying Rights to Enforcing Rights: Second Generation Treaties
Despite their high ratification rates, 20 3 First Generation Treaties fell
short in terms of implementation and observance. In the first few decades after
the Universal Declaration, systemic repression and flagrant atrocities
remained common in many of the states that had ratified the treaties.
2 0 4
Wholesale violations typically were met with silence. Thousands
"disappeared" in Latin America. Millions were murdered in Cambodia.
Freedom of expression was suppressed across Eastern Europe. Apartheid
dominated South Africa. The Geneva Conventions were repeatedly ignored in
the Vietnam War.
205
At the heart of First Generation Treaties were flaws that explained this
failure. The drafters of these texts assumed that future international
institutions would be able to expose and sanction noncompliance. In the late
1940s, it was anticipated that a permanent international criminal court with
jurisdiction broader than that of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals would
206soon be created. Nearly sixty years passed before such a court was born.
Without the anticipated enforcement mechanisms, texts such as the Genocide
Convention came to be viewed by some as merely aspirational, though that
typically with respect to grave human rights offenses and atrocities. See infra notes 218-223 and
accompanying text.
202. Consider one representative provision, Article 23.1 of the ICCPR, which states that "[t]he
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and
the State." ICCPR, supra note 191, art. 23.1. Not only does the provision fail to say how and to What
extent society is to protect the family, it also fails to address potentially conflicting principles such as
individual liberty and public welfare. With provisions like these, states were able to claim that First
Generation Treaties were a valid but indeterminate source of law, and that the task of balancing
competing principles was left to national governments.
203. The ICESCR has 149 states party; the ICCPR has 152 states party; the Convention on the
Elimination of Race Discrimination has 177 states party; the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women has 174 states party. See Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (June 9, 2004). The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
has 140 states party. U.N. Treaty Collection, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty2ref.htrn
(Feb. 5, 2002). The Genocide Convention has 133 states party. U.N. Treaty Collection, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treatyl gen.htm (Oct. 9, 2001).
204. In an important piece of empirical research, Professor Hathaway concludes that actual
compliance with human rights norms has not greatly improved. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights
Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1939 (2002) (undertaking a "large-scale quantitative
analysis of the relationship between human rights treaties and countries' human rights practices" and
finding that noncompliance is still common among states that ratify human rights treaties).
205. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions]. For
analysis of violations of the Geneva Conventions during the Vietnam War, see GEORGE S. PRUGH, LAW
AT WAR: VIETNAM 1964-1973 61-78 (1975).
206. See Genocide Convention, supra note 195, art. VI (referring to trial by either a court in the
state in which the offense was committed or by an "international penal tribunal"); see also M. Cherif
Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need To Establish a Permanent
International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11 (1997).
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outcome was clearly not what the generation drafting the Convention had
intended.
In the absence of international criminal tribunals or courts with broad
jurisdiction over human rights claims, 20 7 hope was placed in treaty-monitoring
208committees. Experience soon demonstrated, however, that these committees
were flawed in design. Lacking compulsory, unannounced, on-site inspection
powers and prompt access to witnesses and documents, these committees all
too often had to rely for information on the government under review.
Moreover, the monitoring process soon came to be plagued by habitual
lateness. Even today, it is not uncommon for human rights committees to
report on regimes that are no longer in power rather than on the current
209
situation.
In addition, First Generation Treaties did not stray far from the core
Westphalian principles of state sovereignty. Even the Genocide Convention, a
treaty drafted during the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials and concurrent with the
retreat of Westphalianism on other fronts, largely conformed to the
Westphalian mold. By its terms, the Convention failed to contain any express
provision stripping state officials of immunity. It did not limit the ability of
states to ratify the treaty subject to extensive reservations, understandings, and
declarations.210 The Convention contained no express statement that the
prohibition on genocide was a jus cogens norm being codified, rather than
created, by the Convention text. Nor did it impose any affirmative obligations.
Ratifying states did not undertake to prosecute violators, to extradite them to
207. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) was created in 1959, but initially as a court
with a very limited ability to redress human rights abuses. Its jurisdiction extended solely to complaints
against states party, and an individual's ability to bring a complaint depended upon the defendant's
consent. Even then, individual complaints could not be heard by the Court unless deemed admissible by
the European Commission on Human Rights. See generally The European Court of Human Rights:
Historical Background, Organisation and Procedure, at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDoes/-
HistoricalBackground.htm (Sept. 2003). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was created in
1979 with similar constraints. See Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American
System, OEA/ser.L.V/II.82 doc. 6 rev. 1, at 13 (1992), http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/-
general.html.
208. E.g., the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the Migrant
Workers Committee, and the Committee on the Rights of the Child.
209. For evaluation and criticism of human rights committees, see generally INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MECHANISMS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAKOB TH. MOLLER (Gudmundur
Alfredsson et al. eds., 2001); THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (Philip
Alston ed., 1992).
210. The United States did not ratify the Genocide Convention until 1987. See Genocide
Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-93 (1994). In ratifying the treaty, the
United States entered numerous reservations, understandings, and declarations. U.S. Reservations,
Declarations and Understandings, International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 132 Cong. Rec. S1355-01 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986), reprinted in 28 LL.M. 782.
States' ability to opt out of various provisions of human rights treaties was confirmed by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in a 1951 advisory opinion concerning reservations to the Genocide
Convention. The Court concluded that the standard for judging the compatibility of reservations to a
human rights treaty was less stringent than that stated in Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, supra note 11, art 19. See Interpretation of Reservation to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28).
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other states, or to take any specific measures on behalf of communities
targeted for genocide.
21 '
1. Expanding National Jurisdiction: The Hague and Montreal
Conventions
In the decade after the Genocide Convention, national courts seemed
unlikely institutions to place at the center of any regime for enforcing
international law. To the extent that such courts had applied international law
in the past, they had done so only sporadically, hampered by the territorial
nature of their jurisdiction. Throughout the nineteenth and the early twentieth
centuries, municipal courts were quite limited in their ability to adjudicate
disputes involving conduct that had taken place outside their borders. The
territorial nature of this limitation had many manifestations: the dominance of
the doctrine of lex loci delicti (the law of the place of wrong) in choice of
law,212 the presumptive territorial limits of prescriptive jurisdiction, 213 the
breadth of the act of state doctrine, 2 4 and the great stinginess with which res• 215 w
judicata and collateral estoppel were applied across borders. Even when
increasing numbers of judicial opinions began to signal the decline of
territoriality as an exclusive principle of jurisdiction and choice of law,
2 16
211. For example, the prerogative, in some circumstances, of courts in Country B to entertain a
civil or criminal action for a violation that took place in Country A, when Country A has declined to act.
212. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934) (maintaining that the
law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury).
213. It was not until 1945 that courts committed the United States to an interpretation of the
Sherman Act that included the possibility of its extraterritorial application. Compare United States v.
Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (sitting by designation) (finding that the Sherman Act
applies to antitrust conspiracy carried out abroad with intent to affect prices in the United States
combined with actual effects on the U.S. market), with Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.
347, 356 (1909) (interpreting the Sherman Act and concluding that "the general and almost universal
rule must be that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful is determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done"). On the presumptive territoriality of criminal legislation, see, e.g.,
[Montevideo) Treaty on International Penal Law, Jan. 23, 1889, art. 1, reprinted in Harvard Law Sch.
Research in Int'l Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 439,
638 (Supp. 1935) ("Crimes are tried by the courts and punished by the laws of the nation on whose
territory they are perpetrated, whatever may be the nationality of the actor, of the victim, or of the
injured party.").
214. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897):
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state,
and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must
be obtained through the means open to... sovereign powers as between themselves.
215. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (noting that traditionally "[n]o law ha[d]
any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived").
216. As early as 1927, the S.S. Lotus case affirmed the principle that legislative jurisdiction
could rest on harmful effects within the forum even if the conduct producing those effects took place
wholly outside the forum. See Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept.
7) [hereinafter S.S. Lotus] (finding that Turkish courts could exercise criminal jurisdiction based on
injuries sustained by the crew of a Turkish ship as a result of the negligence of the captain of a nearby
French vessel). In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the U.S. Supreme Court
overruled Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), a bastion of territoriality, and announced that the
touchstone for personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts no longer was the defendant's physical presence
within the forum. The focus shifted to the extent of the defendant's contacts with the forum.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction soon received limited embrace from the EU. See Cases 48/69, 49/69 & 51-
57/69, Imperial Chemical Indus. Ltd. v. Commission, 1972 E.C.R. 619 (the Dyestuffs case) (upholding
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extraterritorial bases of jurisdiction did not immediately find their way into
multilateral treaties.
Global terrorism changed this. So did the war on illegal drugs and
attempts at creating an effective nonproliferation regime. Repeated hijackings,
hostage takings, 21 assassinations, leaks of Western technology to the Eastern
bloc, and steadily rising movements of narcotics into Western countries
demonstrated the inadequacy of territoriality as an exclusive principle of
either legislative or adjudicative jurisdiction. These and other transnational
offenses became the driving force for the creation of the Second Generation
Treaties, texts focused on violence perpetrated by non-state entities against
civilians, usually for political ends. 218 This second generation of treaty-
making stepped outside the Westphalian mold largely out of urgent political
necessity. 2 9 Those who drafted the Hague 
220 and Montreal Conventions,
221
two early Second Generation Treaties, were responding to a pervasive
problem for which conventional juridical responses had been unsuccessful.
Efforts to apprehend and try hijackers and other perpetrators of transborder
crimes repeatedly had been hampered by the limited jurisdiction of national
authorities.222
Western leaders were under enormous pressure to stop the violence,
which in some places had become politically destabilizing. It was in this
context that states became more willing to reevaluate a central aspect of state
sovereignty: the exclusive jurisdiction of each nation-state over conduct
223carried out within its borders. The Hague and Montreal Conventions
jurisdiction over defendants alleged to have operated a cartel outside the EU that produced effects within
the EU).
217. Most prominently, the 1979 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the hostage crisis
that ensued. See generally AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN: THE CONDUCT OF A CRISIS (Warren
Christopher et al. eds., 1985). See also S.C. Res. 579, U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2637th mtg., at 24, U.N.
Doe. S/17685 (1985) ("condemn[ing] unequivocally all acts of hostage-taking and abduction").
218. Typically, victims were targeted based on their nationality by perpetrators seeking to
extract something from that country's government. For example, the Palestinian Liberation
Organization's taking hostage Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics followed this pattern.
219. See, e.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 146, U.N.
GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/39 (1979) (stating that international
cooperation to combat hostage taking is "urgently necessary"); Treaty for the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 28,
1973, pmbl., 28 U.S.T. 1977, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 (stating that the international community is
"[c]onvinced that there is an urgent need to adopt appropriate and effective measures").
220. Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1643, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Unlawful Aircraft Seizure Convention].
221. Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
222. In the United States, the Antihijacking Act of 1974 was enacted to fill a jurisdictional void
and to implement the Unlawful Aircraft Seizure Convention, supra note 220, which requires signatory
nations to extradite or punish hijackers present in their territory. Antihijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-366, 88 Stat. 409 (1974).
223. One indication of the perceived urgency was the speed with which the new antiterrorism
treaties were ratified. Whereas forty years passed before the United States ratified the Genocide
Convention, supra note 195, (and even then with two reservations and five understandings), it took only
six years for the United States to ratify the Aircraft Offenses Convention, supra note 115, less than a
year for the Unlawful Aircraft Seizure Convention, supra note 220, and one year for the Montreal
Convention, supra note 221-all without reservations, understandings, or declarations. These
Conventions, together with the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra
note 219, entered into force, on average, within three years of being opened for signature, a brisk pace
for multilateral treaties open to worldwide ratification.
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reflected a new focus on accountability 224 and a new willingness to use
domestic courts to combat offenses that typically produce transnational
effects. The jurisdictional scheme of both the Hague and Montreal
Conventions was a first response to a set of new problems for which the
traditional jurisdictional point of view offered no simple answer: acts of
violence committed across multiple geographic boundaries in a matter of
hours; violence directed against civilians (often indiscriminately) and harming
victims of many nationalities; and violence perpetrated by self-proclaimed
liberation movements possessing some but not all the characteristics of states.
The Conventions responded by authorizing national courts to exercise
jurisdiction over perpetrators, even in the absence of any connection between
the offense and the forum.
2. Expanding National Jurisdiction: National Legislation and Case
Law
The new jurisdictional principles embodied in the antihijacking treaties
soon made their way into national law. This process began in the United
States in the late 1970s, to be followed two decades later by countries in
Europe, the Commonwealth, and to a lesser extent elsewhere. Now, with the
recent entry into force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC), 225a wave of national implementing legislation incorporating
extraterritorial jurisdiction has begun.
Although these new extraterritorial provisions vary in form from one
country to another, they all represent a challenge to the future of procedural
harmonization. Each variant, each national method of implementing Second
Generation Treaties poses a challenge to decades of efforts to marginalize
theories of jurisdiction that rest upon tenuous connections between the forum
and the dispute. In common law countries, for example, international human
rights actions have given new life to power theories of jurisdiction." 6 In the
civil law world, universal jurisdiction 227 has been the primary approach. Yet a
224. For a critique of what are often vague calls for accountability, see Jos6 E. Alvarez,
Accounting for Accountability, 37 COLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1003 (1999).
225. Ninety-seven countries have now ratified the Rome Statute. Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, Ratification Status, at http://un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last
visited Dec. 12, 2004).
226. Power theories of jurisdiction developed in England and reached their height in the
United States in the late nineteenth century. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Under such
theories, the sovereign's physical power over a person-the ability of a sheriff or some other state
official to arrest a defendant-was the basis for adjudicating claims against that person.
227. Universal jurisdiction is defined in many different ways. Recent variations can be found in
the work of the International Law Association, the case law of the ICJ, and in several widely recognized
documents. RESTATEMENT (THIiRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 423 (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS]; PRINCETON UNIV., THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (2001), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-lapa/univejur.pdf
(hereinafter THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES]; Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction in Respect
of Gross Human Rights Violations: An African Perspective, http://www.kituochakatiba.co.ug/cairo-
arusha.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2004). What all of these definitions have in common is that universal
jurisdiction arises by virtue of the universality and severity of the offense and not by reason of any
contacts between the offender, the offense, and the forum.
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third doctrine-passive personality jurisdiction-has also gained ground 228
Though different in form, these jurisdictional approaches stem from a
common motivation to deny impunity to those who violate the norms
articulated in First Generation Treaties. When enforcing human rights today,
even national courts in the EU have gone down a road that ultimately may
undermine the Brussels Convention.
a. The Rebirth of Power Theories of Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction
Through Physical Presence
The story repeatedly told about power theories of jurisdiction is that they
are shadows of their former selves-that conceptions of jurisdiction based
purely on the physical power of the state and its tribunals over the defendant
have long been in decline in favor of theories grounded in fairness,
convenience, and comity. Once dominant in the common law world, these
theories are now widely regarded as "exorbitant" 229 infringements on the
prerogatives of other states and as unfair to litigants.
This story is only partly true. Power theories have indeed been in decline
for decades. But recently they have enjoyed a limited resurgence in two fields:
international human rights and international criminal law. Consider transient
jurisdiction as practiced in England and Ireland.23° This concept refers to a
court's ability to adjudicate a claim against a defendant based solely on the
defendant's having been served with process (formerly called a "writ") while
physically present within the country. 231 Until recently, the assertion of
transient jurisdiction was the most common basis for the jurisdiction of courts
in England and Ireland.232 When these countries acceded to the Brussels
228. Passive personality jurisdiction is the ability of a state to apply its law to a dispute
(typically a criminal matter) based on the fact that nationals of that state were deliberately targeted for
injury based on their nationality. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 227, § 402
cmt. g.
229. The term "exorbitant" is used here as a term of art employed in private international law.
In the Hague Judgments Convention negotiations, the term was defined as follows:
[J]urisdiction is exorbitant when the court seised does not possess a sufficient connection
with the parties to the case, the circumstances of the case, the cause or subject of the
action, or fails to take account of the principle of the proper administration ofjustice. An
exorbitant form of jurisdiction is one which is solely intended to promote political
interests, without taking into consideration the interests of the parties to the dispute.
Hague Preliminary Draft Convention Doc. No. 7, supra note 47. See also supra notes 80-99 and
accompanying text (discussing the Brussels Convention's role in curtailing exercises of exorbitant
jurisdiction in EU member states).
230. See Colt Indus. v. Sarlie, 1 W.L.R. 440 (C.A. 1966) (service on an American defendant
temporarily staying at a London hotel); H.R.H. Maharanee Seethadevi Gaekwar of Baroda v.
Wildenstein [1972] 2 Q.B. 283. See generally INT'L LAW ASS'N, HUMAN RIGHTS COMM., REPORT ON
CIVIL ACTION IN THE ENGLISH COURTS FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (2001).
231. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 629 n.1 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(distinguishing between "jurisdiction premised solely on the fact that a person is served with process
while physically present in the forum State" from service where the defendant has other connections to
the forum and the act of service merely provides notice).
232. See John Russell & Co. v. Cayzer Irvine & Co., [1916] 2 A.C. 298, 302 (H.L.):
The root principle of the English law about jurisdiction is that the judges stand in the
place of the Sovereign in whose name they administer justice, and that therefore whoever
is served with the King's writ, and can be compelled consequently to submit to the decree
made, is a person over whom the courts have jurisdiction.
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Convention, however, it was on the condition that the exercise of jurisdiction
based on the physical presence of the defendant in the forum had to be
curbed.233 The practice was expresslY prohibited with regard to defendants
domiciled in Convention countries, 23 and it was widely anticipated that the
practice would eventually fall into disuse in cases outside the Convention's
scope as well, thus bringing about a major procedural rapprochement between
common law countries and the European continent.235
Both the specific doctrine of transient jurisdiction and theories based on
territoriality in general lost ground in England and Ireland in the 1980s and
1990s, even in cases not governed by the Brussels Convention's jurisdictional
rules. 236 British courts more readily allowed plaintiffs to serve process outside
the country, based on a prima facie showing that the case had some
connection to the forum and that the forum was an appropriate place to try the
action.237 In a widely followed case, British courts held that jurisdiction based
on extraterritorial service could be upheld where an initial tort injury was
sustained abroad, based on allegations that subsequent emotional and mental
injuries were sustained within the territory after the plaintiff had moved to
238
England. They also became more willing to apply the doctrine of forum non
conveniens so that cases that had made it through the jurisdictional gate solely
by service of process on English soil could be dismissed if such cases lacked a
real connection to the United Kingdom.239 Forum non conveniens soon spread
240
throughout the common law world.
But see Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "'Power" Myth and
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 295-96 (1956) (arguing that pure transient jurisdiction, in the
absence of other connecting factors, has rarely been applied in the United States and had little support in
English legal history).
233. Classically, a defendant could be made to defend a civil suit based solely on his having
been served with process while within the court's territory, even if that individual's physical presence
was temporary and even if the lawsuit had nothing to do with that presence. For an extreme example, see
Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (D. Ark. 1959) (service on defendant while on board an airplane
entering Arkansas airspace). Once served with process in the forum, the defendant remained subject to
the court's power even after leaving the state. A corollary was also true, at least at common law:
individuals physically outside a state's territory and not served within the forum could not be subjected
to the power of the state's tribunals.
234. See Brussels Convention, supra note 76, art. 3; Lugano Convention, supra note 79, art. 3;
European Council Regulation 44, supra note 77, Annex 1.
235. In civil law countries, the act of service, by itself, cannot confer jurisdiction upon the
court. See generally MERRYMAN, supra note 25.
236. For example, cases in which the defendant is not domiciled in any Brussels Convention
country.
237. See BRITISH CIV. P.R. 6.20 (specifying when a British court may permit service of a claim
form on a defendant located outside of England). See generally WILLIAM BINCHY, IRISH CONFLICTS OF
LAW 123-91 (1988); CROMIE, supra note 89, at 29-35; P.M. NORTH & J.J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND
NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 181,285-332 (13th ed. 1999).
238. See A1-Adsani v. Gov't of Kuwait, 100 I.L.R. 465 (1994) (unpublished). Subsequently, the
Court of Appeal denied the plaintiffs claims for damages, relying on the Kuwaiti government's
sovereign immunity. AI-Adsani v. Gov't of Kuwait, 107 I.L.R. 536 (C.A. 1996). The ECHR upheld that
ruling by a vote of nine to eight. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R. 752. For other
common law decisions in which subsequent effects of physical injury have greatly broadened the scope
of what is deemed to be territorial, and thus actionable, see Vile v. Von Wendt, [1979] 103 D.L.R. 356
(Can.) and Flaherty v. Girgis (1985) 4 N.S.W.L.R. 248 (Austl.).
239. See, e.g., Connelly v. R.T.Z. Corp., 1998 A.C. 854 (H.L.); Spiliada Maritime Corp. v.
Cansulex, 1987 A.C. 460 (H.L.). See generally NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 237.
240. See, e.g., Laurie v. Carroll (1958) 98 C.L.R. 310 (Austl.); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235 (1981); Spar Aerospace Ltd. v. Am. Mobile Satellite Corp., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 205 (Can.); Vivion
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Meanwhile, territoriality also declined in the United States. In terms of
personal jurisdiction, Pennoyer 241 gave way to International Shoe. 242
Jurisdiction increasingly turned less on the place of service and more on the
quantity and quality of contacts between the defendant and the forum. 243
Within a generation of International Shoe, nearly all U.S. jurisdictions had
enacted new long-arm statutes reflecting the shift.244 These statutes elevated
the importance of state interests and the contacts between the defendant and
the forum state. They also displaced personal service as the principal basis for
acquiring jurisdiction over foreign defendants. 245 Even when the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of transient jurisdiction,246 no general
revival of transient jurisdiction followed. State legislatures did not seize upon
Burnham as an invitation to expand the use of territoriality-based forms of
jurisdiction. It remained quite rare for the jurisdiction of a court in the United
States to rest solely on service of process within the jurisdiction, 47 and legal
scholars of all stripes continued to condemn transient jurisdiction, particularly
as applied to foreign nationals. 248 Elsewhere in the common law world,
249territoriality also yielded to contacts and reasonableness. In Canada,
India, 25 and South Africa, 251 personal jurisdiction in garden-variety civil
Gill, Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Ireland, 4 J. IRISH Soc'Y EUR. L. 2, 4-17
(1980).
241. In the United States, throughout the nineteenth and into the early twentieth centuries, the
jurisdiction of state courts was thought to be rigidly defined by state geographical boundaries. See
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (state courts cannot acquire jurisdiction by service upon individual
defendants located outside the state, even if those defendants have extensive contacts with the state).
However, state courts may exercise jurisdiction over individuals served with process within the state's
borders, even if those individuals lack minimum contacts with the forum. See Burnham v. Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) ("Nothing in International Shoe or the cases that have followed it,
however, offers support for the very different proposition petitioner seeks to establish today: that a
defendant's presence in the forum is not only unnecessary to validate novel, nontraditional assertions of
jurisdiction, but is itself no longer sufficient to establish jurisdiction.").
242. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
243. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
244. See FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 74-87 (5th ed. 2001).
245. See Scott D. Irwin, Burnham v. Superior Court of California: The Final Word on
Transient Personal Jurisdiction?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 613 (1992).
246. See Burnham, 495 U.S. 604 (upholding the exercise of jurisdiction by California over
someone who was served with process while in California, although that person's contacts with the state
arguably did not meet the International Shoe standard). Burnham did not address the exercise of
transient jurisdiction over natural persons who are neither U.S. citizens nor individuals domiciled in the
United States.
247. It is, of course, still routine for defendants to be served with process while physically
present within the state where the court sits, but usually the defendant is domiciled in the state or the
physical act of serving process is supported by the defendant's prior minimum contacts with the state,
such as having negotiated contracts within the state or having directed products into the state. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Edgel, Proper Application of CRS §15-12-723 For Recovery of Estate Assets, 32 COLO. L. 59,
61 (2003) ("many attorneys routinely provide personal service"); Miserando v. Resort Props., 345 Md.
43, 58 ("personal delivery of process .. .is a time-honored method of acquiring personal jurisdiction.").
248. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 284-85 (2d ed. 1995) (characterizing
Burnham as "an anomaly in a body of doctrine that is otherwise founded on fairness to the defendant");
Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially over International Defendants: Critical Comments on
Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 593; Russell J. Weintraub, An Objective
Basis for Rejecting Transient Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 611 (1991).
249. See J.G. CASTEL, CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS 199-228 (4th ed. 1997).
250. See generally PARAS DIWAN, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, INDIAN AND ENGLISH (3d
rev. ed. 1993).
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litigation moved toward flexible standards of fairness to the defendant and
away from the rigid application of territorial principles.
But just as power-based theories of jurisdiction were on the verge of
being thoroughly marginalized, territoriality experienced a resurgence in the
fields of human rights and international criminal law. This resurgence has
even affected countries with no tradition of resting jurisdiction on physical
presence. The Barbie252 case is a good illustration. Klaus Barbie',s presence in
France was held to be sufficient for French courts to try him for his role in
deporting the Jewish community and resistance fighters of Lyons to Nazi
concentration camps. 253 When Barbie argued that French courts lacked
jurisdiction over him because agents of the French state had secured his
physical presence in France by abduction, French courts rejected the
argument. Ordinarily, physical presence alone was not a lawful basis for the
exercise of jurisdiction by French courts, but in a surprisingly broad opinion,
France's highest court went beyond the fact that Barbie's crimes had been
committed in France. Power theories of jurisdiction could be valid in France,
at least in one category of cases-crimes against humanity. As the Cour de
Cassation put it:
[T]he crimes against humanity with which Klaus Barbie, who claims German nationality,
is charged in France where those crimes were committed, do not simply fall within the
scope of French municipal law but are subject to an international criminal order to which
the notions of frontiers and extradition rules arising therefrom are completely foreign.
254
The jurisdictional ruling in Barbie was important in several respects.
First, Barbie broke new ground in France (and by extension elsewhere in the
civil law world), where power theories of jurisdiction had never enjoyed the
influence they had in common law countries. The Cour de Cassation seemed
to go out of its way to observe that ordinary principles of French procedural
law could be displaced where jus cogens violations were alleged and certain
imperatives of the international legal order were at stake. Barbie's
jurisdictional objections were treated like technicalities in a case that the
Court was determined not to decide on the basis of technical procedural
doctrines.
Courts elsewhere have similarly upheld jurisdiction despite the
defendant's abduction from another country. Israeli agents kidnapped Adolf
Eichmann from Argentina to stand trial in Israel for his role in the destruction
of European Jewry. 255 More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
251. See PETER B. KUTNER, COMMON LAW IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: CONFLICT OF LAWS AND
TORTS PRECEDENTS 31-40 (1990).
252. Federation nationale des d port~s et intemrs rrsistants et patriotes v. Barbie, Cass. crim.,
Dec. 20, 1985, J.C.P. 1986, II G, No. 20, 655, translated in 78 I.L.R. 125, 128 [hereinafterBarbie].
253. French authorities apprehended Klaus Barbie by arranging for his abduction in Bolivia,
where he had taken refuge for several decades after World War 11. Barbie was then brought to France
and tried. Id. at 125.
254. Id. at 130.
255. Eichmann was convicted of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and mass murder in his
capacity as a Nazi official carrying out the Final Solution against the Jewish people. The Israeli Supreme
Court ruled that he lacked standing to raise his kidnapping as a challenge to the jurisdiction of Israeli
courts. C.A. 336/61, Eichmann v. Attorney-General of Israel, 16(3) P.D. 2033, translated in 36 I.L.R.
277, 304-08 (1962) [hereinafter Eichmann]. There was a certain irony in this jurisdictional ruling. On
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exercise of jurisdiction in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, in which agents
of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration orchestrated a Mexican
citizen's abduction from Mexico. 256 Moreover, recent studies suggest that the
practice of government-sponsored abduction for the purpose of bringing
atrocity perpetrators to justice before domestic courts is on the rise.257 Several
common law jurisdictions have effectively endorsed the practice, at least in
extreme cases, 258 based on the principle that allegations of severe violation of
fundamental human rights norms sometimes call for extraordinary
jurisdictional reaching.259
Territoriality has also enjoyed a resurgence in civil actions arising out of
grave human rights violations. In the United States, the landmark case in this
resurgence is Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 26 a seminal case in what has become a
line of atrocity suits in which personal jurisdiction is based solely on service
of process within the jurisdiction. In Filartiga, the Second Circuit interpreted
the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) 261 as authorizing U.S. courts to exercise
jurisdiction over a Paraguayan national in a civil suit alleging the torture of
another Paraguayan citizen in Paraguay. The defendant's only link to the
the merits, the Israeli Supreme Court rejected Eichmann's "following orders" defense, maintaining that
in the modem era individuals-and not just states-are subjects of international law. But ruling on
Israel's jurisdiction, the Court held that where the defendant's presence in court had been procured by
abduction in violation of another country's territorial rights, only the injured state and not the abducted
individual possesses standing to challenge the forum court's jurisdiction. Id. at 286.
256. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992). Alvarez-Machain, a
physician, was accused of forcibly administering drugs to an agent of the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration to assist efforts to obtain information through torture. After the Supreme Court's
decision upholding jurisdiction, Alvarez-Machain was tried and acquitted in a federal court in Texas.
Subsequently, he brought a suit under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) against the U.S. officials
involved in his kidnapping. See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004). The Supreme Court
ruled that he was not entitled to a remedy under the ATCA. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct.
2739 (2004).
257. Compare Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, Jurisdiction over Persons Abducted in
Violation of International Law in the Aftermath of United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 5 U. CHI. L. ScH.
ROUNDTABLE 205 (1998), with Felice Morgenstem, Jurisdiction in Seizures Effected in Violation of
International Law, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 265 (1952). See also Vincent Coussirat-Coustere & Pierre-
Michel Eisenmann, Enldvement des personnes privges et le droit international, 76 REVUE GENtRALE DE
DRoIT INTERNATIONALE PUBLIC 346 (1972); Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State
over Fugitives Brought from a Foreign Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 IND. L.J.
427 (1957); Bartholomd de Schutter, Competence of the National Judiciary Power in Case the Accused
Has Been Unlawfully Brought Within the National Frontiers, 1 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
88 (1965). Before Cambodian dictator Pol Pot's death, the United States and other governments made
preparations to bring him to trial in Canada, through kidnapping if necessary. See Elizabeth Becker, U.S.
Spearheading Effort to Bring Pol Pot to Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1997, at Al; Allan Thompson,
Canada Faces Hurdles for Trial of Pol Pot: U.S. Proposes to Use Our Powers of Extradition, TORONTO
STAR, June 24, 1997, at Al 3; A Trial for Pol Pot, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1997, at Al 8.
258. Increasingly, the subject of abduction is addressed in two types of national statutes: those
originating in the effort to root out World War II war criminals who illegally took refuge outside of
Europe after the war, and those implementing the Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 201. Examples of
statutes that expressly permit prosecution of defendants whose sole connection to the forum is having
been forcibly dragged there include War Crimes Act, 1945, amended by War Crimes Amendment Act,
1988 (Austl.); Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, R.S.C., ch. 24 (2000) (Can.), available at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/c-45.9 (last visited Dec. 12, 2004) (implementing Canada's ratification of the
Rome Statute); War Crimes Act, 1991, c. 13 (U.K.); PARLIAMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, REPORT OF
THE WAR CRIMES INQUIRY cmt. 744 (1989).
259. See, e.g., In the Matter of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. 1468, 1478 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Raoul
George Niccolo et al., 27 C.M.L.R. 173 (1990).
260. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004).
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United States was his physical presence in New York at the time he was
served with process. Nevertheless, the Filarti a court likened the alleged
offense (torture) to eighteenth-century piracy; f2 both plagued all civilized
communities, not just the states whose nationals had been struck in any
particular instance. Both offenses were potentially destabilizing to the
international community. Ordinary principles of jurisdiction could not apply
with their usual force to either offense.
Since 1980, more than one hundred ATCA suits have been filed in U.S.
263courts. Jurisdiction has been based on service of process on defendants
temporarily present in the country while in federal custody awaiting
extradition; 264 while temporarily present in New York for a visit to the United
Nations and other unrelated activities; 265 and while an invited speaker at a
university. 266 Despite the tenuousness of these jurisdictional contacts, tag
jurisdiction ATCA cases have had a substantial influence on judicial
interpretation of human rights norms in the United States. They are a major
substantive category of cases requiring U.S. courts (principally federal courts)
267to interpret and apply international law. ATCA cases, along with claims
brought under the Torture Victim Prevention Act of 1991 (TVPA), have
addressed such issues as what constitutes state action for purposes of
assessing alleged violations of international law; 268 the circumstances under
which the statute of limitations can be tolled in a suit for forced
disappearance; 269 whether non-state actors can commit violations of
international law;270 whether immunity has been waived;271 whether plaintiffs
have exhausted foreign remedies; 272 what constitutes command
262. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
263. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1948); 14A ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3661 (3d ed. 2002).
264. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (process served on former
Argentine general in custody in California awaiting hearing on extradition to Argentina); see also Forti
v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
265. See Kadic v. Karad~id, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, 1996
WL 164496, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
266. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (Guatemalan general served
with papers while at Harvard University).
267. Other major categories of cases in U.S. courts involving issues of international law
concern the FSIA, supra note 166, and treaty interpretation. To some extent, cases in these other two
categories also have ATCA issues.
268. See Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 449 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that indirect
benefit from unlawful state action is not sufficient); Bao v. Li, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2000)
(holding forced laborers unable to establish claim against private corporation under Torture Victim
Prevention Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) [hereinafter TVPA]).
269. See Cabello Barrueto v. Femndez Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
270. See Kadic v. Karad~id, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995):
We do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in the modern era, confines its
reach to state action. Instead, we hold that certain forms of conduct [including genocide]
violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a
state or only as private individuals.
271. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) (immunity
may be waived if defendant uses U.S. courts to harass plaintiff); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 210
(S.D. Fla. 1993) (former Haitian head of state's immunity waived by successor government). See also In
re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting
immunity claim); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (same).
272. See TVPA, supra note 268, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.2(b) (2004) (TVPA) (requiring that
plaintiffs "exhaust[] adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the
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responsibility; 273 and what human rights abuses are violations of customary
international law.274
More important about cases brought under the ATCA and the TVPA is
that they run contrary to many postwar trends in U.S. civil procedure,
especially trends in favor of the diminished importance of territoriality in
jurisdictional determinations. 27' Although jurisdiction premised solely on
physical presence has disappeared from the landscape in nearly ever
substantive area of U.S. law, it has expanded in ATCA and TVPA cases.
Before Filartiga, one searched in vain for any legal academic prepared to
defend transient jurisdiction at all, much less as applied to foreign nationals.
Since Filartiga, tag jurisdiction has new, if qualified, defense in the
academy, 278 among human rights NGOs, 2 79 and in Congress.280 Thus, an
claim occurred"); Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, 1996 WL 164496, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Plaintiffs
have fulfilled the exhaustion requirement of the TVPA by demonstrating that the Rwandan judicial
system is virtually inoperative and will be unable to deal with civil claims in the near future."); Xuncax
v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 178 (D. Mass. 1995) (local remedies exhausted where criminal case had
languished in Guatemalan courts for years and, under Guatemalan law, a civil action cannot be filed
until final judgment is rendered in criminal proceedings).
273. See Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 192 (anyone with higher authority liable for having
"tolerated" or "knowingly ignored" acts of torture, summary execution, or disappearance); Forti v.
Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1537 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that agents, employees, or
representatives of the defendant, an Argentine general, had acted pursuant to a "policy, pattern and
practice" of the First Army Corps under defendant's command).
274. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 604 (1980) (requiring less than
universal acceptance-a "consensus in the international community that the right is protected and that
there is a widely shared understanding of the scope of this protection").
275. Critics of ATCA/TVPA litigation note that in most cases the result has been either a Rule
12(b) dismissal, FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b), or a default judgment. See, e.g., Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza,
1996 WL 164496, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (default judgment of approximately $100 million); Doe v.
Karadzic, 93 Civ. 0878, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8108 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2000) (default judgment of
$4.5 billion). Typically, the defendant has left the United States soon after being served, leaving no
assets behind. The only instance in which an ATCA judgment premised on tag jurisdiction was
recognized and enforced by a foreign court is the proceeding in Switzerland against the estate of
Ferdinand Marcos. See In re Federal Office for Police Matters, Judgment by the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court, Case 1A.87/1997/err (Dec. 10, 1997).
276. See Jacques deLisle, Human Rights, Civil Wrongs and Foreign Relations: A "Sinical"
Look at the Use of U.S. Litigation To Address Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 473
(2002).
277. Since International Shoe, the amenability of defendants to suit generally has expanded not
through aggressive applications of territoriality, but through ever more broadly worded long-arm statutes
and through such concepts as agency, veil piercing, and conspiracy. See, e.g., Hargrave v. Fibreboard
Corp., 710 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying a "less stringent standard for alter ego jurisdiction than
for alter ego liability" in the context of asbestos litigation); Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d
95 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (upholding jurisdiction over British tobacco companies based on alleged conspiracy
with American tobacco companies); Frummer v. Hilton Hotels, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533 (1967) (upholding
personal jurisdiction over British hotel based on New York activities of its U.S. reservations service).
278. See Harold Hongju Koh, Reconciling the Hague Judgments Convention with International
Human Rights Litigation in National Courts, Speech at the New York University Law School
Conference on the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention (Apr. 30, 1999) (on file with author)
(arguing that use of transient jurisdiction against foreign individual defendants is consistent with the
Supreme Court's decision in Asahi Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)); Elizabeth Van
Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights Norms in the
Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2001).
279. In the negotiations over the proposed Hague Judgments Convention, NGOs denounced
early drafts that proposed to abolish transient jurisdiction. Their threats to sink the proposed convention
in the U.S. Senate led to intense efforts among delegates to find a way of exempting human rights suits
from some of the Convention's rules against exorbitant bases of jurisdiction. See AMNESTY INT'L, Doc.
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aspect of civil procedure that as recently as two decades ago was being read
its last rites-a victim of harmonization-has rebounded in the United States
to become a contentious issue in the proposed Hague Judgments Convention
negotiations and, more broadly, a potential obstacle to procedural
harmonization.2 1
b. Jurisdiction Based on Passive Personality
Passive personality jurisdiction-jurisdiction based on injury to a state's
citizens sustained while outside the state's territory-was practically unknown
in international law until a few decades ago.282 Thaf situation changed in the
1960s. In that decade, the first multilateral treaties on hijacking and other
forms of terrorism expanded the reach of state jurisdiction over defendants
whose only connection to the forum was having targeted nationals or residents
of the forum state. The 1963 Tokyo Convention283 adopted this approach with
respect to criminal jurisdiction where individuals had committed offenses on-
board aircraft. 284 The 1970 Hague Convention expanded the passive
personalit, principle, allowing it to be applied in tandem with extradition
treaties.
The passive personality provisions in these new antiterrorism treaties
destabilized what, just a few decades earlier, had been a relatively solid
consensus on the limits of a state's criminal jurisdiction. As late as 1935, the
landmark Harvard study on jurisdiction with respect to crime did not address
passive personality.286 With the advent of large-scale terrorism by liberation
movements a few decades later, large numbers of countries began to
incorporate the passive personality principle in domestic legislation. 287 In the
NO. IOR 53/02/99, JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS: ENSURING EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT ABROAD OF COURT
DECISIONS CONCERNING REPARATIONS (1999); CTR. FOR JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, THE CASE FOR
PRESERVING HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION
AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS (1999); INT'L ASS'N OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS,
WORKING Doc. No. 117, PROPOSALS OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE AND THEIR EFFECT ON EFFORTS TO
ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH ADJUDICATION (1998).
280. Both the House and Senate reports to the TVPA, supra note 268, supported the ATCA
case law, much of it resting on tag jurisdiction, up until 1991. See HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY,
TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, H.R. REP. No. 102-367, pt. 1 (1991); SENATE COMM. ON
JUDICIARY, TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, S. REP. No. 102-249 (1991).
281. In the preliminary version of the Hague Judgments Convention negotiated from 1998 to
2000, the focal point of contention with regard to transient jurisdiction was Article 18(3), which as
proposed would have allowed certain victims of grave human rights offenses to avail themselves of
transient jurisdiction and other forms of exorbitant jurisdiction under national law in certain
circumstances. For more detailed discussion of this debate, see Nygh & Pocar, supra note 48; van
Schaack, supra note 278 at 171-200.
282. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 902 (D.D.C. 1988) ("the Passive Personality
principle traditionally has been an anathema to United States lawmakers.").
283. Aircraft Offenses Convention, supra note 115.
284. Id. art. 4(b).
285. See Unlawful Aircraft Seizure Convention, supra note 220, art. 8.
286. See Harvard Law Sch. Research in Int'l Law, supra note 213.
287. See lAIN CAMERON, THE PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION 76-79 (1994) (comparing the growth in use of the protective principle with passive
personality); JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 176-225
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United States in particular, the growth of such legislation was dramatic. As
late as 1965, the Second Restatement of U.S. foreign relations law expressly
288rejected passive personality as a basis for applying U.S. law. It did so at a
time when no U.S. statutes incorporated the principle and no prosecutions or
civil suits in U.S. courts had been litigated squarely on that basis. Within two
decades, the legislative and judicial landscape had greatly changed. Well into
the war on drugs and poised for a juridical battle against terrorism, Congress
began enacting criminal legislation premised on passive personality
jurisdiction.28 9 By 1987, the ALI did an about-face. The Third Restatement of
U.S. foreign relations law contained a section comprehensively addressing
prescriptive jurisdiction and including a statement that passive personality had
become "increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist and other organized
attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their nationality," though it was not
"generally accepted" for "ordinary torts or crimes." 290 In subsequent years, an
291increasing number of federal statutes relied upon passive personality.
This growth in passive personality jurisdiction has already come at the
expense of procedural harmonization, nowhere more clearly than in the law
relating to sovereign immunity and related jurisdictional immunities. Until
quite recently, there was much uniformity (at least among Western
democracies) with respect to the conditions under which foreign states and
their officials were susceptible to suit. Under the so-called restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity, which was codified in a series of multilateral treaties and
national statutes, immunity from foreign court jurisdiction could be claimed
by states, their agents, and their instrumentalities 292 so long as the claim
related to a sovereign act, as opposed to a commercial act. Thus, a sovereign
state generally is immune from suit if it deliberately shoots down an unarmed
civilian aircraft,293 but susceptible to suit for breaching a letter of credit.
294
In litigation under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), U.S.
courts initially ruled that a foreign state's alleged human rights abuses were
sovereign acts, not commercial acts. 295 The state and the official involved
(2d ed. 2000); F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, Revisited After Twenty
Years, 186 RECUEILS DES COURS 19-116 (1984-11).
288. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 30.2 (1965) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS] ("A state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule
of law attaching legal consequences to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that
the conduct affects one of its nationals.").
289. See, e.g., Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2001); Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, H.R. 3485, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999);
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,110 Stat. 1214 (1996);
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853 (1989)
(making it a crime to kill or cause serious bodily injury to a U.S. national outside the territory of the
United States); Aircraft Sabotage Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2187 (1986). U.S. courts
held that the new legislation passed muster under the Constitution and under international law. See, e.g.,
United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988).
290. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) oF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 227, § 402 cmt. g.
291. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
292. FSIA, supra note 166, § 1608(b) (defining "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state").
293. See Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (Cuba would have
been immune from suit but for retroactive application of a 1996 anti-terrorism amendment to the FSIA).
294. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
295. See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (holding that alleged torture by
Saudi officials of U.S. citizen employed in hospital owned and operated by Saudi government was not
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were thus entitled to immunity, even where the alleged conduct clearly was
illegal under international law, under the law of the place where it took place,
and under the law of the forum. Cases decided in other countries under similar
immunity legislation initially drew a line along the same grounds: the more
the alleged conduct was an abuse of governmental power, the more inclined
courts were to conclude that the basis for the suit was an official, sovereign
act that came within the scope of immunity.
296
With the growth of passive personality jurisdiction, the line between
sovereign acts and acts not entitled to immunity has shifted. In suits premised
on passive personality jurisdiction, plaintiffs seek to go much further in
stripping states of sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs and prosecutors argue that in
supporting hostage-taking, assassination, torture, and slave labor, states and
their officials forfeit any claim to immunity for behavior that could not
297possibly have been thought to be legal. American courts have begun to
respond to these arguments, and so has Congress. In successive amendments
to the FSIA, Congress has curtailed the immunity of foreign states known to
be sponsors of terrorism. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), Cuba,
298 Iran, 299
Iraq, 3°° and Libya 30 1 have been stripped of jurisdictional immunity in suits
over their su Rort for hostage-taking, attacks on civilian aircraft, and
assassinations.
Sovereign immunity has been in retreat in other countries as well.
Canada has enacted two far-reaching statutes amending the Criminal Code
303
and requiring Canadian courts to act pursuant to an expanded conception of
the nationality and passive personality principles with respect to war crimes
and crimes against humanity.3  As amended, Section 6 of the Code supports
jurisdiction if the perpetrator was either a Canadian citizen, or a person
employed by the government of Canada, or a citizen or employee of a state
engaged in an armed conflict against Canada. 30 5 Canadian courts can also
exercise jurisdiction when the victim is a Canadian citizen and when the
based on commercial activity); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(finding no liability for enslavement). But see Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d
699 (9th Cir. 1992) (claims relating to discriminatory expropriation of property in Argentina found to be
based on commercial activity).
296. See generally Arthur Watts, The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of State,
Heads of Government, and Foreign Ministers, 247 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (19944Il).
297. See Abrams v. Socirt6 Nationale des Chemins de Fer Frangais, 332 F.3d 173, 187-88 (2d
Cir. 2003); Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 2002).
298. See, e.g., Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
299. See, e.g., Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001); Sutherland
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001); Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
172 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2000); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998).
300. See, e.g., Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2001).
301. See, e.g., Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325
(E.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, 162 F.3d 748 (2d Cir. 1998).
302. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, Civil Remedies for International Terrorism, 12
DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 169 (1999-2000).
303. See Bill C-71, Act to Amend the Criminal Code, the Immigration Act, 1976 and the
Citizenship Act, 1987, ch. 37, 1987 S.C. 1105. For commentary on this legislation, see W.J. Fenrick,
The Prosecution of War Criminals in Canada, 12 DALHOUSIE L.J. 256, 294-97 (1989).
304. CRIM. CODE, R.S.C., ch. C-46 § 6(1.91) overrides the presumption in § 5(2) against
prosecution of extraterritorial offenses, stating that its provisions apply "[n]otwithstanding anything in
this Act or any other Act."
305. Id. § 6(1.91)(a)(i) & (ii).
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offense is committed against "a citizen of a state that is allied with Canada in
an armed conflict." 306 If either the nationality or the passive personality
principle applies, the statute directs Canadian courts to treat the offense as
though it had been committed in Canada.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the protracted Pinochet extradition
proceedings demonstrated that passive personality had gained ground in
Western Europe as well. During Augusto Pinochet's detention in England, the
U.K. government received extradition requests from four countries: Belgium,
France, Spain, and Switzerland. Each request referred to the requesting state's
right to prosecute based on torture and other injuries inflicted against their
nationals in Chile. Each request also asserted that these violations were the




In the realm of jurisdiction, the growing tension between well-
established procedural principles and new means of imposing accountability
does not stop at physical presence or passive personality. In fact, the last
decade witnessed a reborn and expanded conception of universal jurisdiction.
From national statutes 308 to national court decisions 309 and reports by
influential bar associations,3 10 from the opinions of international tribunals31' to
scholarly works312 and NGO advocacy (including a ten-volume study by
Amnesty International), t3 the validity of universal jurisdiction stands at the
306. Id. This provision, by encompassing victims who are not Canadian citizens or
domiciliaries, actually goes beyond the passive personality principle.
307. See infra note 384 and accompanying text.
308. See, e.g., Loi du 10 f6vrier 1999 relative A la repression des violations graves du droit
international humanitaire, MONITEUR BELGE, Mar. 23, 1999, at 9286 (Belg.), translated in 38 I.L.M. 918
(1999).
309. See Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte,
2 W.L.R. 827 (H.L. 1999) [hereinafter Pinochet].
310. See ABA Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, Standing Comm. on Law and
Nat'l Security, Section of Int'l Law and Practice, Ctr. for Human Rights, Criminal Justice Section,
Report to the House of Delegates, Recommendation, http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/-
universaljurisdictiondocuments.doc (Feb. 2004); see also INT'L LAW ASS'N, COMM'N ON INT'L
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW & PRACTICE, FINAL REPORT: ON THE EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN
RESPECT OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENCES (2000) [hereinafter INT'L LAW ASS'N, FINAL REPORT ON
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION].
311. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
121 (Feb. 14) [hereinafter Congo v. Belgium].
312. Among recent works on universal jurisdiction, see INT'L LAW ASS'N, FINAL REPORT ON
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 310; THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 227; A.R. Carnegie,
Jurisdiction over Violations of the Laws and Customs of War, 39 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 402 (1963);
Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REv. 785 (1988);
Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 150; Thomas
H. Sponsler, The Universality Principle of Jurisdiction and the Threatened Trials of American Airmen,
15 LOY. L. REv. 43 (1968-1969); Henry J. Steiner, Three Cheers for Universal Jurisdiction-Or Is It
Only Two?, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 199 (2004).
313. See AMNESTY INT'L, DOC. NO. EUR 45/001/1999, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND
ABSENCE OF IMMUNITY FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (1999); LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
I INT'L CRIM. CT. BRIEFING SERIES No. 8, EXERCISE OF ICC JURISDICTION: THE CASE FOR UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION (1998), available at http://www.iccnow.org/romearchive/papers/RomeTreaty/-
LCHRUniJurisdiction.pdf; FIONA McKAY, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE (2000), available at
http://www.redress.org/documents/unijeur.html.
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forefront of discourse in international affairs. 314 Past and present U.S.
Secretaries of State have warned of its dangers. 315 The volume and breadth of
the commentary almost make it seem as if the future of the human rights
movement, on the one hand, and orderly diplomatic relations, on the other,
hang in the balance. The debate is also being waged in queries that laymen
understand: "On what basis does Belgium presume to judge General Tommy
Franks?, 316 or "Why should Osama bin Laden escape justice merely by
staying out of countries with extradition treaties with the United States?
3 17
The issues are clarified by recognizing that the recent growth of
universal jurisdiction is one of a number of practical and theoretical areas in
which the human rights movement and the unification movement are currently
far apart. This divergence can be analyzed by turning to some basic questions:
What are the origins of universal jurisdiction? What is its likely trajectory? In
what ways does it conflict with procedural law harmonization? How serious
and inherent are these points of conflict?
i. Defining Terms
The term "universal jurisdiction" is currently used in several related yet
distinct ways. Understanding these distinctions is important to analyzing its
interaction with traditional jurisdictional doctrines.
Universal jurisdiction is often understood as a type of prescriptive
jurisdiction or choice-of-law principle. Used in this way, it refers to the
circumstances in which a state can apply its law to conduct that takes place
outside its borders and that lacks any connection to the forum state.318 With
respect to a circumscribed list of offenses, universal jurisdiction is invoked
when lawmakers in a state displace familiar choice-of-law rules319 and direct
314. Critics include Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, U. CHI. LEGAL F.
323 (2001); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights
Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2133-34 (1999); Jack L. Goldsmith & Stephen Krasner, The Limits
of Idealism, 132 DDALUS 47 (2001).
315. See Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction: Risking Judicial Tyranny,
FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2001, at 86; U.S. Chides Belgium over Rights Law, BBC NEWS WORLD
EDITION, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2863273.stm (Mar. 19, 2003) (quoting U.S. Secretary of
State Colin Powell).
316. Franks to Face Iraq War Crimes Case, CNN INT'L EDITION, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/world/europe/04/29/belgium.crime/index.html (Apr. 30, 2003). The case was
dismissed by the Belgian courts in May 2003.
317. There may be no extradition treaty, or another country's courts and Justice Ministry may
have serious doubts that such a defendant could receive a fair trial in a U.S. court, especially in light of
the current administration's embrace of military commissions. For recent commentary critical of such
commissions and their fairness, see Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96
AM. J. INT'L L. 337 (2002); Evan J. Wallach, Afghanistan, Quirin and Uchiyama: Does the Sauce Suit
the Gander?, 2003 ARMY LAW. 18 (2003).
318. For example, connections such as the nationality of the people or entities involved in the
case, or a threat to various interests of the forum state, such as national security or the health and
economic well-being of its people. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 227,
§ 402.
319. In criminal actions, this would usually be the place where the criminal act took place. In
tort actions, most European courts would apply lex loci delicti, the law of the place where the injury was
sustained. Today, most U.S. jurisdictions would apply the law of the jurisdiction with the most
significant relationship to the cause of action, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145
(1971), or the law of the jurisdiction with the strongest interest in having its law applied. See, e.g.,
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their domestic courts to apply the forum's law to claims arising from atrocities
committed elsewhere.
320
The term is also used in another way. In this second usage, universal
jurisdiction refers not to the applicable law but to whether a court will
adjudicate a dispute with which it has no connection. Universal jurisdiction is
thus a species of what U.S. lawyers call adjudicatory jurisdiction. 321 For
example, in a recent case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
Belgium sought to assert its courts' jurisdiction to hear criminal allegations
against a Congolese national, even though the alleged offense had taken place
completely outside of Belgium. 322 At issue was the availability of a Belgian
forum, not which substantive law should apply. Had Belgium prevailed before
the ICJ, conceivably Belgian courts might have applied something other than
Belgium's substantive law to some issues in the case.
323
Whether employed as a principle of prescriptive or adjudicative
jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction is typically associated with criminal law,324
in part because in much of the world, universal jurisdiction offenses are
violations of national criminal law, even when committed outside the
forum.325 Thus, at first blush, universal jurisdiction might seem to have little
to do with efforts to harmonize procedure in civil cases. If the Hague
Conference, the EU, the OAS, and others are attempting to harmonize
procedural rules for "civil and commercial matters," 326 how do their efforts
relate to a jurisdictional doctrine primarily used by courts in criminal cases?
Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313 (1976) (applying interest analysis in the context of cross-
border torts and concluding that the forum's strong governmental interest would be significantly
impaired by applying the law of the place where the negligent act occurred).
320. For example, if the forum's ordinary choice-of-law rule for tort actions is lex loci delicti, a
tortious act taking place in Iraq and producing injury in Iraq would be governed by Iraqi tort law. But if
the act is a universal jurisdiction offense-torture, for instance-the forum can ignore some or all of
Iraqi tort law and apply its own substantive law. Moreover, for most universal jurisdiction offenses the
law of the forum incorporates elements of international law-in this case, the definition of torture. See
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10,
1984, art. 1, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention]; Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note
201, art. 7.2(e).
321. In the United States, universal jurisdiction is not a form of adjudicatory jurisdiction. Even
with respect to the offenses listed in the Restatement of Foreign Relations, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 227, § 404, U.S. courts cannot proceed without an independent basis
for personal jurisdiction over the defendant that satisfies the Due Process Clause of either the Fifth or
the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. Due process can be satisfied by minimum
contacts, tag service, or continuous and systematic contacts. The question of personal jurisdiction is
quite separate from that of which law is applied.
322. See Congo v. Belgium, supra note 311.
323. Belgian procedural law clearly would govern.
324. See INT'L LAW ASS'N, FINAL REPORT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 312; THE
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 227, Principle 1.1, at 28 ("For purposes of these Principles, universal
jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction."); Steiner, supra note 312, at 202 ("[T]his article refers only to
criminal prosecutions.").
325. Traditionally this last principle has not been applied in common law countries, where
there is a presumption against extraterritorial application of criminal law. In the Pinochet case, the
House of Lords concluded that acts of torture committed outside the United Kingdom and not involving
British nationals were not crimes under English law (for purposes of the dual criminality requirement)
until the late 1980s, when the United Kingdom ratified and implemented the Torture Convention.
Pinochet, supra note 309 (in particular Lord Browne-Wilkinson's discussion of extradition crimes, id. at
836-40).
326. The term "civil and commercial matters" has long been used in Hague Conference
conventions. For an extensive discussion of the term and its origins, see Nygh & Pocar, supra note 48.
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The answer is that there is no longer an air-tight separation between
theories of jurisdiction in criminal matters, on the one hand, and civil cases,
on the other-if there ever was one. Such an understanding of universal
jurisdiction is based on an outdated formalism that ignores that what matters
most is the nature of the proceedings and the exercise of judicial power, not
the name of the forum in which they take place. 327 Civil law countries employ
universal jurisdiction in courts that are labeled penal, that predominantly
apply penal law, and that possess the authority to impose quintessentially
penal remedies. However, a close look reveals aspects of those proceedings
that resemble civil litigation: the ability of victims and victims' rights
organizations to initiate proceedings through partie civile mechanisms (which
allow victims of a criminal act to join criminal prosecution with civil
claims); 328 the ability of private parties, including human rights organizations
and other amici, to participate meaningfully in such proceedings; and the
ability of those courts to order defendants to pay monetary compensation to
those who suffer injury, much as courts routinely do in civil cases. To be sure,
there are differences, 32 9 but there is no clear, impenetrable barrier preventing
procedural concepts (such as universal jurisdiction) long applied by criminal
tribunals from being used in civil courts. The more important observation is
that domestic courts of both civil and criminal stripes are now invoking
327. Even in organizations prone to formalism, there has been an acknowledgment that civil
claims are not hermetically sealed off from all types of criminal proceedings. Peter Nygh and Fausto
Pocar, co-rapporteurs for the Hague Judgments Project, summarized the consensus this way:
It should be noted that the scope of the preliminary draft Convention is defined in terms
of "matters" not "courts." Consequently, the characterisation of the matter as civil and
commercial should depend on the nature of the claim and not necessarily on the character
of the court in which the action was brought, be it civil, commercial, penal or
administrative. In particular, civil claims for compensation for victims of crime brought
by them or on their behalf in conjunction with criminal proceedings should not for that
reason be denied a civil character.
Id. at 31.
328. On the partie civile mechanism in France, see UEJF & LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc., T.G.I.
Paris, May 22, 2000, translated at http://www.juriscom.netltxt/jurisfr/cti/-tgiparis20000522.htm#texte
[hereinafter Yahoo.q; Jean Larguier, The Civil Action for Damages in French Criminal Procedure, 39
TuL L. REv. 687 (1964-1965). In Spain, a similar procedural device, the acci6n popular, allows a
member of the public or an advocacy organization to initiate a criminal action without having to show
specific injury to itself See C.E. art. 125; L.E.CRiM arts. 101 & 270. See generally ELENA MERINO-
BLANCO, THE SPANISH LEGAL SYSTEM 160-63 (1996); Richard J. Wilson, The Spanish Proceedings, in
THE PINOCHET PAPERS: THE CASE OF AUGUSTO PINOCHET IN SPAIN AND BRITAIN 23 (Reed Brody &
Michael Ratner eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE PINOCHET PAPERS]. Once a criminal action is initiated,
either by an accirn popular or by a public prosecutor, civil claims for compensation or restitution can be
consolidated in the same case. Had Pinochet been extradited to Spain, ahead of him lay not only a
criminal trial by Spanish prosecutors, but also actions for compensation by private parties. The criminal
complaints against a number of figures in the Argentine and Chilean military were filed by the
Progressive Union of Prosecutors, a private organization based in Spain. The action against Augusto
Pinochet was instigated in part by Izquierda Unida [United Left] and Agrupaci6n de Familiares de
Detenidos y Desaparecidos de Chile [Chilean Group of Relatives of Detained and Disappeared Peoplel.
See Nizkor Human Rights Team, Special Report on the Preparation and Development of General
Augusto Pinochet's Detention and Spanish Judge's Ruling Recognizing the Principle of Universal
Criminal Jurisdiction for Domestic Courts, at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/juicio/report.html
(Nov. 5, 1998).
329. These civil law variations on human rights enforcement essentially piggyback on top of
state-directed criminal proceedings. See generally Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative
and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27
YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2002). In certain respects the civil law actions are constrained by the criminal
proceedings.
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extraordinary principles of jurisdiction on an unprecedented scale and, in both
instances, they are doing so for the sake of accountability and compensation.
After being applied in a criminal context, these principles have been extended
to civil proceedings.330 Moreover, whatever real distinction exists between
criminal universal jurisdiction and civil universal jurisdiction may become
less clear in the future, as large numbers of states enact implementing
legislation for the Rome Statute of the ICC,331 a treaty that calls for expansive
jurisdiction for the sake of punishment and victim compensation.
332
ii. The Origins of Universal Jurisdiction
Although it is being applied in new ways, universal jurisdiction has a
long history, one that predates the Treaty of Westphalia. Its rationale largely
stems from the centuries-old use of universal jurisdiction as a tool to combat
piracy.333 Piracy was distinctive because attacks on commercial ships and
their crew were not easily countered through ordinary principles of
jurisdiction. The attacks took place on the high seas, outside any country's
maritime jurisdiction. Perpetrators were not likely to be found in the territorial
waters of the country whose merchant ship had been attacked. Universal
jurisdiction allowed any state, even one not directly injured, to apprehend the
perpetrators, wherever found, and try them.
This early form of universal jurisdiction sought to promote commerce
rather than hamper it. In response to a menace to commercial shipping,334
universal jurisdiction was a kind of juridical "smart bomb," tailored to combat
a specific problem without inflicting collateral damage on the general
jurisdictional regime or prevailing concepts of state sovereignty. Universal
jurisdiction of this era was directed at truly universal undesirables, "enemies
of all mankind," 335 outlaws to whom no state was willing to extend its
diplomatic protection.
The doctrine ultimately rested on principles of agency. When the British
Navy, patrolling the high seas, intercepted a pirate ship that had previously
attacked a Dutch or Spanish vessel, Great Britain acted on behalf of a
community of nations with shared interests in trade and the safety of the
330. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 227, § 404 cmt. b ("In
general, jurisdiction on the basis of universal interests has been exercised in the form of criminal law,
but international law does not preclude the application of non-criminal law on this basis, for example, by
providing a remedy in tort or restitution for victims of piracy.").
331. Links to such implementing legislation may be found at http://web.amnesty.org/pages/-
intjus iccimplementation (last visited Dec. 12, 2004).
332. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 201, art. 75.2 (providing that ICC may order
convicted persons to pay reparations or restitution directly to victims).
333. Piracy was for many years the only offense subject to universal jurisdiction. For an
extensive analysis of the legal treatment of piracy, see ALFRED P. RuBmN, THE LAW OF PIRACY (2d ed.
1998).
334. See, e.g., Peter Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210, 226 (1844) (explaining that
Congress had enacted legislation on piracy because "commerce was suffering"). In this respect,
traditional piracy is different from its modem forms. Modem aircrafl piracy, for instance, has thrived
during periods in which some countries benefit from hijacking. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2004)
(defining state sponsors of terrorism).
335. The Latin term is hostis humanigeneris. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d
Cir. 1980); see generally RuaiN, supra note 333, at 91-95.
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seas. 336 Other states in this community were deemed implicitly to have
deputized one another to act on their behalf in such circumstances. The
jurisdictional power of any agent of the community (in this case the British
Navy) vis-A-vis a particular pirate vessel was the sum total of the jurisdictional
prerogatives belonging to all states of the community. Universal jurisdiction
was a kind of pooling of jurisdictional powers.
337
Modem universal jurisdiction noticeably departs from this classic model,
both in the number of instances in which it might apply and in the rationale
for its application. After the Nuremberg trials, the list of universal jurisdiction
offenses grew-genocide, 338 crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture,
slavery, and terrorism became widely regarded in this light.339 Additional
offenses such as aggression, 340 drug trafficking, sexual offenses against
children,34t grave environmental harms, use of weapons of mass destruction,
336. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 227, § 404 cmt. a
("Universal jurisdiction over the specified offenses is a result of universal condemnation of those
activities and general interest in cooperating to suppress them .... "). Pirates typically reside on the high
seas, beyond the territorial waters of any nation. They rarely come to port in a country whose ships they
have attacked.
337. For a modern take on this reasoning, see LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 313, at 8 ("There is no reason why the ICC--established on the basis of a Treaty concluded by the
largest possible number of states-should not be in the very same position to exercise universal
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in the same manner as the
Contracting Parties themselves."). Alternatively, global efforts against piracy could be seen as a product
of customary international lawmaking. Under ordinary principles of customary law, a pirate ship at sea
might be beyond the jurisdictional reach of any country. However, the world community can, in the case
of piracy, create an exception to ordinary jurisdictional constraints, and in creating this new customary
rule, that community of countries might authorize any state to exercise universal powers with respect to
piracy. Note that with this latter approach, the jurisdictional powers of the community of states, acting
together, is greater than the sum of its parts.
338. It is possible to argue that universal jurisdiction over genocide is precluded by the wording
of the Genocide Convention. See Genocide Convention, supra note 195, art. VI (providing for trial "by a
competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed" or by an international
penal tribunal).
339. See THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 227, Principle 2, at 29 (listing as "serious
crimes under international law" piracy, slavery, war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against
humanity, genocide, and torture, but further stating the list "is without prejudice to the application of
universal jurisdiction to other crimes under international law").
340. Compare Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8 1945, art. 6(a), 59 Stat.
1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, with THE PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES, supra note 227, cmt., at 47, and Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 201, arts. 5.1(d) &
5.2. The main obstacle to implementing universal jurisdiction with respect to the crime of aggression has
been in reaching global consensus on a definition of aggression. See generally Proceedings of the U.N.
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, 8th Sess., at 13-20, U.N. Doe. No.
PCNICC/2001/L.3/Rev.1 (2001). For one attempt at definition, see G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31, Annex, at 142, U.N. Doc. A19631 (1975). No definition of aggression has yet been
adopted pursuant to Articles 121 and 123 of the Rome Statute. As a result, the ICC prosecutor cannot yet
indict-nor can victims claim compensation pursuant to Article 75-with respect to aggression. Some
see little prospect of reaching a global agreement criminalizing aggression in the foreseeable future. See,
e.g., Aryeh Neier, Did the Era of Rights End on September 11 ?, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Sept 2. 2002,
at 6, http://www.crimesofwar.org/sept-mag/sept-neier.html.
341. Over a dozen countries now have statutes that make it a crime for a national to travel
abroad for the purpose of engaging in sexual activities with a minor. These statutes apply even where
none of the prohibited acts takes place within the home country. For an overview of Belgian legislation
on sexual slavery and sexual exploitation of children, see generally Mich~le Hirsch, La traite des itres
humains: Une legislation moddle pour l'Europe?, J. DES TRIBUNAUX 553-64 (1995). For a proposal that
U.S. federal law be used to prosecute the organizers of child sex tours to foreign destinations, see
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342and certain forms of bribery may soon become candidates. With such
additions,343 universal jurisdiction may be poised to become more than a
narrow comer of the law. Wider acceptance of the principle poses a threat to
one of harmonization's central goals-limiting concurrent jurisdiction. The
very premise of universal jurisdiction is that for some offenses, more fora are
better than fewer.
Second, the growth of modem universal jurisdiction tends to undermine
jurisdictional harmonization because the underlying rationale has also
changed. Early universal jurisdiction was directed at non-state actors: pirates
and slave traders. In contrast, contemporary universal jurisdiction is typically
aimed at state officials. War crimes are committed in the context of armed
conflict among or within states. Crimes against humanity involve widespread
and systematic abuses usually resulting from government policies, and state
action is built into the definition of torture. 344 Thus, for each of these offenses,
state action is typically present in a manner quite unlike seventeenth-century
piracy. This state action element makes a difference in terms of the rationale
for exercising universal jurisdiction. Is the suicide bomber of today truly a
common menace, prejudicial to the interests of the entire international
community? Perhaps not, or at least not in the same way as was true of the
rogue groups which attacked seventeenth-century merchant ships. Those who
carry out acts of terrorism are not bereft of all international support and state
sponsorship. Unlike the piracy of old, modem terrorism serves the interests of
at least some states. 345 If even a handful of governments regularly fund groups
to carry out violence against civilians, is it not questionable to say that those
prosecuted under universal jurisdiction statutes are universally regarded
(rather than just denounced) as hostis humani generis?
Nor are the perpetrators of modem universal jurisdiction offenses
especially elusive. Augusto Pinochet is not in hiding; Idi Amin did not take to
the high seas.346 After their fall from power, they enjoyed the embrace of at
least one nation-state. They remained heroes to some, and by virtue of that
support they were able to live openly in public. While the pirate of old sought
out jurisdictional lacunae and flouted territoriality, Alberto Fujimori does the
Jonathan Todres, Prosecuting Sex Tour Operators in U.S. Courts in an Effort To Reduce the Sexual
Exploitation of Children Globally, 9 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 1 (1999).
342. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1
(1998) [hereinafter OECD Convention]; Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 27, 1996,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-39 (1996), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996).
343. The comment to § 404 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations lists the following
offenses: piracy, the slave trade, attacks on aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and "perhaps certain acts of
terrorism," but it does not rule out additions to the list in the future, either through treaty or through the
growth of international customary law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note
227, § 404 cmt.
344. See, e.g., Torture Convention, supra note 320, art. 1.1.
345. Various forms of what is labeled "terrorism" are actually calculated means by which a
weak state wages a deniable, low-level armed conflict against a more powerful state. Used in this way as
an instrument of state policy, modem terrorism clearly differs from forms of violence perpetrated by
non-state actors which no state sees an interest in supporting.
346. Amin lived the last twenty years of his life in Saudi Arabia where, according to Ugandan
press accounts, he received a monthly stipend from the Saudi government. See David Kibirige, Idi Amin
Is Dead, MONITOR, Aug. 17, 2003, http://www.monitor.co.ug/specialincludes/ugprsd/amin/articles/-
newsl.php.
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opposite. 347 He benefits from territoriality by residing where one state has
paramount jurisdiction, and that state, Japan, is not inclined to extradite or try
him.
So, notwithstanding the frequent analogies to piracy, in some ways
modem universal jurisdiction poorly fits the classic agency model developed
with respect to piracy. A second, more persuasive rationale stems not from the
reality of a complete convergence of state interests, but rather from the jus
cogens nature of the offense. Perhaps war crimes are subject to universal
jurisdiction because they violate universally observed customs. The jus cogens
nature of torture rests on something other than its being contrary to the shared
interest of all states. After all, significant numbers of war crimes take place in
nearly every armed conflict. High state officials authorize or acquiesce in
many such acts, having concluded that disregarding the Geneva Conventions
is in their interest. q48 Does not the frequent occurrence of torture,
notwithstanding the ratification of the Torture Convention by 136 states,
undermine the contention that torture is regarded as a common plague?
349
State behavior with respect to torture, at least torture that is used to secure
useful information, might be better understood in terms of a standard
prisoners' dilemma-a substantial number of states actually do not want to
end the strategic use of torture; they just want to restrict the ability of other
states to obtain information through torture.
Jurisdiction over Augusto Pinochet did not rest on notions of agency.
Had he been extradited to Spain, the legitimacy of the Spanish proceeding
would not have rested on his status as a hostis humani generis. For decades he
had the firm backing of the United States. Even while under house arrest in
London, he enjoyed the vocal support of Margaret Thatcher. Unlike the
seventeenth-century brigand, Pinochet was a general who at one time was
useful to key members of the international community and then outlived his
usefulness.350 Universal jurisdiction is appropriate in such cases, but not
because state practice demonstrates that the offense is treated as lying beyond
the bounds of state behavior. Rather, the proposition is that torture should lie
beyond such bounds. Universal jurisdiction depends less upon the extent to
which torture remains an aspect of state practice, and more upon the extent to
347. Fujimori is living in Japan amidst reports that he plans a political comeback in Peru. On-
The-Lam Fujimori: I'll Be Back, CBS NEWS, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/28/world/-
main546606.shtml (Mar. 28, 2003).
348. For example, today's occupying states increasingly conclude that it is not in their interest
to abide by all the rules of occupation of the Geneva Conventions, supra note 205.Top U.S. officials
concluded as much with respect to detainees captured in Afghanistan and taken to Guanthnamo Bay,
Cuba. See Katharine Q. Seelye, First "Unlawful Combatants " Seized in Afghanistan Arrive at U.S. Base
in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2002, at A7.
349. Recent events show that even liberal democracies sometimes resort to torture. See, e.g.,
Douglas Jehl, Some Abu Ghraib Abuses Are Traced to Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004, at Al1;
Neil A. Lewis, Broad Use of Harsh Tactics Is Described at Cuba Base, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2004, at
Al. For differing views on the predictability of the behavior of liberal states, compare Anne-Marie
Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503 (1995), with Jos6 E.
Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L.
183 (2001).
350. See supra note 174.
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which it has been formally denounced. The question is not one of customary
law but rather one of peremptory norms.
What turns on this distinction? First, it is intellectually more honest to
say that Augusto Pinochet faced extradition proceedings in London because
he committed jus cogens offenses than it is to try to ground the legitimacy of
such proceedings in an attenuated analogy to piracy. The latter may have been
the origin of universal jurisdiction doctrine, but it need not be its present or
future. The modem justification for universal jurisdiction is that to grant
impunity to those who have committed grave human rights violations is to
facilitate the commission of atrocities elsewhere.
Second, this alternative basis for universal jurisdiction may potentially
lead to greater conflict with traditional principles of procedural law.35' The
range of human behavior that over time may be seen as violative ofjus cogens
norms extends more broadly than the piracy analogy. If forced disappearance
is to be recognized as a universal jurisdiction offense, should it turn on
whether, like piracy, the practice of forced disappearance is actually treated
by all states as being against their interest? Is it not better to focus on the
effects that dehumanization in one country tends to bring about elsewhere?
Such ripple effects may include lower human rights standards, a descent
toward deeper levels of barbarism, or a sense that if genocide is taking place
in Rwanda, then abridgments of free expression in nearby countries are mild
by comparison.
Understood in this way, universal jurisdiction is truly an explosive idea.
The list of universal jurisdiction offenses may still have much room for
growth, possibly triggering substantial expansion in concurrent jurisdiction.
Not two or three but potentially an unlimited number of states may have the
option of applying their laws and judicial processes to a single offense.352
iii. How Prevalent Is Universal Jurisdiction in State
Practice?
To what extent is the growth of universal jurisdiction undermining
efforts to unify procedural law? The answer depends on how prevalent
universal jurisdiction has become and what trajectory it has followed. A
logical place to look for an answer to this question is the Congo v. Belgium
351. Another way of stating this rationale is as follows: Assume that the murder conviction rate
in a given society is 60%. A higher conviction rate would be better, but the society may be unwilling
either to spend more resources or to alter its jurisdictional and constitutional law in order to achieve a
higher rate. It is conceivable, however, that it would be willing to take such steps to raise conviction
rates for specific murders: e.g., terrorist killings, assassination of high government officials, genocide.
States may be willing to go to extraordinary lengths to raise conviction rates for these offenses by even a
small percentage.
352. With respect to the charges against Augusto Pinochet for torture and other crimes
committed in Chile, Great Britain received extradition requests from Belgium, France, Spain, and
Switzerland, all of which, except France, relied on universal jurisdiction. Spain's extradition request and
the British Home Secretary's response are excerpted in Nat'l Court, Madrid, Communication to the
Competent Judicial Authorities of the United Kingdom (Nov. 3, 1998), translated in THE PINOCHET
PAPERS, supra note 328, at 203-10; see also Secretary of State Jack Straw to the Chief Metropolitan
Stipendiary Magistrate, Authority to Proceed (Dec. 9, 1998), reprinted in THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra
note 328, at 181.
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case decided by the ICJ in 2002,"' 3 in which one of the opinions purported to
conduct an extensive survey of state practice in regard to universal
jurisdiction. The case grew out of Belgian efforts to arrest Abdulaye Yerodia
Ndombasi (Yerodia) for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and
crimes against humanity. 35 The defendant, who was the Congolese foreign
minister at the time, was not Belgian. The allegations related solely to conduct
outside Belgium. The alleged victims were not Belgian. The alleged offenses
posed no credible threat to the security of Belgium or to its other vital state
interests.
Although thirteen of the Court's seventeen judges decided the case on
the basis of their finding that a sitting foreign minister--even one accused of
grave human rights offenses-possessed absolute jurisdictional immunity,
355
the joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Koojimans, and Buergenthal (the
Concurrence) addressed whether international law could support the issuance
of the arrest warrant pursuant to Belgium's universal jurisdiction statute. In
their view, it could not-at least not at the time.
356
What is most significant about Congo v. Belgium is the extent to which
the Concurrence understated the current use and acceptance of universal
jurisdiction. It attempted to assess the history and current prevalence of
universal jurisdiction through a survey of custom, state practice, and other
sources of international law. 357 Notwithstanding the opinion's ultimate
conclusion, however, its survey shows that universal jurisdiction is already
sufficiently prevalent to create serious problems for procedural
harmonization.358
The Concurrence proceeded with a narrow defmition of universal
jurisdiction-what it called "universal jurisdiction in absentia."3 59 First, it
reviewed existing treaties and found that none embodied that concept.
353. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 311.
354. The Belgian investigating judge alleged that Yerodia had incited mobs to go on killing
rampages against Tutsi civilians. See id. para. 1.
355. Absolute jurisdictional immunity is subject to waiver by the minister's home country,
something more likely to take place after a change in government, which was not the case in Congo v.
Belgium. In context, this narrower holding seems like the avoidance of a difficult issue. The universal
jurisdiction question was plainly before the Court, and resolving prima facie jurisdictional issues is
typically a court's first order of business, even before addressing immunities from jurisdiction. The three
concurring Judges pointed out this implication of the Court's holding:
The Court, in passing over the question of jurisdiction, has given the impression that
"immunity" is a free-standing topic of international law. It is not. "Immunity" and
"jurisdiction" are inextricably linked. Whether there is "immunity" in any given instance
will depend not only upon the status of Mr. Yerodia but also upon what type of
jurisdiction, and on what basis, the Belgian authorities were seeking to assert it.
Id. para. 3 (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal).
356. See, e.g., id. para. 59 (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and
Buergenthal) ("A State contemplating bringing criminal charges based on universal jurisdiction must
first offer to the national State of the prospective accused person the opportunity itself to act upon the
charges concerned.").
357. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 3.1, 59 Stat. 1055,
1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
358. The Concurrence did conclude that universal jurisdiction had created significant
exceptions to traditional jurisdictional doctrines and showed signs of significant growth in the future.
Congo v. Belgium, supra note 311, para. 75 (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and
Buergenthal).
359. Id. para. 3.
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Although many treaties after 1970 contained aut dedere aut judicare
provisions, 36 they addressed only the question of what states could or should
do with a suspect physically apprehended in the state's territory, not whether
states could issue global arrest warrants for suspects located outside the
country and lacking any conventional ties to the state issuing the warrant.
361
Nor, according to the Concurrence, was a rule embracing universal
jurisdiction to be found in the decisions of international tribunals, even in the
famous S.S. Lotus case, 362 a landmark decision commonly cited as authorizing
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Though national courts and legislatures had
repeatedly cited the S.S. Lotus case for the proposition that a presumption lay
in favor of the forum state, 363 the famous dictum from the opinion of the
Permanent Court of International Justice now, according to the concurring
Judges, had to be seen as a "high water mark of laissez-faire"364 from which
international relations had retreated.
An examination of state practice, according to the Concurrence, yielded
mixed results. A significant number of countries have enacted legislation
authorizing their courts to exercise jurisdiction over persons with few or no
contacts with the forum. However, these statutes do not lead to the conclusion
that state practice in favor of universal jurisdiction has taken root. Their
wording and approach vary, making it difficult to draw solid conclusions.
Although the cases relying on these statutes show a strong inclination toward
extraterritorial jurisdiction,365 they do not demonstrate a clear trend in favor of
a "classical assertion of a universal jurisdiction, 366 especially because much
of the legislation is recent.
367
Although technically accurate, at least regarding the specific facts before
it, the Congo v. Belgium Concurrence greatly understated the prevalence of
universal jurisdiction. This opinion needs to be seen as a less-than-reliable
guide in addressing the different question posed here-the extent to which
universal jurisdiction is currently, or is likely to become, a significant point of
conflict between human rights enforcement and standardization of procedural
360. This phrase is typically translated as "try or extradite." The Concurrence refers to this
principle as aut dedere aut prosequi. Id., para. 30.
361. According to the Concurrence, some courts and scholars had referred, through "loose use
of language," to treaties containing the "try or extradite" provision as incorporating the universal
jurisdiction principle. In their view, however, such treaties were to be seen as embodying "an obligatory
territorial jurisdiction over persons, albeit in relation to acts committed elsewhere." Id. para. 41.
362. S.S. Lotus, supra note 216, at 18-19:
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the
application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts
outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is
only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State
remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.
363. For example, the Israeli Supreme Court relied on the S.S. Lotus decision in upholding
Israeli courts' jurisdiction lo try AdolfEichmann. Eichmann, supra note 255.
364. Congo v. Belgium, supra note 311, para. 51 (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins,
Kooijmans, and Buergenthal).
365. Id. para. 47 ("The contemporary trends, reflecting international relations as they stand at
the beginning of the new century, are striking. The movement is towards bases ofjurisdiction other than
territoriality.").
366. Id. para. 21.
367. See, e.g., id. para. 32 (noting "a remarkably modest corpus of national case law emanating
from the jurisdictional possibilities provided in the Geneva Conventions or its Additional Protocol I.").
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norms. The Concurrence confined its inquiry to a small subset of universal
jurisdiction cases-only those in national courts, only criminal cases, and only
those in which the defendant is not physically present within the forum. In
terms of universal jurisdiction's challenge to procedural harmonization,
however, it matters little that states typically require the defendant's physical
presence in the forum. What matters is that, for grave human rights offenses,
many states grant their courts jurisdiction over alleged perpetrators in the
absence of any of the connecting factors that would be required in other cases.
To judge universal jurisdiction's potential ability to transform the
jurisdictional landscape, one must also consider the work of the ad hoc
criminal tribunals and the negotiations leading to the Rome Statute of the ICC,
developments that the Congo v. Belgium Court ignored, perhaps because it
focused only on proceedings in national courts.36 Opinions rendered by the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugsolavia (ICTY) repeatedly refer to
torture, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity as being subject to
universal jurisdiction. 369 In doing so, these tribunals consistently rely on
domestic court precedents.370 Moreover, universal jurisdiction lay at the center
of debate at several junctures in the negotiations over drafts of the Rome
Statute, including debates about trials in absentia,371 amending Article 25 so
as to permit any state (not merely "interested states") to file complaints,372 and
whether to invest the Court with subject matter jurisdiction over more than
four offenses. 373 In response to criticisms of these proposals, supporters
argued that none went further than the jurisdiction that national courts were
already capable of exercising pursuant to widely accepted principles of
universal jurisdiction. The new international criminal tribunal, it was
maintained, should be an agent of the international community in the same
way that national courts exercising universal jurisdiction already were. 374 In
short, evidence of universal jurisdiction's growing influence lay beyond
368. Meron, supra note 169, at 464 ("There is, of course, a synergistic relationship among the
statutes of the international criminal tribunals, the jurisprudence of the Hague Tribunal, the growth of
customary law, its acceptance by states, and their readiness to prosecute offenders under the principle of
universality ofjurisdiction.").
369. Id. at 468 (noting that recent developments in the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as well as
negotiations over the Rome statute "will surely generate further growth of universal jurisdiction").
370. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furund'ija, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, para. 156 (Trial
Chamber, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 10, 1998) (citing Eichmann, supra
note 255, and Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985) for the "inherently universal
character of the crime" of torture and the proposition that "every State [has] the authority to try and
punish those who participated in [its] commission").
371. See Christopher Hall, The First and Second Sessions of the U.N. Preparatory Committee
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 177, 184 (1997) ("France
and The Netherlands strongly argued that such trials should be permitted.").
372. See id. at 132 ("Other delegations stated that, since the crimes were the concern of the
entire international community, all states were 'interested states."').
373. Among the other offenses proposed were hijacking, hostage taking, certain drug offenses,
use of certain weapons, and attacks on U.N. personnel. See Hall, supra note 371, at 179.
374. These international courts are also widely viewed as descendants of the Nuremberg
Tribunal in their disregard for immunity defenses, their ability to claim defendants for trial from any
comer of the globe, and their focus on only the most serious offenses. See generally Theodore Meron,
From Nuremberg to The Hague, 149 MIL. L. REv. 107 (1995). But whereas only the victors participated
at Nuremberg, states with no link to the offenses committed have helped create these modem tribunals.
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national court practice. Additional evidence can be found in a nuanced
interaction between domestic courts and international tribunals.
375
Congo v. Belgium also ignored the extent to which the United Nations
has supported universal jurisdiction, as illustrated by the U.N. Security
Council's actions at a crucial point in the early life of the ICTR. Amidst
perceptions that the Tribunal was floundering,376 the Security Council urged
member states to arrest and try those suspected of grave human rights offenses
in Rwanda, even in the absence of a connection between the arresting state,
the defendant, and the offense.377 Several countries then did so, relying on
universal jurisdiction. 378 Positions taken by the U.N. Committee Against
Torture also lend support to this practice. In querying states party to the
Torture Convention on their failure to exercise jurisdiction over suspects,379
the Committee emphasized that the duty to try or extradite was mandatory,
even if the exercise of universal jurisdiction was necessary to carry it out.
Finally, the growing influence of universal jurisdiction rests on what
some have called "constitutional moments" in international law. 380 All the
Congo v. Belgium opinions weighed the evidence pertaining to universal
jurisdiction according to the formula articulated in Article 38 of the ICJ
Statute.381 That approach is defensible under current doctrine, but it has a
certain static quality when applied to universal jurisdiction. The nine years
from the 1993 Security Council Resolution authorizing the creation of the
ICTY382 to the Congo v. Belgium decision in 2002 include some enormously
important data points-watershed events indicative of momentum and a new
direction in international enforcement mechanisms. The negotiations leading
to the Rome Statute included 160 countries debating under the intense
scrutiny of a worldwide audience. 38 3 What emerged was a treaty ratified by
375. Moreover, the statutes of these tribunals go beyond criminal penalties to address
compensation to victims. See Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 201, arts. 75 & 79.
376. See, e.g., Jos6 E. Alvarez, Lessons from the Akayesu Judgment, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 359, 367-70 (1999).
377. See S.C. Res. 978, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3504 mtg. at para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/Resa978
(1995). To see how far U.N. institutions have come, compare Security Council Resolution 978, id., with
G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/9326 (1973) ("as a general
rule," suspects should be tried "in the countries in which they committed those crimes").
378. The cases are collected in Luc H. Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction over Atrocities in
Rwanda: Theory and Practice, 4 EuR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 18 (1996).
379. See Menno T. Kamminga, Lessons Learned from the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in
Respect of Gross Human Rights Offenses, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 940, 961 n.91 (2001).
380. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional
Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2002) (referring to the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks). The term "constitutional
moment" was coined by Bruce Ackerman in relation to domestic constitutional transformations. Bruce
Ackerman, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 160 (1998); Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of
Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1519, 1519 (1997) (a constitutional moment "occurs when a rising
political movement succeeds in placing a new problematic at the center of American political life").
381. ICJ Statute, supra note 357, art. 38 (directing the ICJ to apply treaties, international
custom, general principles of law, judicial decisions, and the teachings of highly qualified publicists).
382. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/808 (1993).
383. Those debates culminated in five weeks of intense negotiation in Rome in the summer of
1998, resulting in the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC. See Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard
Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 383 (2000).
For a study of the earlier sporadic efforts to create such a court beginning soon after the end of World
War I, see STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (M. Cherif
Bassiouni, ed., 1998).
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some ninety countries in less than five years-a work different in stature than
a typical private law harmonization treaty on jurisdiction might be.
Similarly, the Pinochet case was not a lone data point. It was an
extended drama followed daily in newspapers, on television, and over the
Internet on all continents. It drew extradition requests from four countries,
opinions from high courts in Spain and the United Kingdom, and legal
commentary from all over the world. Despite Pinochet's return to Chile, the
U.K. proceedings produced a widely felt perception that a major blow against
impunity had been struck.3 84 An important bridge had been crossed leading
away from old-style diplomacy and toward more accountability. In the past
decade, universal jurisdiction has been exercised over foreign nationals in
courts in Austria,385 Belgium,3 86 Denmark,387 France,388 Germany,38 9 Israel,390
Senegal,9 Spain,392 Switzerland,393 and the United States.394
If the prime goal of unification is eliminating concurrent jurisdiction and
other sources of juridical uncertainty, 39 5 then the expansion of universal
jurisdiction, as with other forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction, may lead to
somewhat of a showdown. Universal jurisdiction is concurrent jurisdiction at
384. As this Article went to press, a Chilean court ruled that Pinochet was competent to face
criminal charges in Chile for human rights abuses allegedly committed while he was head of state. See
Larry Rohter, Chilean Judge Says Pinochet is Fit For Trial, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 2004, at Al. While
Pinochet was in the United Kingdom, U.K. authorities received extradition requests from Spain,
Belgium, Switzerland, and France, each premised on some form of universal jurisdiction in absentia. See
Letters from the Home Office to the Spanish, Belgian, Swiss and French Ambassadors Announcing the
Termination of Extradition Proceedings (Mar. 2, 2000), reprinted in THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note
328, at 465-81. In all, six concurrent legal proceedings were launched in the Pinochet matter in Belgium,
Chile, France, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
385. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 145 (2001) (commenting on Austria's
Penal Code, Articles 64 and 65, and the case of Republic of Austria v. Cvjetkovic).
386. See Belgian Court Considers Charges Against Rafsanjani, RFE/RL IRAN REPORT, at
http://www.rferl.org/reports/iran-report/2000/03/ll-130300.asp (Mar. 13, 2000); Chris Morris, Arafat
Lawsuit Filed in Belgium, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/-
newsid_1679000/1679044.stm (Nov. 27, 2001).
387. See CRIM. CODE art. 8.5. (Den.). See generally Marianne Holdgaard Bukh, Prosecution
Before Danish Courts of Foreigners Suspected of Serious Violations of Human Rights or Humanitarian
Law, 6 EuR. REV. PUB. L. 339 (1994).
388. See Barbie, supra note 252; Frederic L. Kirgis, French Court Proceedings Against
Muammar Qadhafi, ASIL INSIGHTS, Oct. 2000, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh56.htm; Court
Removes Bar to Gaddafi Trial, BBC NEws, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/Europe/981080.stm
(Oct. 20, 2000).
389. See Christoph J.M. Safferling, International Decision, Public Prosecutor v. Djajic, No.
20/96, Excerpted in 1998 Neue Juristische Wochenscrift 392, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 528 (1998)
(summarizing a decision of the Supreme Court of Bavaria, Germany).
390. Eichmann, supra note 255.
391. See Reed Brody, The Prosecution of Hissene Habre- "An African Pinochet", 35 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 321 (2001); Frederic L. Kirgis, The Indictment in Senegal of the Former Chad Head of
State, ASIL INSIGHTS, Feb. 2000, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh4l.htm.
392. See, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Request for Extradition of Miguel Cavallo from Mexico to
Spain for Alleged Torture in Argentina, ASIL INSIGHTS, Sept. 2000,
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh44.htm.
393. See Andreas R. Ziegler, International Decision, Switzerland-International Humanitarian
Law--Existence of an International Armed Conflict-Attribution of Violations of the Red Cross
Conventions to De Facto Organs of Agents of Parties to a War-Universal Jurisdiction over War
Crimes in Switzerland, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1998) (summarizing a Swiss military tribunal's decision).
394. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985) (granting Israel's request for
extradition based on universal jurisdiction over crimes committed in during World War II).
395. See supra Part II.
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its most extreme. Though other bases of jurisdiction can lead to more than one
country's involvement in adjudicating a dispute, universal jurisdiction
potentially puts many courts in play, all with valid claims to jurisdiction.
The ICJ clearly found this latter development worrisome in Congo v.
Belgium. Its concern with the stability of international dispute resolution was
appropriate, but its failure to place those concerns within the larger context of
expanding conceptions of jurisdiction was unfortunate. Not surprisingly, none
of the opinions in the case decisively resolved the underlying jurisdictional
tension.396 Before Part V attempts to grapple with that tension, Part IV will
show that the scope of the problem is even broader than discussed thus far.
IV. JURISDICTION AND BEYOND: THE CONFLICT ILLUSTRATED IN
HYPOTHETICAL CASES
Part II demonstrated that the leading efforts at global harmonization
today are proceeding largely according to a European model. This model calls
for (1) harmonization processes steeped in comparative law; (2) uniform texts
rather than model laws or texts with opt-out provisions; and (3) a search for
efficiency and regional integration. The ultimate focus is on domestic courts,
and the package is one that has been shaped for decades by the European
search for intellectual coherence, predictability, and political integration.
Part III showed that the harmonization movement is not alone in offering
a vision of the future of domestic courts. In the last four decades, the human
rights movement has shifted its focus to implementation and enforcement.
Domestic courts have emerged as the institutions with the legitimacy,
continuity, and coercive power to enforce the new international human rights
and criminal law. However, effective enforcement of prohibitions on torture,
forced labor, disappearance, and the like requires that domestic courts be free
of procedural restraints that may make sense in ordinary tort and commercial
cases, but that are unwarranted obstacles in suits arising out of mass atrocities.
At this point the discussion may seem abstract, and the conflict may
seem limited to jurisdiction. Neither is true. This Part seeks to show, through
hypothetical examples (based loosely on actual cases), that the tension
experienced by national courts is quite tangible. Courts are being pulled in
opposite directions across a range of procedural issues, including rules for
enforcing foreign judgments, rules relating to class actions and forum non
conveniens, statutes of limitations, and rules of evidence, to name just a few.
A. Case 1: The Asset Trail: Recognizing and Enforcing Human Rights
Judgments Worldwide
For three years, State A has been embroiled in civil war. During the
conflict, Group A forces repeatedly sack cities in the minority Christian region
396. See Congo v. Belgium, supra note 311, para. 5 ("One of the challenges of present-day
international law is to provide for stability of international relations and effective international
intercourse while at the same time guaranteeing respect for human rights."). For a case currently
pending before the ICJ posing issues similar to those raised by Congo v. Belgium, see Case Concerning
Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo-Fr.), 2003 I.C.J. 129 (July 11).
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of the country, carting off artwork from the museums, looting gold and
jewelry from the civilian population, and stealing valuables from churches.
The looting is approved at the highest levels of State A's military, which is
controlled by the majority population. General Or, the chief of all military
forces for State A, personally sees that half of the looted assets are directed to
him and put in bank accounts and safe deposit boxes in Switzerland.
Two years after the war's conclusion, with the Christian insurgency
having been brutally suppressed, Or is served with a civil complaint while
visiting Washington, D.C. The complaint charges him with having committed
war crimes and crimes against humanity during State A's civil war. The
complaint seeks restitution of looted valuables on behalf of a class of
thousands of victims. General Or enters an appearance to contest personal
jurisdiction. The court rules against him. After the ruling, he takes no further
actions to defend the suit, and a default judgment is entered against him. He
has no assets in the United States. After three years, lawyers for the plaintiff
class receive information that Or controls bank accounts and safe deposit
boxes in Switzerland. They file suit there based on the presence of those
assets. Will they be able to collect?
Until recently, the general answer was no. With no treaty on mutual
recognition of judgments between Switzerland and the United States, Or's
assets would have been beyond reach. Under case law applying the 1987
Swiss legislation on private international law, a judgment creditor seeking
enforcement in Switzerland had to meet a reciprocity requirement-a showing
that the country from which the judgment originated consistently recognized
Swiss judgments. Creditors seeking to enforce U.S. judgments might have
difficulty satisfying this burden, because judgment recognition in the United
States is governed by state law and is thus subject to varying state practices
with no overarching federal treaty or legislation to govern.
But is that all there is to be said? What about the nature of the judgment?
The Swiss rule on enforcing judgments rests on the principle of reciprocity.
Switzerland is willing to extend benefits to other countries and their nationals
based on assurances that the other country will reciprocate. Absent such
assurances, Swiss courts generally will not extend the benefit since doing so
would encourage the other country to free-ride.
Reciprocity is certainly a major theme that runs through all of
international law and treaty relations in particular. But how relevant a
principle is it in this specific context? The judgment here relates to offenses at
the heart of the Geneva Conventions-brutalizing civilians and looting both
national and religious treasures and civilian possessions. For these offenses,
current international law supports the proposition that treaties prohibiting such
conduct do not rest on reciprocity at all. The rhetorical question, "If troops of
State A torture POWs of State B, can State B do likewise?," is meant to
demonstrate that the Geneva Conventions, like most treaties in humanitarian
397. See Loi frd~rale sur le droit international priv6 (Fr.), Bundegesetz fiber das internationale
Privatrecht (Ger.); see generally Yves P. Piantino, Recognition and Enforcement of Money Judgments
Between the United States and Switzerland: An Analysis of the Legal Requirements and Case Law, 17
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 91 (1997); Martin Bernet & Nicolas Ulmer, Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments in Switzerland, 27 INT'L LAw. 317 (1993).
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and human rights law, rest on principles other than reciprocity. The
obligations that flow from the Geneva Conventions are duties erga omnes,
obligations owed to all.
398
The analysis does not end there. Treaties to which Switzerland is a party
provide that states party have a duty to assure that victims of such offenses
"obtain[] redress" and "an enforceable right to fair and adequate
compensation" within any signatory country's legal system. 399 Does
Switzerland thus have a treaty-based obligation, or an obligation grounded in
customary international law, to recognize a judgment ordered by a U.S. court
for the sake of providing redress to victims of atrocities?
Swiss courts took a position close to this view in the Marcos
litigation. 400 There, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court did not apply its
standard approach to recognizing foreign judgments. Rather than insist on
strict reciprocity, it held that the nature of the rights at stake-rights that were
the subject of human rights treaties, customary law, and jus cogens norms-
dictated that Swiss courts be willing in principle to recognize at least some
aspects of a U.S. judgment, even in the absence of a treaty.
That judgment in particular, along with a general pressure on Swiss
banks to ease bank secrecy laws in cases relating to the criminal acts of
foreign dictators, money laundering, drug trafficking, and other international
crimes, introduced instability into Swiss procedural law. The standard for
recognition of foreign awards has become less clear-cut than before. The rules
for obtaining an asset freeze, formerly quite clear and rigid, are now difficult
to predict in individual cases. In short, developments in international human
rights law and international criminal law have brought about less certainty in
Swiss procedural law in the areas of mutual recognition and preliminary relief.
B. Case 2: Class Actions and Forum Non Conveniens
Suit is filed in British courts on behalf of the plaintiffs described in the
case at the end of Part 11.402 Assume this time that the case is not governed by
the Brussels Convention because the wine company is located outside the EU.
Assume also that, under U.K. law, British courts are authorized to exercise
398. The ICJ reached a similar conclusion in a case interpreting the Genocide Convention,
supra note 195. The Court held that reservations to the Convention were not strictly governed by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties because the Genocide Convention does not fit the reciprocity
model of treaty relations on which the Vienna Convention rules are premised. Advisory Opinion of the
International Court of Justice in re Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28); see also Advisory Opinion on the Effect of
Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights, OC-2/82, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., Series A, No. 2 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 37 (1983).
399. Torture Convention, supra note 320, art. 14; cf Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 201,
art. 75.5 (describing duty of states party to "give effect" to reparation orders of the ICC).
400. See Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995) (finding former Philippine
President Ferdinand Marcos liable for human rights violations).
401. See In re Federal Office for Police Matters, Judgment by the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court, Case 1A.87/1997/err, paras. 6(c)(dd)-(hh) (Dec. 10, 1997). This ruling was instrumental in
enabling the plaintiff class to negotiate a $150 million settlement with the Marcos estate. See Ramon C.
Casiple, Waiting for Justice in the Marcos Litigation, Carnegie Council on Ethics and International
Affairs, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php/prmTemplatelD/8/prmID/613.
402. See The Case of the Migrant Workers, supra Part II.D.
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jurisdiction over the wine company. The suit is brought as a group action, a
British procedural device that allows a large number of plaintiffs to litigate as
a group in a manner somewhat analogous to a class action in the United
States. 4°3 The defendant seeks to have the suit dismissed under the common
law doctrine of forum non conveniens. The company argues that in terms of
expense, access to evidence, burden on the judicial system, and local interest
in the controversy, the courts of State A are the proper forum for litigation.
404
The suit has nothing to do with England, other than the defendant's technical
amenability to suit there.
The briefs for the plaintiffs respond as follows: "There are thousands of
us, including many for whom we do not yet have names and addresses. In
British courts we are able to proceed under procedural rules that allow us to
litigate as a group. A group action promotes efficiency, both by spreading the
costs of litigation among us and by preserving judicial resources. It enables us
to commence litigation (and hence meet the statute of limitations) on behalf of
those who are not yet identified by name. Group actions also avoid
competition among us for what may be fixed and inadequate assets for
recovery. Because State A's procedural rules do not permit group actions, we
are limited in the State A legal system to numerous small suits. By virtue of
that reality and other barriers to litigating in State A (such as distance,
expense, and language), State A is not an adequate forum."
How will British courts rule? If they stick to precedent, they will hold
that the absence of any group action mechanism in State A does not make it an
inadequate forum. 4 05 Legal systems differ in terms of procedure. Courts
outside of Great Britain are quite capable of reaching a just result without
employing all the mechanisms that are a familiar part of British justice.40 6 But
will they reach that result where the class claims relate to torture and forced
disappearance? The answer to that question is less clear. To the extent that
British courts will consult practice in the United States, they will find that
human rights class actions have greatly complicated the law on forum non
conveniens.
407
403. FED. R. CIV. P. R. 23.
404. See, e.g., Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., 1987 A.C. 460 (H.L.).
405. See Lubbe v. Cape plc, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1545 (H.L.) (holding that the absence of a group
action mechanism in South Africa does not preclude forum non conveniens dismissal).
406. In the United States, the Second Circuit followed this line of reasoning in In re Union
Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part,
809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
407. See generally Kathryn Lee Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non
Conveniens in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 41 (1998).
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C. Case 3: Statutes of Limitation and Retroactivity
Statutes of limitations constitute another category of procedural rules
40 8
in the crossfire of this conflict. Efforts are under way, especially in the EU, to
harmonize prescription periods 409 and thereby eliminate commercial
advantages that result when the window of liability ends sooner for some
commercial actors than for others. On the other hand, with respect to human
rights offenses, there are still important differences in how national legal
systems approach prescription. Some EU member states have enacted
legislation reviving causes of action that expired long ago. In some instances,
courts have upheld these statutes. In other instances, these revival statutes
have been struck down. In still other states, statutes of limitations have been
lengthened judicially, rather than legislatively, by tolling them during periods
in which facts on the ground presented obstacles to filing suit. An analysis of
these approaches to the prescription problem supports the conclusion that
domestic courts and their procedural rules lie at the intersection of two
competing movements in international law.
Consider another hypothetical case. The country of Zandor is composed
of two main ethnic groups. The minority population, Group A, ruled the
country from 1979 to 1999. A military junta had a firm grip on the capital and
tenuous control over the rural provinces, where the junta had informal
alliances with local strongmen. With the tacit approval of the junta leaders,
these locals systematically oppressed the Group B civilian population, denying
basic civil and political rights and committing grave crimes against humanity.
Group A soldiers periodically rounded up teenage boys, to be sold abroad in
countries with mining operations. Many were badly injured. Young girls were
rounded up and sold abroad to prostitution rings.4 lThe junta leaders received
kickbacks on both forms of trafficking.
In 1999, the junta is overthrown. Two priorities for the new majority
government are establishing the rule of law and righting past injustices. An
obstacle to the latter goal, however, is a statute passed in 1995 setting the
limitations period for all civil and criminal actions. That statute, which
408. Whether statutes of limitations are rules of procedural or of substantive law is much
disputed. Even within a single legal system, statutes of limitations can be regarded as rules of procedural
law for some purposes and as rules of substantive law for others. Compare Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99 (1945) (substantive for purposes of applying Erie doctrine), with Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486
U.S. 717 (1988) (procedural for choice-of-law purposes).
409. See generally REINHARD ZIMMERMAN, COMPARATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF A EUROPEAN LAW
OF SET-OFF AND PRESCRIPTION (2002).
410. The U.S. Department of State estimates that "[o]f the 600,000-800,000 people trafficked
across international borders every year, 70 percent are female and 50 percent are children. The majority
of those women and girls fall prey to the commercial sex trade." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS 15 (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/34158.pdf. See also
David Binder, In Europe, Sex Slavery Is Thriving Despite Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2002, at AS. For a
recent study of global child prostitution, see JUNE KANE, SOLD FOR SEX (1998). For a report directed at
the sex trade in minors, see Recommendation of the Comm. of Ministers to Member States Concerning
Sexual Exploitation, Pornography and Prostitution of, and Trafficking in Children and Young Adults,
461st Mtg. of Ministers' Dep., Recommendation No. R(91) 11 (1991),
http://cm.coe.int/ta/rec/1991/91rl .htm. For the prevalence of slavery more generally in the current
global economy, see Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global
Economy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 973 (2002). For a recent case alleging enslavement of domestic workers
in the United States, see Manliguez v. Joseph, 226 F. Supp. 2d 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
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shortened the limitations period from the prior statutory period of twenty
years, was enacted soon after the junta came under intense international
criticism for its human rights record. Under the statute, a common law tort
action, for example, became time-barred within three years of the statute's
entry into force or three years of the act or omission giving rise to the claim,
whichever came later.4 Two aspects of the 1995 prescription statute are
especially problematic from the viewpoint of victims of the 1979-1999
period. First, the statute expressly abolishes the doctrine of equitable
tolling,4t2 with the result that thousands of claims became time-barred even
though any victim seeking legal redress in Zandor before 1999 would have
been putting his or her life at risk. Second, the statute specifies relatively short
limitations periods for what are widely regarded as very serious offenses,
413
and these shorter limitations periods are applied retroactively. A claim that
arose in 1989 suddenly has its expiration date changed from 2009 to 1998.414
For the new government, the 1995 prescription statute is unacceptable. If
applied by Zandor's courts, the statute would shield thousands of perpetrators
from accountability. The new legislature enacts the following statute:
Law ofJanuary 1, 2000: Statute ofLimitations for Grave Human Rights Offenses
Whereas widespread and systematic offenses against fundamental human rights were
committed in Zandor during the period from 1979 to 1999;
Whereas the 1995 prescription statute unjustly confers impunity on those who perpetrated
these offenses and denies just compensation to their victims;
Now therefore:
1. The prescription statute of January 1, 1995 is hereby repealed.
2. The statute of limitations for any criminal offense listed in (4) is hereby abolished;
3. The statute of limitations for any civil action arising out of any offense listed in (4)
shall be twenty-five years;
4. Applicable offenses:
(a) Crimes against humanity, as defined in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court;
(b) Slavery or involuntary servitude, as defined in the Supplementary Convention
on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices
Similar to Slavery;
(c) Torture, as defined in the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;
(d) Forced disappearance, as defined in the Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearance of Persons.
411. Assume that Zandor is a common law country with little statutory law in the fields of torts,
contracts, or other private law subjects.
412. Under the doctrine of equitable tolling in the United States, the statute of limitations
ceases to run, for instance, during periods when wrongful conduct by the defendant prevents the plaintiff
from filing suit. It may also be tolled when extraordinary circumstances (e.g., natural disasters or
wartime) prevent the plaintiff from filing suit on a timely basis. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327
U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (defendant's fraudulent concealment of facts); Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
532, 540 (1867) (statute tolled during U.S. Civil War).
413. Let us assume that other legal systems provide for longer prescription periods for slave
trading and offenses of comparable severity.
414. Under the twenty-year prescription period of the 1979 law, a cause of action that arose in
1989 would expire in 2009. Under the 1995 statute, the three-year prescription period starts running
from the date the statute entered into force, so the statute of limitations ran out in 1998.
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5. The courts of Zandor shall, where appropriate, apply the doctrine of equitable tolling
in actions within the scope of this statute.
6. This statute shall enter into force on January 1, 2000. It shall apply retroactively to
applicable offenses committed on or after January 1, 1979.
This hypothetical statute poses some extremely difficult issues. Some
are familiar questions of due process and constitutionalism. Others are less
familiar. For example, is it desirable for statutes of limitations in Country A to
be similar to those in Country B? Is it desirable enough for governments to
conclude that there is little room for doctrines such as equitable tolling that
rely for their implementation on judicial discretion? Is it important enough to
conclude that all states must abolish statutes of limitations for an agreed-upon
lisi of crimes under international law? 415 How important is it that all
perpetrators of atrocities be prosecuted? Is it important enough for states to
depart from ordinary legal principles barring retroactivity? Is it important
enough for courts to look behind facially neutral procedural rules and probe
the reasons for their enactment? 416 How important are continuity and
predictability? Surely, not every law and judicial act of the old regime should
be suspect. Much unnecessary dislocation would be caused by calling into
question every zoning ordinance, every divorce decree, and every
environmental regulation just because they came from the same courts and
legislatures that were used to administer a grossly unjust regime. On the other
hand, underneath some facially neutral laws, including procedural rules, may
lie a legislative history suggesting that a rule of law was changed for the
purpose of conferring impunity. That motive seems to have been present in
the Zandor example above. Should the new courts in Country A dig deep into
the legislative history of laws enacted during the 1979-1999 period, even
those of a procedural character? If they do, should courts elsewhere follow
their lead?
These questions have arisen repeatedly in the past half-century-at
7 418.41Nuremberg,4 1 in multilateral treaty negotiations, in national legislation,41
415. Creating uniformity in this way has been attempted, with mixed results. Two treaties were
drafted in the 1970s-a U.N. convention and a European convention. Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754
U.N.T.S. 73 (entered into force Nov. 11, 1970); European Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, Jan. 25, 1974, Europ. T.S. No. 82
(has not entered into force). Both are limited in scope, and neither has gathered a large number of state
ratifications. More recently, the Rome Statute addressed the issue as follows: "The crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject to any statute of limitations." Rome Statute of the ICC,
supra note 201, art. 29.
416. That is, in the aftermath of oppressive regimes, should courts scour every law and judicial
decision, looking for signs of intent to confer impunity or to deny judicial remedies to specific groups of
people?
417. The Nuremberg defendants were indicted for crimes against peace and crimes against
humanity even though crimes with those titles had not been articulated in treaties or statutes before the
war. See Louis HENKN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 986 (2d ed. 1987) ("The Nuremberg Charter
applied a customary intemational law of human rights in charging the Nazi war criminals, inter alia,
with 'crimes against humanity."').
418. See supra note 415.
419. See, e.g., Robert A. Monson, The West German Statute of Limitations on Murder: A
Political, Legal, and Historical Exposition, 30 AM. J. CoMP. L. 605 (1982).
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and in regional human rights courts. 42 0 The newly created ICC may also
confront these issues soon,421 and similar questions have been posed before
domestic courts repeatedly over the past fifty years, with national legal
422
systems taking widely divergent approaches.
What competing norms underlie this conflict? On the one hand,
substantial social benefits flow from short and relatively uniform statutes of
423limitations. When statutes are short and when their length is easy to
determine, they perform the following functions: (1) free courts from the
inefficiency and uncertainty of adjudicating cases based on old and unreliable
evidence; (2) curtail the power of government officials to conduct
interminable investigations, forcing suspects to function for prolonged periods
under the shadow of liability; (3) allow private actors to use capital that would
otherwise be held in contingency funds;424 and (4) spare potential litigants
complex choice-of-law analyses to determine the applicable period of
* 425prescription.
On the other hand, short, inflexible statutes of limitations also have
drawbacks, in that they (1) inevitably confer impunity on some percentage of
criminals and tortfeasors; (2) leave some victims without redress; 426 and (3)
420. See Streletz, Kessler, & Krenz v. Germany, App. Nos. 34044/96, 35532/97, & 44801/98,
Eur. Ct. H.R., reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 811 (2001), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/-
Judgments.htm [hereinafter Streletz, Kessler, & Krenz].
421. Imagine a defendant accused of committing acts of forced disappearance. Imagine further
that three different statutes of limitations potentially apply to this offense: the statute of the place where
the victims disappeared, the statute of the defendant's state of nationality, and a customary international
law rule abolishing prescription for disappearance. Now imagine an ICC indictment that is brought after
the defendant has been acquitted by a national court that held that the relevant statute of limitations had
run. In reaching its conclusion, the national court (after applying its choice-of-law rules) applied its own
statute of limitations. Would a subsequent action in the ICC be admissible? Article 17 of the Rome
Statute partially addresses the question. Under that provision, the relationship between the ICC and
domestic courts is one of complementarity, meaning that cases brought before the ICC are generally
inadmissible if a member state is investigating or prosecuting them. An exception, however, is triggered
when a state is "unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution." Rome
Statute of the ICC, supra note 201, art. 17.1(a). But under Article 17, the following question would
arise: if a national court, acting in good faith, dismisses an action because the relevant statute of
limitations has expired, can the ICC nonetheless conclude that the national court was unwilling or
unable to carry out the prosecution? Would the answer more likely be in the affirmative if the offense at
issue were not subject to prescription under international law?
422. See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Politicizing the Crime Against Humanity, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 677 (2003); Richard H. Weisberg, The Risks of Adjudicating Vichy, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 127 (1999); Leila S. Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French
Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289 (1994);
Constitutional Court of the Hungarian Republic, Resolution No. 11 (1992), translated in 1 J. CONST. L.
E. & CENT. EuR. 129 (1994).
423. See N.H. Andrews, Reform of Limitation of Actions: The Quest for Sound Policy, 57
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 589 (1998); Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes
of Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453 (1997).
424. Once the statute has run, individuals and business entities can write potential liabilities off
their books, and capital held in reserve in anticipation of claims or legal expenses can be put to other
uses.
425. The sources of such complexity include questions about how to characterize the claim,
how to determine which jurisdiction's law applies with respect to the statute of limitations for that claim,
and how to determine whether a particular jurisdiction's rule on equitable tolling or similar doctrines
will apply.
426. The plaintiff may not be at fault for falling to bring suit; in some cases, it may be quite
difficult to file suit in a court with jurisdiction over the defendant that is also accessible and affordable
for the plaintiff.
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30:211
427may promote unnecessary litigation. In transitional democracies like
Zandor, these drawbacks are accentuated. Thousands of victims who had no
real opportunity to seek justice before the junta was ousted from power will be
further deprived if the 1995 prescription statute is applied now. The credibility
of the new government is also on the line. A large portion of the population is
expecting it to deliver justice and to right some of the wrongs of the past.
However, the new government and its courts cannot respond with
vindictiveness or lawlessness. Citizens need to see that the new regime is
different from the old.
Complicated issues in applying statutes of limitation often lie at the
intersection of these two competing demands. A transitional democracy that
subordinates accountability to procedural technicalities puts its credibility at
risk. To some, this policy will suggest that the new government lacks a firm
grip on power, that it is corrupt, or that it has skeletons of its own to bury. But
the opposite scenario, zealous prosecution with no regard for procedural
fairness, raises different fears. To some, Zandor's law of January 1, 2000, may
plant seeds of doubt. Will the new regime uphold the rule of law any better
than the old? Will such key procedural values as evenhandedness, neutrality,
notice, and accuracy play any meaningful role in the new legal system? Are
the longer prescription periods, applied retroactively, simply a way of settling
old scores? If at this critical constitutional juncture the courts allow
themselves to be co-opted into retribution, will they ever be truly
independent? Effective enforcement of global human rights norms may come
at the cost of procedural regularity. Conversely, at some point extraordinary
procedural efforts to vindicate substantive rights may exact a huge price in
terms of fairness, putting all rights at risk.
The international community grappled with these legal questions during
the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, and then during successive efforts a
generation later to draft treaties eliminating statutes of limitations for crimes
against humanity. The first of these treaties, the U.N. Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, 8 strongly leaned toward accountability. It wholly embraced
retroactive application of new and longer statutes of limitations. 9 Thus, for
example, if the domestic statute of limitations for murder had been twenty
years in 1942, the Convention called for the cause of action to be revived,
even after 1962, and for it to continue indefinitely in the future.430
The clarity of this approach came at the expense of concerns about
procedural fairness. The U.N. Convention went too far for much of Western
427. Parties facing a statutory deadline may file suit prematurely-without adequate
investigation or efforts at settlement-rather than risk losing a claim. Although tolling agreements are
widely used in the United States to avoid this problem, in other legal systems such agreements are not so
clearly enforceable.
428. Supra note 415.
429. See id. art. 1 ("No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, irrespective of
the date of their commission.") (emphasis added).
430. See id. (discussing "eviction by armed attack or occupation and inhuman acts resulting
from the policy of apartheid, and the crime of genocide").
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Europe, which voiced domestic constitutional objections. 431 Allowing
extinguished actions to be revived was viewed as inconsistent with
fundamental principles of procedural law such as legal certainty, justified
reliance, and protection against stale claims and unreliable evidence. The
Convention never bridged this gap between accountability and procedural
fairness. Only forty-eight countries have ratified it.
432
The Council of Europe took a different approach, leaning more toward
procedural fairness. Thus, the European Convention on the Non-Applicability
of Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes was
intended to be applied prospectively-to eliminate the statute of limitations
only with respect to offenses committed after the treaty's entry into force.433
In reducing retroactivity problems, however, the European Convention
sacrificed much in terms of impunity. Had it entered into force, which it has
not, notorious war criminals from World War II would have escaped
434prosecution.
These conflicting impulses--one in favor of extraordinary steps to
combat impunity and the other in favor of maintaining the stability and
integrity of procedural law-also surface in national legislation and yield
different results even in legal systems that are otherwise quite similar. For
example, although the German and Hungarian legal systems similarly
emphasize legal certainty and clear adherence to procedural rules, their
treatment of statutes of limitations and retroactivity has been different.
In postwar Germany, retroactivity and prescription have been at the
center of an extended legal drama, with much internal inconsistency. The
former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) declined to ratify the 1968 U.N.
Convention because reviving statutes of limitations that had already run out
was widely viewed as unconstitutional. Yet, with respect to Nazi crimes, the
FRG repeatedly enacted legislation extending statutes of limitations that had
not yet run out. 435 Finally, in 1979, legislation was enacted eliminating
431. See Natan Lerner, The Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to
War Crimes, 4 ISR. L. REv. 512, 520-22 (1969) (discussing the rejected Greek and Norwegian proposals
to eliminate the retroactive applicability of the U.N. Convention); Robert H. Miller, The Convention on
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 65 AM. J.
INT'L L. 476, 488 (1971).
432. Among the non-ratifying countries are the United States, Australia, Canada, China, Japan,
New Zealand, nearly all the South and Central American states, and all the EU member states except for
the formerly communist countries. See Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, Ratifications and Reservations, at http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/6.htm
(Nov. 24, 2004).
433. See European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes
Against Humanity and War Crimes, supra note 415, art. 2.1 ("The present Convention applies to
offenses committed after its entry into force .... ") (emphasis added). The treaty's goal of regional
harmonization is set out in the Preamble's references to "a common criminal policy" and "greater unity"
among members of the Council of Europe. Id. art. 2.2. Under Article 2.2, the Convention also extended
the limitations period for offenses whose prescription period had not yet expired as of the time the
Convention entered into force. Id.
434. The European Convention was also broader in scope than the 1968 U.N. Convention. It
covered not only the short list of grave offenses enumerated in the latter, but also "any other violation of
a rule or custom of international law [of a "comparable nature"] which may hereafter be established." Id.
art. 1.3.
435. The FRG repeatedly extended the period of time for bringing criminal cases against Nazi
perpetrators. These actions came in response to inadequate commitment of resources early on and
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prescription altogether for those Nazi offenses for which the limitations period
(with extensions) had not yet expired as of 1979. FRG courts upheld these
extensions, drawing a distinction between extending a limitations period not
yet expired and reviving one already expired.436
The issue gained new currency after German reunification. With respect
to state-sanctioned killings and other grave offenses committed before 1991 in
the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), German courts have been
selective in their willingness to apply the laws of the former GDR. In the
Border Guards cases, the German Constitutional Court upheld the conviction
of former GDR officials responsible for the deaths of East Germans shot while
attempting to flee to the West.437 It brushed aside arguments that applying
post-unification German law (including its statute of limitations), rather than
the law of the former GDR, would undermine legal certainty. The Court did
so even though the principle of legal certainty had been repeatedly cited by
German courts and legislators as an obstacle to genocide prosecutions.438 In
contrast, Hungarian courts have rejected attempts to extend statutes of
limitation or to apply post-1989 laws to offenses committed during the
Communist period. When in 1991 the new, democratically elected Hungarian
Parliament enacted a law purporting to toll the statute of limitations for certain
offenses that had been committed during the Communist period, the
Hungarian Constitutional Court struck it down.439 In a landmark ruling, the
Court openly wrestled with what had motivated the political branches-
widely voiced demands by ordinary citizens that the sins of the old order be
exposed and punished. The Court nonetheless rejected these demands. Popular
calls for substantive justice could not trump something more fundamental to
inadequate evidentiary coordination with Eastern European countries. See generally Monson, supra note
419. External pressure also played a role. Id. at 607. Initially, the statute of limitations for murder was
deemed to be tolled from 1933 to 1945 because of the "inadequacies" of the Nazi judicial system. With
the twenty-year statute on murder set to expire in 1965, the Bundestag reset the beginning of the tolled
period for murder from 1945 to 1949, the year the FRG came into being. Id. at 610. In 1969, with the
limitations period set to expire again, the Bundestag acted again, this time lengthening the prescription
period for murder to thirty years. Id. at 615. Finally, in 1979, the FRG passed legislation entirely and
retroactively eliminating the statute of limitations period on murder. Id. at 618-25.
436. Where the old statute of limitations had not yet expired, lengthening the statute of
limitations was believed not to violate Article 103 of the German Basic Law, which bars retroactive
legislation. This view rested in part on the theory that statutes of limitations are rules of procedural law,
not grants of substantive rights. See id. at 611. It is unclear why, in terms of legal certainty, there is a
meaningful difference between the two. Imagine two offenses committed in 1945: murder and
enslavement. The statute of limitations is thirty years for the former and twenty years for the latter. The
commencement of the statute for both crimes was tolled until 1949. In 1979, efforts to allow prosecution
in perpetuity for Nazi murders committed in 1945 are deemed constitutionally permissible. But similar
efforts to extend, even for a shorter time period, prosecution for slave labor in 1945 are deemed
unconstitutionally retroactive. Why the difference in conclusion?
437. The ECHR agreed. See Streletz, Kessler, & Krenz, supra note 420 (holding that these
convictions did not violate Article 7.1 of the European Human Rights Convention, supra note 98, which
bars prosecution under retroactively applied laws). Under GDR law it was lawful for guards to use lethal
force to prevent people from seeking to cross the border without authorization. Id.
438. Legislation introducing the crime of genocide into the FRG penal code in 1954 barred
prosecution under that section of acts of genocide committed before 1954. Though the crime of genocide
was introduced into the penal code in 1954, crimes of genocide committed before 1954 could not be
prosecuted because of the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. Monson, supra note 419, at
615,623.
439. See Constitutional Court of the Hungarian Republic, Resolution No. 11 (1992), supra note
422, at 131.
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the Hungarian legal order: procedural fairness. The latter, according to the
Court, was "an indispensable component of the rule of law" in Hungary.
440
Citizens were entitled to know in advance their potential liability. They were
entitled to rely on a statute of limitations and to rest secure once the statute
had run, no matter what the alleged offense. The Court did little to answer the
opposing arguments: Can a new republic succeed in instantiating the rule of
law if it fails to address profound wrongs of the past? Only momentarily and
obliquely did the Court pause to consider the conflict between procedural
regularity and substantive justice: "The certainty of the law based on formal
and objective principles is more important than the necessarily partial and
subjective justice."
The U.S. legal system offers yet a third model for balancing these
competing principles. U.S. courts have repeatedly referred to the liberty
interest served by statutes of limitations and the extent to which limitations
periods also reinforce the se aration of powers by restraining overzealous or
discriminatory prosecution. 442 With these concerns in mind and against the
backdrop of the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses, the U.S. Supreme
Court has struck down legislation reviving expired causes of action, whether
civil or criminal."43 State courts have done likewise, 4" and just last term, in
Stogner v. California,4 5 the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed this view by a
vote of five to four in a decision emphasizing that statutes of limitations
should be viewed primarily as procedural laws, akin to rules of evidence.4
6
Although U.S. courts have struck down legislative efforts to revive statutes of
limitations, they have achieved similar results in other ways. The U.S. case
law on equitable tolling in the context of ATCA and TVPA cases, for
instance, is very permissive. Courts typically have tolled the relevant statute
of limitations throughout the period of time in which the alleged victim was
unable to leave the country in which the violation took place. They have also
tolled the limitations period throughout the time in which the alleged
perpetrator was in power, or while government-to-government restitution
440. Id. at 136.
441. Id.; see also id. at 137-38 ("The attainment of social justice ... is not guaranteed by the
Constitution."). The Court did, however, try to even the scales by observing that in the abstract, if not
necessarily in the concrete historical circumstances of Cold War Hungary, statutes of limitations also
serve a rights-protecting function--hey protect individuals from arbitrary governmental action and a
potentially unending threat of trial for acts done long ago. Id.
442. See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003); cf. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24
(1981).
443. See, e.g., William Danzer & Co. v. Gulf & Ship Island R.R. Co., 268 U.S. 633 (1925)
(retroactive change in statute of limitations to revive federal cause of action violates Due Process Clause
of Fifth Amendment).
444. A notable exception is People v. Frazer, 982 P.2d 180 (Cal. 1999).
445. Stogner, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) (invalidating California statute permitting prosecution of
sex-related child abuse crimes even when the prior statute of limitations has expired).
446. Id. at 615 ("[A] statute of limitations reflects a legislative judgment that after a certain
time, no quantum of evidence is sufficient to convict. And that judgment typically rests, in large part,
upon evidentiary concerns .... "); see also United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1971); Wood
v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (describing statutes of limitations as creating "a presumption
which renders proof unnecessary").
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negotiations were under way, even when such negotiations were stalled for
decades."7
Zandor's courts are in a quandary. They can try to choose among the
different approaches discussed above or investigate others. They can reject all
existing approaches and go off in their own direction. They can point to their
unique circumstances, such as the fact that the junta drastically shortened the
statute of limitations in what seems to have been a purely self-serving act. But
no matter what Zandor's courts do, they are not likely to arrive at a solution
that addresses both the system's needs for predictability and the claims of the
many who suffered."4
8
D. Case 4: Rules of Evidence and Testimonial Privileges
Rules of evidence are another category of procedural rules"49 in which
efforts to enforce global human rights norms seem destined to conflict with
the movement to unify procedural laws. The problem in this instance is not so
much with rules the sole or even primary function of which is to ensure
accuracy. Evidentiary rules of that sort appear gradually to be undergoing a
preliminary degree of harmonization, but not in a way that especially impacts
human rights claims.450 The rub is with evidentiary rules that embody some
conscious tradeoff between accuracy and other societal values, such as
promoting frank communication with attorneys, assuring the safety of
447. A counter-example is judicial interpretation of a statute enacted by the California
legislature in 1999. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6 (West 2004). That law extended until December 31,
2010 the statute of limitations on claims "to recover compensation for labor performed as a Second
World War slave labor victim or a Second World War forced labor victim." Id. § 354.6(b). A federal
district court struck down the statute as an unconstitutional infringement on the federal government's
exclusive power over foreign affairs. In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp.
2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2001); see also In the Matter of the Requested Extradition of Suarez-Mason, 694 F.
Supp. 676, 686-87 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (refusing to toll statute of limitations on kidnappings during
Argentina's so-called "dirty war").
448. The proceeding against John Demjanjuk provides a cautionary tale. Alleged to be the
infamous "Ivan the Terrible," a sadistic guard at Treblinka, Demjanjuk became the target of extradition
proceedings in the early 1980s. The proceedings resulted in the revocation of his U.S. citizenship and his
extradition to Israel. Demnjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 612 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ohio 1985). In Israel, Demjanjuk
was convicted after a long public trial in the Jerusalem District Court rivaling that of Adolf Eichmann, at
least in terms of public outrage and media attention. Dozens of Holocaust survivors gave eyewitness
testimony, based on events that took place fifty years earlier, that Demjanjuk and Ivan the Terrible were
the same person. In 1993, the Israeli Supreme Court reversed the conviction, observing that eyewitness
testimony was inherently suspect after the passage of a great length of time. Based in part on newly
discovered documents from the former Soviet Union, the Court concluded that the documents
established a reasonable doubt that the testimony of even dozens of witnesses corroborating one another
could not overcome. Cr.A. 347/88, Demjanjuk v. State of Israel, 47(4) P.D. 221 (1993).
449. Though subject to some debate, most legal systems regard rules of evidence as rules of
procedural law. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Simic, Separate Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Prosecutor's
Motion for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony of a Witness, Case No. IT-95-9, para. 25 (Trial
Chamber, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 27, 1999),
http://www.un.org/icty/simic/trialc3/decision-e/90727EV5955 1.htm ("Whether or not evidence which is
relevant should nevertheless not be permitted to be given is a matter of procedural rather than
substantive law.").
450. In the past decade, advances in technology have spurred treaties and model laws
pertaining to certain forms of evidence, such as electronic signatures and polygraph tests. Recently,
efforts have been directed toward the creation of a common European law of evidence. See, e.g., Acad.
of European Law-Trier, Seminars for Practitioners: The Law of Evidence and Judicial Cooperation in
the European Union, at http://www.era.int/www/en/c_599.htm (Nov. 25-26, 2002).
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witnesses, or providing media outlets with access to information that benefits
the democratic process.
To see the growing conflict between those who seek to bring about a
convergence among national evidentiary rules and those who view existing
evidentiary rules as an often-encountered obstacle to enforcing human rights
law, let us look at a modified version of Case 3.
Imagine that the facts in Case 3 give rise to two legal proceedings, one
in Europe and one in the United States. The U.S. proceeding is a civil class
action brought in federal court under the ATCA. The plaintiffs are a class of
Zandorese men who allege that as teenage boys they were abducted and sold
into forced labor in Zimbabwe, in violation of treaties and customary
international law.451 The defendant is a French mining company, Socit6 des
Mines (SdM), alleged to have purchased the plaintiffs and forced them to
labor in its mines. 452 The European proceeding is an action in a Dutch court
by Zandorese women who claim that as teenage girls they were forcibly
brought to The Netherlands from Zandor and sold into forced prostitution in
Amsterdam. They allege that they were kept in brothels run by organized
crime syndicates and that the Dutch police knowingly looked the other way in
exchange for bribes. The action in The Netherlands is a criminal suit against
those who allegedly ran the brothels and the officials who allegedly were
bribed.
Suppose further that a key evidentiary issue lies at the heart of each case.
In the United States, the plaintiffs rely on photographs taken at SdM's mining
facilities by a clandestine British journalist who visited SdM posing as a
prospective investor. The pictures, which were later published, show young
boys with horrific scars and bruises on their bodies, working in facilities under
appalling conditions. At a deposition, the defendant questions the reporter as
to the dates on which the photos were taken, the names of the people in the
photos, and whether other, unpublished photographs exist. The reporter
refuses to answer the questions, claiming that because the pictures were an
integral part of journalistic work, her sources and methods are privileged. The
defendants file a motion to compel. Who will win?
Meanwhile in The Netherlands, mobsters and corrupt officials are on
trial for trafficking in child prostitutes in violation of Dutch law and
international treaties. Prosecutors want the victims to testify. The victims are
reluctant to do so. At a minimum, they want their identities to be withheld
from both the public and the defendants. The prosecution proposes that the
court allow the witnesses to use pseudonyms and to testify from a location
outside of the courtroom through an electronic connection and technology that
451. See European Human Rights Convention, supra note 98, art. 4.2 ("No one shall be
required to perform forced or compulsory labour."); ICCPR, supra note 191, art. 8.3(a) ("No one shall
be required to perform forced or compulsory labour."); Slavery Convention, supra note 199, art. 3;
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 5., O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3
rev. 5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z1afchar.htm.
452. Assume that SdM is subject to personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301 by virtue
of doing business in New York. See, e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels, Int'l, 19 N.Y.2d 533, 537 (1967)
(upholding jurisdiction over a London hotel because a centralized reservation service located in New
York "does all the business which Hilton (U.K.) could do were it here by its own officials").
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will alter the appearance of their faces and the sound of their voices. The
lawyers advance the following reasons: (1) the women have a well-founded
fear of retribution by the criminal organizations that run the brothels; (2) this
fear is accentuated by the criminal involvement of state officials; (3) the
women are being asked to testify about the most painful events of their lives;
requiring them to do so in the physical presence of those who traumatized
them as children will likely traumatize them again; and (4) the women risk
becoming pariahs in the Zandorese community, where women who engage in
sexual activity outside of marriage become social outcasts. The defense
objects: anonymity will make it impossible to test the witnesses' credibility
and to verify the accuracy of their testimony. How will the Dutch courts rule?
These two hypothetical cases also lie at the intersection of
harmonization (in this case the harmonization of evidentiary rules) and the
potentially conflicting drive to brush aside evidentiary privileges that in
practice tend to work to the advantage of human rights violators. In one case,
a European court must determine whether a witness can testify anonymously
in a criminal proceeding.45 3 In the class action above, a U.S. court must first
determine whether a testimonial privilege exists for journalists and, if it does,
what is covered by the privilege. 454 Under U.S. law, the privilege does cover
non-confidential sources, but in a form weaker than that for confidential
sources. What should the U.S. court do in the forced labor class action before
it?
One approach would be for the court to look closely at decisions from
other countries to determine if those decisions form a consistent pattern. If
they do, there may be great benefits in terms of predictability and efficiency of
falling into line with these other courts. In doing so, the court's thought
process might be based on the following rationale: Journalism is a global
business. There are clear benefits to some degree of global similarity in the
laws bearing on the conduct of journalists. A reporter working for a
worldwide news organization may work in India for several years and then be
assigned to London. If the basic rules on source confidentiality greatly differ
453. The ruling of the highest Dutch court may ultimately be subject to review by the ECHR.
See European Human Rights Convention, supra note 98, arts. 34 & 35 (holding that the Court may
receive applications from "any person" or "group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation"
of the Convention by a state that is a party to the Convention, provided the claim is filed within six
months of exhausting all domestic remedies). If Dutch courts rule in favor of permitting anonymous
testimony, the criminal defendants may seek review in the ECHR on the ground that The Netherlands
has infringed their rights under Article 6.3(d) of the Convention (right to examine witnesses).
454. The convergence among national procedural laws, although incomplete, has been actively
sought by transnational media companies seeking greater predictability in their efforts to investigate and
report news. Indeed, in Prosecutor v. Talic, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, Case No. IT-99-36-
AR73.9 (Appeals Chamber, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 11, 2002),
http://www.un.orglicty/brdjanin/appeal/decision-e/randall02121l.htm [hereinafter Talic], over thirty
news organizations filed an amicus brief asking the ICTY to adopt a set of "clear bright line rules"
capable of "uniformity of application." Brief of Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Various Media Entities and
in Support of Jonathan Randal's Appeal of Trial Chamber's Decision on Motion To Set Aside
Confidential Subpoena To Give Evidence, Prosecutor v. Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, para. 20 (Appeals
Chamber, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Aug. 17, 2002). For another example of
briefs recently filed in various venues around the world by media companies and organizations on
similar matters, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Committee for the Protection of Journalists in Support of
Abdullah Keskin, Gov't of Turkey v. Abdulleh Keskin, State Security Court (2002) (Turk.),
http://www.cpj.org/news/2002fTurkeyAmiciBriefKeskin.doc.
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in the two places, her job will be more difficult. Large media organizations
with thousands of reporters will be unable to produce useful internal policies
on a range of legal questions affecting reporters and sources.455 In some
instances, it may be better to reach a result in harmony with that of other legal
systems than to strike out unilaterally with what, in a vacuum, might be
considered the right result.
456
Thus, a court concerned with uniformity would likely grant the motion
to compel. There was no understanding of confidentiality between the sources
that were photographed and the British journalist. Were the court to extend the
privilege covering confidential sources to non-confidential sources, U.S. law
would step further out of sync with the laws of other countries on this
question.4  In order to prevail, SdM need only show that the photos are "of
likely relevance to a significant issue in the case" and that they are "not
reasonably obtainable from other available sources." 458 SdM should prevail on
both issues.
Alternatively, the court could place less emphasis on uniformity. The
complaint alleges appalling human rights abuses. Perhaps what matters most
is for the legal rule to maximize incentives for exposing abuses, even at the
cost of departing from a consensus reached among several legal systems. A
court inclined to take this route might reason as follows: This case concerns
alleged violations of international law, including violations of jus cogens
norms. 4 59 In determining the scope of evidentiary privileges, judges must
place primary emphasis on whether a rule will encourage or discourage the
exposure of such atrocities. In doing so, the court must recognize that the
media has been indispensable over the past century in uncovering atrocities. A
rule that would require journalists regularly to testify with respect to people
455. Absent some degree of uniformity, a reporter and a publisher are in a difficult spot. When
the interviewee asks for an assurance of confidentiality, should the reporter assume that the validity of
such an assurance is governed by English law because she is a British national, or U.S. law because her
publisher is based in the United States? Should she look to French law because the interviews are to be
done in France and the interviewees are French? Does she need to consider the laws of other countries
where legal proceedings may eventually be brought? When the legal rules are similar, news
organizations can apply the same guidelines regardless where the interview is conducted and regardless
of the nationality of the people involved.
456. See Gonzales v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
457. In Talic, the Office of the Prosecutor argued that a privilege for journalists concerning
non-confidential matters would be "unprecedented in international or national legal systems." Talic,
supra note 454, para. 25. That assertion was an overstatement. Such a privilege has found some
acceptance in the United States. See, e.g., Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 36 ("[W]hile nonconfidential press
materials are protected by a qualified privilege, the showing needed to overcome the privilege is less
demanding than the showing required where confidential materials are sought."). It is unclear whether
the reporters' privilege is a doctrine of U.S. constitutional law or of federal common law. See id. at 35-
36 n.6; Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1993); see also 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2002) (U.S.
Justice Department Guidelines on issuing subpoenas to members of the media); Alan S. Wasserstrom,
Annotation, Reportorial Privilege as to Nonconfidential News Information, 60 A.L.R.5th 75 (1998 &
Supp. 2000).
458. Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 36.
459. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 515 (5th ed. 1998);
ANTONIO CASSESSE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 140-41 (2001); MAuRiZIo RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNEs 43-73 (1997); cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 227, § 404 n.1 (referring to a draft of the International Law Commission's
Articles on State Responsibility that classifyies slavery offenses as being subject to universal
jurisdiction).
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they interview or investigate would put many reporters in untenable positions.
In the course of investigating everything from conditions for detainees at
Guantdnamo Bay to the global sex trade, reporters seeking to expose
unconscionable violations of international human rights run the risk of being
viewed not as neutral observers but as investigative extensions of prosecutors.
The existing precedents that support a narrow privilege arise from much
different factual contexts. They were intended to balance the public's need to
know against a defendant's access to evidence in the context of ordinary civil
and criminal offenses, not offenses of the magnitude of slavery, genocide, and
torture.
Recently, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY adopted a substantially
similar approach in a case in which the reporters' privilege was raised as a
possible bar to obtaining evidence for prosecution of war crimes and crimes
against humanity. At issue in the Talic case was the validity of a trial
subpoena for the testimony of a Washington Post reporter, Jonathan Randal,
with respect to his interviews with a non-confidential source in 1993.460 In a
criminal case against the interviewee, the ICTY Prosecutor obtained a
subpoena for Randal's testimony regarding the source's statements quoted in
the article. Vacating the subpoena, the Appeals Chamber announced a new
rule: in ICTY proceedings, the reporters' privilege extends, at least in part, to
461non-confidential sources.
In reaching this result, the Appeals Chamber acknowledged that it was
going beyond the general consensus among both national courts462 and the
ECHR that a crucial distinction existed between confidential and non-
463confidential sources. However, the rule developed in those cases had
derived from entirely different factual contexts.464 In the Talic court's view, a
different rule was needed for journalists operating in the context of war crimes
and genocide. An interview with a non-confidential source about ethnic
cleansing in Bosnia was simply different from an interview in the United
460. In 1993, Randal wrote a series of articles based in part on interviews with Radoslav
Brdjanin, a Serb nationalist later indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The articles
claimed that Brdjanin, a housing administrator, had said that he was preparing laws to expel non-Serbs
from government housing to make room for Serbs. The articles also quoted Brdjanin as saying that non-
Serbs in Bosnia needed to be ethnically cleansed. Talic, supra note 454, para. 3.
461. Id. paras. 48 & 49.
462. Id. para. 41 ("[Mlany national jurisdictions afford a testimonial privilege for journalists
only when it comes to protecting confidential sources.").
463. According to opinions in these cases and the prosecution's argument in Talic, deterring
sources from talking to the press is less of an issue with non-confidential sources. The absence of a
privilege likely will not deter people from talking to journalists; these sources by definition are ones for
whom assurances of confidentiality are not especially important. Id. para. 23.
464. Here, as in other cases, the ICTY emphasized that its caseload, and therefore its role, is
different in kind from that of national courts or even regional human rights tribunals. See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Simic, Separate Opinion of Judge David Hunt on Prosecutor's Motion for a Ruling
Concerning the Testimony of a Witness, Case No. IT-95-9, para. 23 (Trial Chamber, Int'l Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 27, 1999), http://www.un.org/icty/simic/trialc3/decision-
e/90727EV59551 .htm. Compare Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting
Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, Case No. IT-94-1 (Trial Chamber, Int'l Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Aug. 10, 1995), http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-
e/100895pm.htm [hereinafter Tadic, Majority Opinion], with Prosecutor v. Tadic, Separate Opinion of
Judge Stephen on the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses,
Case No. IT-94-1 (Trial Chamber, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Aug. 10, 1995),
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/50810pmn.htin [hereinafter Tadic, Dissenting Opinion].
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States about possible price fixing. Both pertain to serious matters, but, the
Appeals Chamber seemed to say, the need to remove all disincentives for
people with valuable information to talk to the press was greater in the former
case. Where what is at stake are human rights offenses that may destabilize
entire societies, courts must view skeptically evidentiary rules that inhibit the
media's ability to uncover atrocities 465 -even where the interference is
arguably marginal and even if doing so comes at the cost of departing from a
growing legal consensus.466 The Tribunal then articulated a privilege even
more protective of journalists than that articulated by courts in the United
States.4 67
Talic is not the only case in which the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals have crafted new evidentiary rules departing from those of other
international tribunals and national courts. In the Simic case, the ICTY created
a testimonial privilege for employees of the International Committee of the
Red Cross, who do not enjoy a similar privilege in national courts.46 8 In
Delalic, the Tribunal created a privilege for wartime interpreters. 469 In
Blaskic,470 it granted protective measures for public servants in the interest of
national security.
Even more significantly, the ICTY has staked out a position on
anonymous testimony that is notably more permissive than that of the ECHR
and national courts. In the ICTY's first case, Tadic, the Prosecutor sought
protective orders allowing rape victims to testify anonymously. Ruling on the
motion, the conflicting opinions of Judge McDonald (for the majority) and
Judge Stephen (in dissent) illustrate the underlying conflict between
promoting procedural uniformity and departing from widely shared procedural
norms in the interest of preventing impunity.471 Over defense objections, the
465. See Talic, supra note 454, para. 35:
In war zones, accurate information is often difficult to obtain and may be difficult to
distribute or disseminate as well. The transmission of that information is essential to
keeping the international public informed about matters of life and death. It may also be
vital to assisting those who would prevent or punish the crimes under international
humanitarian law that fall within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal.
466. Id. para. 36 (unhindered access of war correspondents to information "may be vital to
assisting those who would prevent or punish crimes under international humanitarian law").
467. Id. paras. 48 & 49 (holding that the Trial Chamber can compel a war correspondent to
testify only when the evidence sought is "direct and important to the core issues of the case" and such
evidence is not "reasonably available" from another source).
468. Prosecutor v. Simic et al., Decision on the Prosecution Motion Under Rule 73 for a Ruling
Concerning the Testimony of a Witness, Case No. IT-95-9-PT (Trial Chamber, Int'l Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, July 27, 1999), http://www.un.org/icty/simic/trialc3/decision-
e/90727EV59549.htm.
469. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Decision on the Motion Ex Parte by the Defence of Zdravko Mucic
Concerning the Issue of a Subpoena to an interpreter, Case No. IT-96-21-T (Trial Chamber, Int'l
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 8, 1997), http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/-
decision-e/70708SP2.htm.
470. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Decision of Trial Chamber I on Protective Measures for General
Philippe Morillon, Case No. IT-95-14 (Trial Chamber, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, May 12, 1999), http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/trialcl/decisions-e/90512PM113178.htm;
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Decision of Trial Chamber I on Protective Measures for Mr. Jean-Pierre Thebault,
Case No. IT-95-14 (Trial Chamber, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 13, 1999),
http://www.un.org/ictylblaskic/trialc1/decisions-e/90513PMI 13179.htm [hereinafter Blaskic, Thebault].
471. This conflict is also apparent in the sharply divided reactions to the case in the literature.
See Christine M. Chinkin, Due Process and Witness Anonymity, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 75 (1997) (defending
majority opinion in Tadic); Monroe Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against
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majority granted the protective orders. Repeatedly stressing the ICTY's
unique character, Judge McDonald maintained that the Tribunal should not
regard itself as bound by the procedural rulings of national courts or other
international tribunals. 472 Although the ECHR had repeatedly disallowed
anonymous testimony,473 the ICTY did not need to follow that court's lead.
The ECHR was meant to apply in "ordinary criminal and . . . civil
adjudications,, 474 not cases arising from mass rape, torture, and killings
amidst armed conflict.
In contrast, Judge Stephen's dissent emphasizes the need to follow
ECHR precedents. In Kostovski v. Netherlands, the leading ECHR case on
point, the Court had adopted an approach under which anonymous testimony
could almost never be consistent with the rights of the accused.475 Judge
Stephen noted that Kostovski had been repeatedly affirmed and explained by
the ECHR, and he argued that it should be followed because "internationally
recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused" should be uniform,
and because the relevant articles of the ICTY Statute had been inspired in part
by the ECHR.47 6
Judge McDonald's opinion ultimately prevailed in Tadic and subsequent
ICTY cases. 47 On the issue of anonymous testimony, the Tribunal has
repeatedly taken the view that trials involving horrendous human rights abuses
cannot be conducted under the same evidentiary rules as those in national
courts, or even specialized human rights tribunals. As with evidentiary
privileges regarding journalists, the ICTY has rejected appeals for uniformity.
So after Talic, where does the law stand on testimonial privileges for
journalists? Some would say it is in flux. Before Talic, the question of
whether a testimonial privilege should exist for journalists had arisen mostly
in cases involving common crimes and allegations of libel. In those factual
contexts, many jurisdictions had arrived at a qualified privilege that applied
only in criminal proceedings and only with respect to confidential sources.
The ICTY's ruling in Talic springs from an importantly different factual
context-an armed conflict that left hundreds of thousands dead, caused the
largest exodus of refugees in generations, and produced an anti-immigrant
backlash throughout much of Europe. The Tribunal did make some effort to
point out that its new rule emerges from that unique context. Nonetheless, it is
Accused, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 235 (1996) (disagreeing with majority opinion); Michael Scharf & Valerie
Epps, The International Trial of the Century? A "Cross Fire" Exchange on the First Case Before the
Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 635 (1996).
472. Tadic, Majority Opinion, supra note 464, para. 70.
473. See, e.g., Visser v. Netherlands, App. No. 26668/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm; Van Mechelen v. Netherlands, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) at
647 (1997); Ludi v. Switzerland, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 173 (1992); Windisch v. Austria, 13 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 281 (1990); Kostovski v. Netherlands, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 434 (1989); cf.
P.S. v. Germany, App. No. 33900/96 (2001), http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm; Delta v.
France, 191 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 2 (1990) (no opportunity for cross examination).
474. Tadic, Majority Opinion, supra note 464, para. 28.
475. Kostovski v. Netherlands, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 434 (1989).
476. Tadic, Dissenting Opinion, supra note 464.
477. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Decision Granting Protective Measures for Witness FWS-191,
Case No. IT-96-23&23/1 (Trial Chamber, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Nov. 20,
1998), http://www.un.org/icty/kunarac/trialc2/decision-e/81120PM24549.htm; Blaskic, Thebault, supra
note 470.
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hard to see how the Talic holding-that the privilege can apply to non-
confidential sources-can remain confined to war correspondents and
criminal trials. Journalists play equally important roles in exposing grave
human rights abuses that take place in peacetime, such as in the case of
terrorist attacks, unconscionable prison conditions, police brutality, or the
production of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the socially useful role
of interviewing and investigating is not confined to journalists. It is shared by
scholars, documentary filmmakers, photographers, and many others. In short,
as litigants repeatedly refer to Talic in national courts and other tribunals, the
ICTY's holding is likely to disrupt the rough convergence that had taken
shape earlier. Were a U.S. court to rule in the hypothetical case above, it
might reflect on the decision in Talic (if the case were brought to its attention)
and ultimately conclude that the privilege should cover the factual situation
before it for two reasons. First, the human rights violations alleged, though
presented by way of a civil complaint, are similar in severity to those in Talic
and present an equally pressing societal need for the exposure of atrocities.
Moreover, at the moment when an interview takes place, neither the journalist
nor the source knows for sure whether any eventual legal proceeding, if there
should be one, will be civil or criminal.
V. TOWARD COMMON PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURE FOR ADJUDICATING
GRAVE HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENSES IN DOMESTIC COURTS
Each of the hypothetical cases in Part IV illustrates that a specific
segment of the new transnational public law litigation-transnational human
rights litigation involving atrocities and other grave human rights violations-
is placing new and serious pressures on domestic courts. In particular,
fundamental aspects of domestic procedural laws are coming under strain at
the precise point in time when a competing constituency (the advocates of
juridical unification) is looking to these same courts for a wholly different
approach. One possible result is a new variation on an ongoing conflict waged
in some domestic legal systems: an ideological battle that pits rules against
standards, law against equity, substance against procedure.4 78
The parallels between transnational public law litigation today and
domestic public law litigation in the United States a generation ago have been
examined by Dean Koh and others.479 The cases in Part IV show additional
parallels between the two developments, revealing similar pressures to
reevaluate procedural law and the conception of the judicial function. In a
seminal article reflecting on the domestic public law litigation in the 1960s
and 1970s, Abram Chayes revealed an important change in the role of U.S.
courts.4s° Judges who had been schooled in a standard two-party, private law
model of litigation were being asked to adjudicate cases with a complex
478. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REv. 1685 (1976).
479. See, e.g., Deena R. Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of International
Human Rights Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 505 (2003); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law
Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991).
480. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976).
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configuration of parties and interested non-parties. These new disputes pushed
courts to assume a new societal role, one that exposed weaknesses in such key
procedural matters as standing, group actions, and remedies. 481 Courts
responded in different ways. Some tried to tackle public law litigation while
working within the existing procedural framework. Other courts and
commentators concluded that existing tools were inadequate, that innovation
was preferable to trying to do too much with too little.
482
Domestic courts in the United States and elsewhere face a similar
predicament today. First Generation Human Rights Treaties generated high
expectations.483 A catalogue of rights took treaty form, similar in scope and.
substance to rights enumerated in domestic constitutions and statutes. The
rights-codification process in turn generated a demand for rights-enforcing
institutions on the international plane comparable to the domestic institutions
in constitutional democracies. Today, facing that same demand, some
domestic court systems have taken up the challenge. These courts have
adopted, in part or in whole, the following approaches designed to enable
domestic litigation of a core group of grave international human rights
violations: (1) asserting jurisdiction over disputes with little connection to the
forum; (2) refusing to dismiss such suits on forum non conveniens grounds,
despite procedural difficulties in litigating cases so far from the places where
the atrocities occurred; (3) eliminating or liberally tolling statutes of
limitations; (4) improvising with respect to choice-of-law rules; (5) applying
rules of evidence less uniformly and consistently than in non-human rights
cases; and (6) more readily recognizing transnational human rights judgments
than other kinds of foreign judgments.
These procedural innovations were not introduced systematically, in one
identifiable moment of procedural revolution. They evolved over the course of
decades in which victims of atrocity could not find vindication anywhere. For
the most part, innovation has occurred on an ad hoc basis; it has been born of
necessity 484 and, like many other responses to necessity, the fit is less than
perfect. In attempting to adjudicate claims arising out of severe and systematic
human rights abuses, domestic courts are trying to fill an enforcement gap, a
task for which they were not designed. In the process, they are being pulled in
opposite directions. Global business demands that reforms in procedural law
come through multilateral processes. In contrast, the enforcement goals of the
human rights movement seem to require unilateral action, at least in the short-
to-medium term. Faced with just a skeletal system of international tribunals
and the inability or unwillingness of many domestic court systems to police
481. For example, theories of notice and jurisdiction designed for simple two-party law suits
were not easily applied in complex class actions. See Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation
and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26-45 (1982). As for remedies, the new cases presented
demands for new and broad forms of injunctive relief. Id. at 45-56.
482. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and
Limitations on Federal Judicial Power-A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1292 (2000)
(questioning Chayes's celebration of the "triumph of equity" over procedure in public law litigation).
483. See supra Part H.B.
484. See Peruvian Genocide Case, STS, Cr. Div., Feb. 25, 2003 (No. 712/2003) (Spain),
translated in 42 I.L.M. 1200, 1205 (2003) ("[Olne can speak about a principle of necessity of
jurisdiction, which is derived from the very nature and from the finality of universal jurisdiction.").
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systemic human rights abuses, the movement urges domestic courts in
constitutional democracies to put equity ahead of restraint. It entreats national
courts and legislatures, acting unilaterally, to come to the rescue of the global
human rights system and its credibility. As the Hague Conference, the EU,
and others pursue private law harmonization, the human rights community has
cause to be wary. Harmonization efforts are dominated by constituencies that
either oppose or show little interest in improving human rights remedies
through actions in domestic courts. Conversely, to date the human rights
community has offered little outward reflection on whether an aggressive
agenda focused on domestic courts may harm the very institutions to which
these advocates have turned.
Any attempt to lessen the underlying friction must first confront some
basic, though difficult, questions.485 First, are courts suited to evaluating
claims that originate from complex political conflicts such as violence
stemming from oppressive regimes, failed states, or armed conflict? Second, if
courts are at least minimally suited to such a task, what sorts of courts should
undertake it-international tribunals, domestic courts, or some combination of
or variation on the two? Third, if there is to be a continuing role for domestic
courts, how can they function effectively while, at the same time, not
poisoning their relations with courts elsewhere through overreaching and by
failing to view the interests of other legal systems in a spirit of comity?
A. Enforcing Human Rights Law: Why Abandoning a Judicial Role Is Not
Viable
The age-old criticism of international law is that it is not really law.
Some niches like international trade might be on their way to becoming hard
law, but the areas that touch upon core aspects of sovereignty, such as whether
a state goes to war and how it treats its own citizens, are at best soft law
riddled with compliance problems. In the absence of international institutions
that wield clear coercive authority, the argument goes, human rights
instruments will remain merely aspirational.
The response most often heard is that given nearly four decades ago by
Professor Louis Henkin: "Almost all nations observe almost all principles of
international law ... almost all of the time. ' 486 Stated differently, no domestic
legal system achieves total compliance either. People are murdered in Los
Angeles nearly every day. New Yorkers act as though jaywalking were their
485. It might be suggested that neither movement needs to take steps to avoid or lessen this
growing friction. One or both may prefer to let the conflict play itself out in the global economic,
political, and intellectual marketplace. That conclusion is shortsighted. What the unification movement
and the human rights movement have long shared is a common opposition to responses to globalism
grounded in chauvinism and inward-looking parochialism. Both movements have been relentless
proponents of a more cosmopolitan perspective. A future in which human rights organizations and
private international law organizations are perpetually at odds with one another is one in which their
common roots in liberal internationalism will be damaged. Partisans in one camp may be tempted to
discredit the other camp-either for a myopic preoccupation with procedural justice or for a myopic
fixation on results over means. If the camps so divide, those most likely to "prevail" will be their
common foe: those who disparage multilateralism across the board.
486. Louis HENKN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979).
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birthright. Yet few people conclude that California lacks laws on murder or
that New York's laws do not address traffic flow.
Every international lawyer carries these responses in her briefcase. They
are clever because they question a certitude that is rarely challenged-the
character of domestic law as law, even when its limited efficacy is exposed.
Set against this backdrop, it is more difficult to see the relationship between
domestic law and international law as a dichotomy. The difference in
compliance levels more plausibly seems to be a difference in degree rather
than in kind.48 7 But, cleverness aside, there is still a problem, at least where
the international law at issue is core human rights norms. Even if all nations
obeyed almost all human rights law almost all of the time,488 noncompliance
would still be a reason for worry. Noncompliance with traffic laws is not a
trivial matter. It is a source of many deaths and injuries, probably more than
result from terrorism or torture, at least in the United States. But the
prevalence of traffic violations, even over a prolonged period of time, does not
cause a society or the international community as a whole to come unglued. A
country's connection to the rule of law rarely turns on speeding. The case is
different where noncompliance relates to core human rights: systematic racial
profiling, mass deportations based on religion and national origin, calculated
race- or ethnicity-based challenges to voting qualifications, intentional abuse
of U.S.-held prisoners of war.489 Such instances of noncompliance, whether
frequent or not, have recently had highly corrosive effects on the stature of
law in the United States. Similarly, the prolonged, flagrantly brutal televised
siege of Sarajevo caused many around the world to doubt the existence of
humanitarian law and to question whether powerful nations were ever
prepared to defend victims when neither oil nor strategic advantage were
present.4 9 °
From a compliance point of view, what is most distinctive about human
rights law is that it requires extraordinarily high compliance'levels. Human
rights norms are so fundamental-so much a baseline barometer-compliance
487. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?,
74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1998).
488. For the current debate on just how far nations are from that level of compliance, compare
Hathaway, supra note 204, at 1939, with Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of
Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171 (2003) (disagreeing with Hathaway on extent of
noncompliance and approach to measuring it).
489. The recent scandals over the torture and sexual abuse of prisoners of war in facilities that
were under the control of the U.S. military in Iraq has put in doubt what many people had taken for
granted after Vietnam--careful training of all U.S. personnel in adherence to the Geneva Conventions,
supra note 205. See Editorials Raise Heat on Iraq Prison Abuse Scandal, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, May 6,
2004, http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/news/article-display.jsp?vnu-content-id=1000505870
(surveying editorials that had been published across the United States). The sense of disillusionment was
then heightened when it was revealed that the violations had taken place in a context in which the
highest-ranking lawyers in the Bush administration had put forward narrow, highly legalistic
interpretations of both the Geneva Conventions and the Torture Convention, supra note 320. See, e.g.,
Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel, United States Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzalez,
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted at
http://antiwar.com/rep2/dojinterrogationmemo20020801 .pdf.
490. See MIsHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF YuGosLAVIA: THE THIRD BALKAN WAR 201-92 (3d rev.
ed. 1996).
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levels comparable to those expected of domestic laws are not enough. 491 No
one expects the number of murders in New York City to drop to zero. No one
really even expects a conviction for every murder. Neither shortfall from
perfection, however, causes a large segment of the public to conclude that
New York's murder laws are merely "aspirational," a characterization
frequently leveled at war crimes laws. With human rights law and
international criminal law, failure to obtain higher compliance levels
worldwide may ultimately unravel much of the consensus that was achieved
in First Generation Treaties.
When the human rights movement turned to domestic courts to improve
the level of accountability and compliance, there was an implicit assumption
that such courts would be effective and that the availability of these additional
fora would make a difference. As a preliminary matter, any judgment as to
how to resolve a growing conflict in procedural law between domestic courts
acting as international human rights courts and as agents of harmonization and
comity ought to take into account whether domestic courts are effective in
their relatively new role of adjudicating transnational human rights cases. Are
the legal and factual issues generated by large-scale atrocities fundamentally
unsuited to adjudication?
Despite the importance of the question, it is one for which we have little
data on the aspects that would seem to matter most. For example, atrocity
trials can become a substitute for active engagement to prevent massive
human rights abuses in the first place, revealing a lack of will in the
international community to address deep-seated historic grievances before
they ripen into atrocities, or to intervene to stop atrocities once they have
started. Post hoc actions in the legal sphere may serve principally as a cover
for the failures of great powers to do more ex ante. Although there is some
indication that this motive played a role in connection with the creation of the
ICTY and ICTR,492 we lack enough information and analysis to determine
whether this will often be the case.4 93 If we could determine with any certainty
that the option of conducting atrocity trials played a systematic role in
491. In the past few years, international law scholars have returned to the compliance question
with fresh insights. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS
IN NTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995); Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights
Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 121 (2001); Goodman & Jinks, supra note 488; Benedict
Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law,
19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345 (1998); Koh, supra note 487; Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, Introduction:
The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices, in THE POWER OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999).
492. See, e.g., SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE 264-74, 329-89 (2002) (discussing U.S. and European inaction with respect to Bosnia and
Rwanda).
493. For a nuanced defense of humanitarian intervention under the current text of the U.N.
Charter, see Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and Change in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 204, 216 (J.L. Holzgrefe &
Robert 0. Keohane eds., 2003) [hereinafter HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION] (concluding that "[a]s in
domestic cases of 'extreme necessity,' it appears that evidence, facts, and process trump absolute legal
principles, at least within a narrow, but significant, margin of flexibility"); Michael Ignatieff, State
Failure and Nation Building, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra, at 299-311.
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preventing atrocities from occurring in the first place, one would have to
question whether courts should be involved at all.
There are other judicial weaknesses to consider. Trials tend to
individualize guilt,494 a phenomenon lauded by those concerned with a speedy
process of reconciliation but not entirely desirable where complicity has
widely and deeply penetrated a society.49 Moreover, it is by no means clear
that putting yesterday's tyrants on trial plays any discernible role in deterring
496future atrocities.
Although these concerns give pause, those who argue that the human
rights movement's turn to courts was misguided are mistaken.49 7 The atrocity
trials conducted thus far have done much good. Opinions issued by both the
ICTR and ICTY have been helpful in developing the substantive law of
human rights now codified in the Rome Statute of the ICC. The trial arising
out of the bombing of PanAm Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, and the
subsequent financial settlement provided a credible pathway for the United
States and the United Kingdom to normalize relations with Libya.498
Because much that is productive has come out of human rights
adjudication to date, because the phenomenon is still fairly recent, and
because there is not much that suggests it is harmful, we should go forward
with a series of rebuttable presumptions: that victims of fundamental human
rights treaty violations should not be beyond effective judicial protection; that
alleged perpetrators should not enjoy impunity; that courts, as institutions best
designed to provide fair process and decision-making insulated from political
pressure, are appropriate for dealing with guilt, punishment, liability, and
compensation.
As we go forward with a willingness to test these presumptions and
acquire the experience and data to answer our queries, we should realize that
494. See, e.g., Rum G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 34-37 (1999).
495. Collective guilt may be warranted when atrocities could not have been carried out without
legions of underlings and the tacit acquiescence of an entire society. See DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN,
HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996). For thoughtful
discussion of this question, see COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: FIVE DECADES OF DEBATE IN
THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ETHICS (Larry May & Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991); KARL JASPERS, THE
QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT (1947); George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures, Liberals and Romantics
at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, Ill YALE L.J. 1499 (2002).
496. This deterrence rationale is reiterated with the creation of each new international criminal
tribunal. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 201, pmbl. ("Determined to put an end to
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes..
."). Notwithstanding these assertions, we have essentially no empirical evidence that figures such as
Augusto Pinochet, Slobodan Milosevic, or Sadaam Hussein would have been deterred by the prospect of
foreign or international judicial proceedings at some time in the future. Nor do we know much about the
effect of such trials on people under their command.
497. See, e.g., JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS (1989); Goldsmith & Krasner, supra
note 314.
498. See generally The Lockerbie Trial (Robert Black & Ian Ferguson eds.), at
http://www.thelockerbietrial.com (last visited Dec. 12, 2004) (a collection of indictments, trial
transcripts, judgments, appeals, and other useful materials).
499. Winston Churchill initially proposed summary execution of Nazi leaders. See JOSEPH E.
PERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL 7-8 (1994). So did Roosevelt's Treasury Secretary, Hans
Morgenthau. See WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL: THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR
CRIMINALS AT THE END OF WORLD WAR H AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY, 1945-1946, at 7-8 (1954).
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atrocity trials likely will be with us for the foreseeable future. 500 Whether or
not such trials deter future atrocities, whether or not they promote
reconciliation, and whether or not they truly benefit victims, they are a low-
cost response to tragedy.5 1 If the number of deaths in Darfur, Sudan, were to
reach the hundreds of thousands,50 2 the international community would likely
be shamed into doing more than it currently is doing, and its response might
well include some kind of judicial process, as in past responses to wholesale
atrocity. Given that likelihood, the pressing question is: What form should any
such judicial solution take? Is this a job for ordinary domestic courts or for
newly created, specialized international tribunals?
B. International Courts or Domestic Courts?
National judges are in a bind. As they look out at the world beyond the
courthouse, they see two inconsistent trends headed their way. On the one
hand are the many treaties and other instruments produced by the unification
movement. As the executive and legislative branches produce a broader range
of treaties designed to harmonize both procedural and substantive law, the
message to national courts is that globalization requires that they cooperate
with courts elsewhere; that they avoid interpretations of these instruments at
odds with those of courts in other countries; and that they avoid unilateral
actions that tread upon the turf of foreign courts, whose help may be needed at
another time. On the other hand are a set of far-reaching developments in the
field of human rights. Cases, treaties, U.N. studies, specialized tribunals, and
scholarship have generated an explosion of work that points out that the
existing mechanisms for accountability and compensation in the field are
terribly inadequate. The odds that acts of torture will come before an
international tribunal are low. As a result, domestic courts are being asked to
be the primary judicial bodies charged with bringing accountability to this
area. In many instances, however, established principles of procedural law do
not easily permit domestic courts to do the job.
Obvious problems arise when national courts seek to perform two
inconsistent functions. Often they perform neither one well. How can such a
result be avoided? One plausible solution is to free national courts of one set
of demands, either the demands of pursuing legal harmonization or the
demands of acting as primary enforcers of international human rights law. The
500. That political reality rests on some blunt facts. Violations of the most basic rights to life,
bodily safety, and nondiscrimination continue to be severe and frequent in nearly every comer of the
world. Twenty years after the entry into force of the Torture Convention, supra note 320, torture is
widely employed by police, militaries, and rebel groups in many places. More than fifty years after the
introduction of the Geneva Conventions, supra note 205, nearly every military conflict brings appalling
war crimes. One hundred years after the banning of slavery and the slave trade, humanity still witnesses
millions of people sold into conditions of enslavement. See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FACT SHEET No. 14, CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF SLAVERY (1991), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fsl4.htm.
501. That is, they are low-cost as compared to alternatives. The cost of the ad hoc tribunals is a
fraction of the cost to date of the U.S. interventions in Iraq or Afghanistan. For the fiscal year 2004-
2005, the United Nations allocated $271,854,600 to the ICTY, http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htn,
and $251,388,400 to the ICTR, www.ictr.org/default.htm.
502. See S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (2004) (warning of the
possibility of such an outcome).
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30:211
latter is more likely to be removed from municipal legal systems. Domestic
courts lie at the center of the harmonization movement, at least as it pertains
to procedural law. Efforts at substantive harmonization could possibly seek to
achieve harmonization of contract law, for instance, by moving all contract
disputes to highly unique and specialized fora. Harmonization of procedural
law, however, is quite different. It is more process-oriented than result-
oriented, as it seeks to foster a smoother set of relationships among national
court systems. An attempt to move the process of procedural harmonization
from domestic courts to some other kinds of tribunals-international courts,
for instance-would be somewhat illogical.
By contrast, the goals of the human rights movement today are driven by
substantive results-greater accountability and better access to remedies. Its
turn to domestic courts was instrumental, a means of securing more credible
judicial protection for basic rights. Could similar or even better results be
achieved by looking elsewhere and reversing developments over the last few
decades that have put domestic courts at the front lines of efforts to punish and
deter massive rights deprivations? Can the growing conflict discussed above
be managed by channeling most, if not all, atrocity claims to international or
regional tribunals? Should cases such as Filartiga503 no longer be heard in
U.S. courts? Should claimants seeking reparations from corporations for
alleged misdeeds in South Africa be directed to new supranational tribunals
specifically created for that purpose?504 Stated differently, can we simply wall
off civil claims arising from extreme rights deprivations? Should our strategy
be to prevent such atypical claims from distorting the procedural law that
works relatively well for the vast majority of other civil actions?
This approach has a certain appeal. In fact, legal developments over the
past decade are somewhat consistent with it. In the decade since the Bassiouni
Report on the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia,505 the United Nations has
created five geographically specific atrocity courts-two international
criminal tribunals (the ICTR and the ICTY) and three hybrid courts (the
special courts for Cambodia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone)-with the hybrid
courts blending certain characteristics of both domestic courts and
international tribunals. All of these tribunals are highly specialized. They
adjudicate only the most serious human rights offenses. These are criminal
courts that nonetheless operate under statutes enabling victims to seek
compensation in conjunction with criminal cases. They were created with the
intent of removing a set of especially complicated and sensitive controversies
from the domestic courts that otherwise would have jurisdiction over them.
503. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
504. See In re South African Apartheid Litig., 2004 WL 2722204 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (dismissing
ATCA claims and finding that no state action flows from multinational corporations having engaged in
business with South African regime during apartheid era).
505. FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED
PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780, U.N. Doe. 2/1999/679 (1992) (reporting widescale
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Western Balkans in the period from 1992
to 1994). The report was prepared under the supervision of Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni and played a
critical role in causing the U.N. Security Council to create the ICTY.
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These tribunals are expected to acquire expertise with respect to specific
countries, bodies of law, and factual contexts.
Supranational tribunals enjoy procedural advantages over domestic
courts. In these fora, the tension between harmonization and innovation is less
acute. The procedural rules of the ICC were written with genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity in mind.50 7 Rules 34 and 96 of the ICTR
Rules of Procedure and Evidence address witness protection in greater detail
than most national statutes do. They do so in a distinct context-providing
protection to those who have witnessed horrific offenses-and thus need not
wrestle with difficult legal issues over a broad range of criminal and civil
matters, where the strength of the case for anonymous testimony varies
greatly.
The potential advantages of these supranational tribunals extend beyond
the procedural sphere. They offer expertise and continuity. 508 They present a
plausible claim to being representative of the international community as a
whole 50 9 and free of the potential biases that make the judgments of even
widely respected national courts suspect. 510 They offer a response to those
506. The ICC functions on a different plane. The Rome Statute incorporates the principle of
complementarity. Domestic courts have the primary role in adjudicating the crimes that come within the
Statute's scope unless they are unable or unwilling to do so. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 201,
art. 17 (articulating the general rule that the ICC shall determine a case to be inadmissible when it is
being investigated or prosecuted by a state with jurisdiction over it).
507. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (2001).
508. A tribunal such as the ICTR adjudicates such claims continually, not episodically. In the
course of hearing many cases, the ICTR has developed not only an intimate knowledge of the applicable
law but also a factual understanding of the Rwandan massacres more thorough and nuanced than that
attained by national courts in Belgium, France, the United States, and elsewhere.
509. This representativeness typically results from the process by which the tribunal is created,
whether by the United Nations (the ICTR and the ICTY) or by a widely ratified multilateral treaty (the
ICC). See, e.g., Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 201, art. 36 (prescribing that states party may
nominate no more than one candidate for election to the Court, and "[n]o two judges shall be nationals
of the same State"). Permanent regional tribunals share in these virtues, though their jurisprudence tends
to reflect the legal traditions of a geographic region rather than those of the world community.
510. In a recent article, Professor Vagts argues that the best venue for terrorism trials is civilian
courts because "judges of the U.S. federal system enjoy a reputation at home and abroad for
independence and impartiality" making conviction in such courts "convincing to all fair minded
observers." Detlev F. Vagts, Which Courts Should Try Persons Accused of Terrorism?, 14 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 313, 316 (2003). Doubts may be raised not so much as to whether trials would be conducted with
independence and impartiality-though even the most scrupulous judge lives and works within a
specific social and political context-but as to whether they would be widely perceived that way abroad.
There is ample anecdotal evidence that the stature of U.S. courts, viewed from abroad, has declined in
recent years, in part because of their reluctance to cooperate with international tribunals, their
involvement in administering the death penalty, and the theatrics of a system that relies on juries and
incorporates nearly unsupervised punitive damages. A vivid example of the weaknesses of civil justice
in the United States came in O 'Keefe v. Loewen Group, No. 91-67-423 (Cir. Ct., Hinds County, Miss.
1991), a commercial dispute in which a jury in Mississippi awarded $400 million in punitive damages
against a Canadian corporation sued by a local plaintiff. At trial the judge repeatedly permitted
plaintiffs counsel to make prejudicial references to the defendant's race and nationality. Under
Mississippi law, the defendant was required to post a bond of $625 million in order to appeal the verdict.
Notwithstanding the extraordinary size of the bond requirement, the Mississippi Supreme Court refused
to reduce it. Rather than appeal, the Canadian defendant tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain relief through
the NAFTA dispute resolution process. Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. United States,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (Nov. 19, 1998), reprinted in 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003) (dismissing all
claims for lack of jurisdiction). The case was widely criticized in Canada and elsewhere. See, e.g., Jane
Bussey, Loewen Files U.S. Suit, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Nov. 26, 1998, at C3. For more general
criticism of the U.S. justice system, see, e.g., Regina Kiener & Raphael Lanz, Amerikanisierung des
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critical of the fact that recent human rights cases have involved courts of a
former colonial power in effect sitting in judgment on a former colony, thus
presenting serious questions of legitimacy. 511 International tribunals are better
constituted to stand apart from those elements that can politicize atrocity
trials. 12
Unlike domestic courts, international and regional tribunals routinely
draw upon multiple legal traditions. Adapting general principles of procedural
law to the unique features of atrocity trials demands drawing upon the many
legal traditions of the countries involved and great flexibility to compromise
and hybridize. The task calls for balancing the virtues of juries against those
of bench trials as well as the clarity of separate civil and criminal proceedings
against the efficiency of combining the two. In trying to find the right balance
on such questions, national courts may suffer from limited room for
innovation and compromise. Although many procedural problems of
conducting atrocity trials in the United States stem from jury fact-finding,
51 3
jury trials are mandated by the U.S. Constitution.5 14 Resistance is widespread
to recognizing and enforcing civil judgments that appear to be punitive in
character, thus posing major obstacles for victims, even those already awarded
a judgment in another legal system. In contrast, the rules of international
tribunals leave more room for judicial pragmatism. 5 15 They are the product of
multinational negotiations in which there are fewer absolutes than in national
schweizerischen Rechts-und ihre Grenzen, 119 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT, NEUE
FASSUNG 155 (2000); Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of American Law in Europe, 39 AM. J. COMP.
L. 229 (1991).
511. These questions of legitimacy are particularly problematic when there has never been a
full moral or legal accounting between the former colony and the former colonial power. Examples of
recent cases set against the backdrop of a prior colonial relationship are: Pinochet, supra note 309 (Chile
and Spain); Congo v. Belgium, supra note 311 (Congo and Belgium); In re Estate of Ferdinand E.
Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992) (the Philippines and the United States);
the Spanish trial of Argentine military officers, summarized in Richard J. Wilson, Argentine Military
Officers Face Trial in Spanish Courts, ASIL INSIGHTS, Dec. 2003,
http://www.asil.org/insights/insighl22.htm (Argentina and Spain); and In re Bouterse, Hof, Amsterdam,
Nov. 20, 2000, Nos. R 97/163/12 Sv & R 97/176/12 Sv (Indonesia and The Netherlands). The existence
of the prior colonial relationship does not per se delegitimize the proceedings, but it does point to
sources of bias that are more likely to be present in national court proceedings than in those before an
international tribunal. See Henry J. Steiner, supra note 312, at 235; Thomas W. Donovan, Jurisdictional
Relationships Between Nations and Their Former Colonies, I ACROSS BORDERS INT'L L. J. 5 (2003),
http://www.across-borders.com/Articles/Donovan/.
512. In the Pinochet proceedings, for example, the Audencia Nacional came under considerable
pressure from the political branches of the Spanish government to abandon the case. See Wilson, supra
note 328, at 23-32. Thus far, nothing comparable has happened at the ICTR or the ICTY, at least with
respect to individual cases. In fact, the lengths to which these courts go with respect to procedural
fairness have brought complaints that the proceedings are too lengthy (especially the Milosevic trial) and
that the offices of the Prosecutor should focus on bringing the tribunals' work to completion.
513. The right of criminal defendants in the United States to confront witnesses is
constitutional in stature. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This constitutional guarantee implicates not only face-
to-face confrontation with witnesses who take the stand, but also the bar on hearsay, which can result in
the exclusion of much evidence in jury trials. Allowing sensitive military or national security
information to be made public is also of particular concern if the fact-finder is ajury rather than ajudge.
514. The Seventh Amendment provides that "in Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... U.S. CONST.
amend. VII. For present purposes, among the most important exceptions to the right to jury trial in civil
cases are suits against foreign states. See FSIA, supra note 166, § 1330.
515. See generally THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
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legal sytems. 516 Thus, in negotiating the rules of procedure and evidence of
the ICC, the United States did not insist on Juries. Civil law countries did not
object to provisions for cross examination. 517 The creation of an international
tribunal fostered a useful hybridization of procedural law that is more difficult
to create in national legal systems.
518
All of these considerations offer strong reasons to favor international
and regional tribunals over domestic ones. But a system with the latter
structure would also have disadvantages. A system that keeps atrocity cases
entirely out of domestic courts is also likely to be one in which core principles
of human rights law remain far from the populations that need to absorb them.
A system in which the trials of both the major perpetrators and the underlings
take place far off in The Hague or some other distant forum is one in which
the critically important principles underlying such trials are unlikely to come
within the grasp of local communities, where they may be needed in order for
a culture of human rights to take root from the bottom up.
519
In terms of the best long-term solution for mitigating conflicts between
harmonized procedural rules and emerging processes for generating new
procedural rules tailored to the needs of the human rights movement, these
pros and cons make the case for separation a close call. On balance, in the age
of the Internet and the global village, directing atrocity cases away from
domestic courts and toward new international tribunals may succeed. In the
short term, however, this option is not viable. In order to compensate for the
complete lack of available domestic courts, the creation of a startling number
of new international or regional tribunals would be necessary. There is
520virtually no chance of this happening anytime soon. In terms of expense
and the scope of institution-building, a development of that magnitude is not
possible in the current political environment. Far more modest endeavors-the
negotiation of the Rome Statute of the ICC and the creation of the WTO
Appellate Body-came about only after many false starts and painful
compromises that limit their effectiveness. 521 The creation of not just one new
516. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004) (emphasizing strong differences
between criminal procedure in the United States and in civil law countries).
517. See COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE (Otto Truffterer ed., 1999).
518. Compare this development with the hybridization that takes place in international
arbitration. See supra Part lI.B.2.
519. Moreover, where the line between grave human rights offenses and other claims is not so
clear, there will be difficult issues related to severing claims or aspects of a case, so that one part goes to
the international tribunal while the rest remains in a domestic court. Aspects of the Holocaust restitution
litigation in U.S. courts illustrate this problem. Some of the suits arose from forced labor and
enslavement, surely a grave human rights offense. The principal claim, however, was for restitution of
the value of labor that had been misappropriated fifty years earlier. Such a claim is at least similar to
other unjust enrichment claims adjudicated by domestic courts. For an overview of the Holocaust
litigation, see supra Part I.
520. See Steiner, supra note 312, at 208 (arguing that "at least for the while" domestic courts
will remain the primary institutions for application of developing international criminal norms).
521. The three most populous countries--China, India, and the United States-declined to
ratify the Rome Statute, even after extensive modifications were made to earlier drafts at the insistence
of the U.S. delegation. These modifications moved the new court away from an early model premised on
universal jurisdiction. Under the final statute, the ICC is able to hear only actions against natural
persons; it affords very limited opportunity for involvement by victims and non-parties; its ability to
adjudicate is secondary to that of domestic courts; its jurisdiction is limited to genocide, crimes against
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court but of a well-developed system of tribunals with the resources and
mandate to adjudicate large numbers of atrocity-related cases would be a far
bigger step toward a real global culture of accountability. 522 There are no
signs that such a bold step is near.
C. Toward Common Principles of Procedural Law for Human Rights
Claims
If domestic courts will continue to play some role in this field for the
foreseeable future, how can they do so without acting in ways that frustrate
the fulfillment of their duties under the growing number of initiatives in
private law harmonization?
Perhaps the immediate solution to the conflict confronting domestic
courts does not lie in separation and a search for alternative fora. If it is not
immediately feasible to create a network of ICC-type tribunals, it is feasible to
have all ICC-type cases adjudicated under the same procedural law. The heart
of the conflict is not that domestic courts are incapable of adjudicating both
human rights cases and commercial cases. The problem is that their existing
procedural rules do little to differentiate between the two, a state of affairs that
produces two kinds of pathologies. First, domestic courts or legislatures that
adjust their existing procedural rules to the exigencies of human rights
enforcement typically do so unilaterally. For example, in crafting an exception
to mainstream choice-of-law rules for the German slave labor case discussed
in Part I,523 a court might fail to pay attention to how courts and legislatures
elsewhere confront similar challenges. Second, such adjustments typically are
done on an ad hoe basis rather than systematically. Not only does a U.S. court
adjudicating a decades-old slave labor claim feel little inclination to study
foreign choice-of-law principles, but its efforts are likely to be limited to
solving just one small piece of the harmonization-versus-human rights puzzle.
Neither that court nor Congress will take on the larger problem. One is left
524with a series of unilateral, ad hoc adjustments.
Long-term reliance on equity and ad hoc balancing in enforcing human
rights has its costs. Repeatedly departing from well-paved paths of legal rules
for the sake of equity may put the legitimacy of courts at risk by virtue of the
seemingly unpredictable nature of legal developments. The proceedings
against Augusto Pinochet in the United Kingdom, for example, were received
humanity, war crimes, and aggression; and its capacity is quite limited by virtue of it being just one
court with only eighteen judges. See Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 201, art. 5. The ICC will not
be able to adjudicate cases involving aggression until the crime of aggression is defined in accordance
with Article 5.2 of the Statute.
522. See id. art. 36. A well-funded system of courts loosely modeled on the ICC could do what
a single permanent international criminal court cannot do: ensure wide geographic diversity of judges,
hold proceedings close to the place where the atrocities occurred, adjudicate significant numbers of
cases, including those involving relatively small players, and do so with reasonable speed.
523. See supra text accompanying notes 6 & 7.
524. For all the common law's virtues, there are costs to a human rights regime that relies upon
a series of ad hoc adjustments. Such adjustments raise troublesome questions for lawyers and potential
litigants: Will the repeated use of transient jurisdiction in the United States lead to a broader revival of
territoriality as a principle of jurisdiction and choice of law? Does the assertion of universal jurisdiction
over those alleged to have committed torture signal a broader application of this principle on the way,
perhaps to hijacking and various Internet-related offenses?
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that way. Foreign ministries around the world suddenly reevaluated the travel
plans of top officials, fearing their susceptibility to arrest abroad. Similarly,
the e-commerce world received the Yahoo! litigation with immediate
dismay. 525 Multinational corporations involved with mineral extraction
projects in various parts of the world had to reevaluate the profitability of their
operations in light of human rights cases alleging corporate complicity in
government-sponsored human rights abuses. 526 Widespread uncertainty with
respect to basic principles of procedural law is not a small price to pay, even if
it permits courts to come closer to ensuring optimal levels of human rights
compliance.
There is an alternative way to deploy domestic courts as human rights
courts of first instance. Ironically, it also involves harmonization. The
growing conflict described in Parts II through IV results not so much from the
presence of both commercial disputes and litigation over extreme human
rights abuses in the same courts. The greater problem (at least in terms of
private international law) is that courts in different legal orders (or even within
the same one) are coping in inconsistent ways. In expanding access to court,
for example, some have reinvigorated principles of territoriality.52 7 Others
have turned to universal jurisdiction. 528 Still others have enacted numerous
passive personality statutes.529 The result can be labeled experimentation or
anarchy, depending on one's point of view.
A better approach would be to develop a set of common principles
applicable to adjudicating grave human rights offenses, no matter where the
claims are brought. Such an effort would narrow the range of national
procedural practices in this area. It would thus limit uncertainty. A widely and
internationally endorsed set of such principles might dissuade a domestic
judge struggling with a difficult problem from turning first to familiar, though
inapposite, domestic sources of law in an effort to adapt them to the new
context. Instead, that judge might look to multilateral principles.
Harmonization projects somewhat like this one, though on a much
smaller scale, have been suggested. A decade ago, Ralph Steinhardt argued
that the U.S. legal system was suffering from great uncertainty and a lack of
rigor in its handling of remedies in ATCA cases. 530 His complaint still rings
true today. U.S. judges in ATCA cases look to standard principles applied
with respect to tort remedies, principles that have been borrowed from car
525. See Yahoo!, supra note 328.
526. See, e.g., Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (dismissing
suit for violations of right to health, life, and sustainable development brought against a U.S. mining
company operating in Peru); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000)
(upholding jurisdiction in suit against Dutch and British defendants relating to killings associated with
oil exploration in Nigeria; lower court's forum non conveniens dismissal reversed); Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoran, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (dismissing suit for genocide and environmental degradation
brought against U.S. mining companies operating in Indonesia).
527. See supra Part III.C.2.a.
528. See supra Part III.C.2.c.
529. See supra Part III.C.2.b.
530. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human Rights
Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 65, 93-103 (1995). Unfortunately,
there has been little follow-up to this proposal.
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accident cases, toxic tort cases, libel cases, and so forth.531 None of these areas
of tort law provides an especially apt analogy. Genocide and apartheid
produce rather distinctive kinds of injuries, especially when one considers
harms to communities and effects that visit subsequent generations. 532 More
recently, several blue-ribbon committees have attempted to articulate common
principles governing extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction by national courts
and legislatures with respect to a narrowly defined set of human rights
abuses. 
3 3
Although these efforts address a narrow portion of the problem at
hand,534 they have broken important ground. Domestic courts have been
enlisted in the battle against crimes against humanity and their profound and
multi-generational effects on victims. Although this experiment is still quite
young, problems have begun to surface. What needs to be done from this
point is to take steps to make the adjudication of such causes of action in
national courts less of an ad hoc and unilateral process. Courts and scholars
must survey the various approaches that have been tried to date and begin the
process of finding common ground. Common principles must be distilled.
Such principles must be chosen based on their effectiveness in the field of
human rights and in terms of their compatibility (perhaps at a high level of
abstraction) 535 with the principles being developed by the more general
movement to harmonize procedural law.
This article will not attempt to provide a thorough analysis of such
common principles or even a comprehensive list of what they might be.
Instead, it concludes by providing some brief illustrations of how such
principles might be identified and applied.
I. Compensating Victims
One place to begin is with the principle that victims of grave human
rights offenses should be able to obtain individual compensation for their
injuries. This is already the case in a large number of legal systems. In the
United States, this principle finds expression in the case law applying the
ATCA and in Congressional ratification of the ATCA line of cases by the
enactment of the TVPA in 1991. In civil law countries, the victim
compensation principle is expressed through the partie civile mechanism,
which enables victims to intervene in criminal proceedings initiated by the
state. In regional human rights instruments, the victim compensation principle
531. Id. at 94-97, 102-03 (arguing that an international treaty on the redress of human rights
violations could "fill the void").
532. For further discussion of this point, see Paul R. Dubinsky, Justice for the Collective: The
Limits of the Human Rights Class Action, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1152 (2004) (advancing arguments in favor
of collective remedies in some atrocity cases).
533. See, e.g., INT'L LAW ASS'N, FINAL REPORT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 312;
THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 227.
534. For example, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 227, address solely universal
jurisdiction and solely in the context of criminal law.
535. For example, the principle common to many legal systems that forum shopping should not
be encouraged.
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can be found in the Islamic world,536 the African human rights system,537 the
Inter-American system,538 and the European one.539 In terms of global legal
instruments, the principle is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,54° in the work of the United Nations,541 and in the Rome Statute of the
ICC.542 More specific but widely ratified treaties also incorporate the principle
unambiguously.
543
Variations on implementing the principle should also be taken into
account. For example, ten countries have ratified a Council of Europe treaty
that requires them to provide victims of violent crime with compensation from
the public purse when no other source is available. 544 This provision reflects
the treaty's position that victims have a right not only to the state's protection
but also to a remedy when the state has failed to secure the right. Legislation
enacted in the United States on behalf of victims of the attacks of September
11 th conveys a similar message as to the importance of compensation.
545
More generally, the expectation that all national legal systems with
adjudicative jurisdiction must provide a procedural means by which victims of
atrocities can receive compensation finds support in the widely shared
principle that the violation of a right necessitates the provision of a remedy.
The variety and authoritativeness of this material strongly suggest that at
some level of generality the principle is universal and that national procedural
laws that significantly dilute it (e.g., by denying access to the courts to rape
victims, or by retaining overly broad immunity doctrines that are out of step
with customary international law) must be revised. But, of course, that is only
a beginning. Sources like those cited above, along with customary
international law and actual state practice, must be consulted in order to
determine at what level of generality the principle is widely accepted in the
context of grave human rights violations.
2. Exhaustion of Local Remedies
In many instances, victims of human rights violations will be unable to
obtain a remedy in the place in which they were harmed. Usually, they were
536. See Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, Aug. 5, 1990, art. 19,
http://www.humanrights.edu/documents/regionaldocs/cairodec.htm.
537. See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 451, art. 25.
538. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 at 1,
O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.50, doe. 6 at 27 (1980), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673, 682 (1970) [hereinafter
American Convention on Human Rights].
539. See European Human Rights Convention, supra note 98, art. 13; Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, art. 47, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 8, reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 266 (2001).
540. Universal Declaration, supra note 190, art. 8.
541. See, e.g., Draft Articles of Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in
Report of the International Law Commission of the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp.
No. 10 at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/sessions/53/53sess.htm;
Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/10 (1990).
542. See Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 201, art. 79.
543. See, e.g., Torture Convention, supra note 320, art. 14.
544. European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes, Nov. 24, 1983,
Europ. T.S. No. 116, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm.
545. See Air Transportation and System Stabilization Act of 2001, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2004).
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injured because the regime in power was ineffectual, excluded them from its
protection, or actively persecuted them. Those failures in governmental
protection will usually create serious doubts as to whether the courts in that
country can be reliable guardians of fundamental human rights. But this grim
scenario will not always be the case. Societies can emerge from dark periods
with independent and effective judiciaries able to adjudicate the wrongs of the
past. 546 Complaints relating to the military, the police, or other facets of
society do not necessarily suggest a lack of meaningful access to courts in the
society where the abuses allegedly took place.547
Where any reasonable means exists for victims to pursue compensation
in courts with traditional and uncontroversial bases of jurisdiction, such as
territoriality or nationality, there must be a presumption that they should do
so. This principle of exhaustion of local remedies is widely adopted not only
by the fields of international criminal law and human rights law, but also in
other transnational legal regimes. Regional human rights systems require that
petitioners exhaust all available judicial avenues in their home countries
before appealing to supranational mechanisms.548 In the United States, the
TVPA contains an express requirement to this effect,549 and Spain's highest
court recently concurred in that approach. 550 The ICC's complementarity
principle also can be understood as conforming to the exhaustion requirement;
prosecutions cannot go forward in the ICC unless national courts endowed
with jurisdiction are "unwilling or unable" to try the defendants.55'
Wide adherence to such a principle of exhaustion will minimize
instances in which domestic courts will need to engage in the kind of
jurisdictional overreaching that will undermine their legitimacy, provided that
pursuit of local remedies is not required in the face of futility or of physical or
legal danger to the claimants, a caveat that also enjoys widespread support.
3. Choice of Law: International Law over National Law
Those legal systems that have taken the lead in opening their courts to
atrocity victims have done so through national legislation. By itself, that fact
is certainly not objectionable. The situation becomes problematic when courts
allow national law to supplant the body of international human rights law,
humanitarian law, and criminal law.
546. Several courts in Eastern Europe have done so. See generally TEITEL, supra note 494. Cf.
Lawrence Weschler, A Miracle, a Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers, in 1 TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 491 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
547. Palestinian plaintiffs have won a number of landmark cases against the Israeli government
in Israeli courts. See, e.g., H.C. 5100/94, Public Comm. Against Torture v. Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, 38
(May 26, 1999); Israeli Court Bans Interrogation Abuse of Palestinians, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/meast/9909/06/israel.torture (Sept. 6, 1999).
548. See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 538, art. 46; European
Human Rights Convention, supra note 98, art. 35 (referring to the exhaustion requirement as a
"generally recognized rule of international law").
549. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.2(b) (2004) ("A court shall
decline to hear a claim under this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available
remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.").
550. See STS, May 20, 2003 (No. 712), reprinted in 42 I.L.M. 683 (2003) (holding that
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate lack of access to justice in Guatemala).
551. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 201, art. 17.
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This privileging of national law has occurred in Spain, where legislation
relating to genocide differed materially from the definition of the crime in the
Genocide Convention.552 In the United States, the Ninth Circuit has wrestled
with the question of whether aiding and abetting in the context of extrajudicial
killings should be defined with reference to the case law of the new
international criminal courts or to U.S. federal common law.
553
Both of these examples illustrate a growing problem. Even if the basic
choice-of-law principles applicable in this area should be those of the forum,
courts of the forum should not apply those rules in a manner than subordinates
or ignores established or even emerging principles of international human
rights law. A common principle-the primacy of international law in
international atrocity litigation-ought to govern even in those legal systems
that remain dualist.
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This Article is intended as a beginning. It points to the conflicts
emerging from our efforts to create a more coherent worldwide private law
regime and to strengthen compliance with fundamental and universal human
rights norms. If national courts will continue to be called upon in both
endeavors (and all signs suggest that they will), then further work is needed.
The most promising approach is to establish a set of common principles meant
to harmonize the procedural means by which national courts adjudicate grave
human rights violations.
552. At the time of the Pinochet case, genocide as defined under Spanish law extended not only
to "national, ethnical, racial or religious groups," but political and social groups as well. See Order of the
Criminal Chamber of the Spanish Audencia Nacional Affirming Spain's Jurisdiction (Nov. 5, 1998),
translated in THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note 328, at 95, 101-04.
553. See Doe v. Unocal Corp. 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated by 2003 WL
359787 (9th Cir. 2003) (ATCA suit against a U.S. corporation for aiding and abetting human rights
violations in Myamnar perpetrated by the Myanmar military). As this Article was going to press and on
the eve of en bane oral argument in the Ninth Circuit, Unocal reached a tentative settlement with the
plaintiffs in the case. The terms of the settlement are protected by a confidentiality agreement. See Lisa
Girion, Unocal to Settle Rights Claims, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at Al.
554. The term "dualism" characterizes those legal systems for which developments in
international law do not immediately become part of the internal legal order in the absence of a statute, a
court decision, or some other authoritative domestic act. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 85-86 (4th ed. 2003).

